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The thesis explores the semantics of epistemic justification discourse, a very im-
portant part of overall epistemic discourse. It embarks from a critical examination of 
referentialist theories to arrive at a certain nonreferential, expressivist approach to 
the semantics of epistemic justification discourse. That is, it criticizes the main refer-
entialist theories and then goes on to argue for an expressivist approach on the basis 
of its theoretical capacity to outflank the problems referentialist theories meet. In the 
end, I also identify some problems for a prominent expressivist theory and, as a re-
sponse to these problems, propose a novel norm-expressivist approach that seems to 
evade these problems.
In particular, in Ch.1 I introduce what I call ‘the epistemic justification puzzle’ 
and then in Chs.2-4 criticize naturalistic referential theories: analytic naturalistic re-
ductionism, synthetic naturalistic reductionism and epistemic kinds realism. In Ch.5 
I criticize nonnaturalist  referential  theories:  what I call ‘naïve’ nonnaturalism and 
J.McDowell’s (1994) more sophisticated quietist version of nonnaturalism. Next, in 
Ch.6 I introduce the semantic programme of expressivism and go on to construct a 
simple version of epistemic norm-expressivism (inspired by A.Gibbard (1990)) in 
order to explain how expressivism can easily outflank the identified problems of ref-
erentialist theories. This simple norm-expressivist theory, however, is only used as a 
theoretical ‘toy’ for the mere sake of motivating the possibility of expressivism, as in 
Ch.7 I go on to argue for a more sophisticated version of norm-expressivism: habits-
endorsement expressivism.
In Ch.7 I introduce a prominent expressivist theory of moral and knowledge dis-
courses,  namely,  plan-reliance expressivism (credited to A.Gibbard (2003, 2008)) 
and extend it cover the epistemic justification discourse. I then identify some prob-
lems for plan-reliance expressivism as extended to cover justification discourse and 
in response to these problems propose habits-endorsement expressivism. Habits-en-
dorsement expressivism builds on the intuition that (justified) belief-fixation is ha-
bitual and exploits the theoretical flexibility of the notion of habits in order to over-
come the identified problems of plan-reliance expressivism.
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‘Now, what do you think justification means? ’
                                            Plato, Theaetetus 206c7-8
‘I don’t know yet; we must go wherever the wind of the argument 
carries us.’
                                              Plato, Republic 3, 394d8-9
v
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Part I The Problems of Epistemic Referentialism
Chapter 1 The Epistemic Justification Puzzle
1.1 Unpacking the Puzzle
The aim of this work is to pursue an inquiry into the semantics of one of the key 
parts  of  epistemic  discourse:  epistemic  justification  discourse.  It  is  to  pursue  an 
inquiry  into  what  we  mean when  we  think  and  say  that  a  belief,  a  theory,  an 
explanation etc. is (epistemically) justified. That is, what we mean when we think 
and say things like ‘S justifiedly believes that p’, ‘S’s theory is justified’ and the 
like1.
Unsurprisingly,  as  any  other  philosophically  interesting  notion,  epistemic 
justification gives rise to a puzzle  as soon as we realise  the relevant  background 
assumptions  in  play.  That  is,  it  gives  rise  to  a  number  of  individually  plausible 
premises which are, unfortunately, jointly inconsistent. This is what we may call ‘the 
epistemic justification puzzle’2:
P1 The Property Assumption: All properties are either natural or nonnatural.
P2  The  Referential  Semantics  Assumption:  Justification  assertions  and 
attributions purport to refer to a certain property (natural or nonnatural) of epistemic 
justification.
P3 The Naturalism-Denial Assertion: Justification assertions and attributions do 
not purport to refer to a certain natural property of epistemic justification.
P4 The Nonnaturalism-Denial Assertion: Justification assertions and attributions 
do not purport to refer to a certain nonnatural property of epistemic justification.
 The starting point of the puzzle seems to be the -prima facie innocent- Socratic 
question ‘What is Epistemic Justification?’. Once we pose this question, though, the 
seas  of  argument  raise  high  and  ‘the  epistemic  justification  puzzle’  pops  to  the 
1  In  what follows, I will mostly be concerned with what it  takes for a belief to be epistemically 
justified, though, parallel considerations hold for other objects of epistemic justification like theories, 
explanations and inferences.
2  This might not appear at first sight a ‘puzzle’ to some people either because they might accept all the 
premises of the puzzle (e.g. error theorists, relativists) or because they find some of the premises 
utterly implausible (e.g.  nonnaturalists  the P4).  If  that  is  the case then the reader  should see this 
formulation as a merely crisp way to kick off the argument. Why I am not really worried with error 
theory and relativism that seem able to satisfy all premises of the puzzle is briefly explained in section 
1.4.
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surface. Let me explain. To pose such a Socratic ‘What is Fness?’ question, it is to 
ask for the essential property constitutive of the nature of the notion in question. It is 
to  search  for  a  reduction  of  epistemic  justification  in  terms  of  necessary  and 
sufficient  conditions.  Indeed,  this  is  the  theoretical  approach  of  ‘Naturalistic  
Reductionism’.  Naturalistic  reductionism  endeavours  to  reduce  epistemic 
justification to other non-epistemic, natural properties.
There are two ways to reduce a higher-order, epistemic property to a lower-order, 
non-epistemic natural property: the traditional analytic way and the relatively recent 
synthetic.  Analytic  naturalistic reductionism searches for a reduction of epistemic 
justification by traditional a priori semantic analysis. In the same way we reduce by 
semantic  analysis,  let  us  say,  ‘spinster’  to  ‘old  unmarried  woman’,  ‘bachelor’  to 
‘unmarried adult man’ or ‘vixen’ to ‘female fox’ we should attempt to reduce by 
semantic analysis the notion of epistemic justification (and other normative notions); 
or at least this is what this philosophical programme urges. 
In  contrast  with  reduction  by  traditional  a  priori  semantic  analysis,  recently 
arrived synthetic naturalistic reductionism searches for a reduction in the pattern of 
the Kripke-Putnam a posteriori reduction of natural kinds and other science-theoretic 
terms3.  In  the same  way we take  advantage  of  the empirical  results  of  scientific 
inquiry in order to reduce natural kinds like ‘water’ to ‘H20 molecules’, and science-
theoretic terms like ‘genes’ to ‘DNA molecules’ or ‘temperature’ to ‘mean molecular 
kinetic  energy’,  we  should  attempt  to  reduce  epistemic  justification  (and  other 
normative notions); or at least this is what this philosophical programme urges. 
Unfortunately, however, both analytic and synthetic naturalistic reductionism do 
not seem to be especially promising. On the one hand, as we shall see in Chs.2-3, 
reducing the property of epistemic justification by a priori semantic analysis proves 
to be a Sisyphean task, a task that we endlessly strive to accomplish but we never 
seem to really succeed.  Despite the existence of a plethora of proposed analyses, 
none seems to be in a position to evade counterexamples and establish itself as a 
successful analysis of epistemic justification. For a semantic reason we will make 
explicit in the next Ch.2, the notion of epistemic justification (and other normative 
notions) seem to stubbornly resist successful analysis4. 
3  See S.Kripke (1981) and H.Putnam (1975, 2004).
4  Compare W.Alston (2005:11): ‘the perennial quest [for an analysis of epistemic justification]... is 
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On the other hand, as we shall see in Ch.4, reducing epistemic justification (and 
other normative notions) in the a posteriori pattern of Kripke-Putnam identities does 
not seem to fare any better. Normative properties do not seem to be reducible to such 
a  posteriori  identities.  Indeed,  some would add that  we don’t  even know how to 
begin  for  such an  a  posteriori  reduction  since,  unlike  natural  kinds  and science-
theoretic terms, normative properties do not seem to have anything to do with the 
empirical, natural realm explored by scientific inquiry5. 
Or at least they don’t have anything apparent to do with the natural realm, as we 
don’t find normative properties like justification or goodness in nature in the same 
way  we  find  natural  kinds  like  water  and  salt.  Thus,  the  constant  failure  of 
naturalistic  reductionism  (analytic  or  synthetic)  motivates  the  plausibility  of  the 
intuitive  ‘Naturalism-Denial  Assertion’ (premise  3  of  the  puzzle):  Justification 
assertions and attributions do not purport to refer to a certain  natural  property of 
epistemic justification.
Once naturalistic  reductionism (analytic  or synthetic)  appears unpromising,  the 
way opens for ‘anti-reductionist  approaches’  to epistemic  justification.  There are 
two such antireductionist approaches (broadly construed): (a) ‘Nonnaturalism’ and 
(b)  ‘Expressivism’.  First,  nonnaturalism  suggests  that  the  property  of  epistemic 
justification stubbornly resists reduction to a natural property due to the plain reason 
that there is no such natural property to be found. Granted the truism of ‘the property 
assumption’ (premise 1) stating that all properties are either natural or nonnatural, it 
appears then that epistemic justification is a nonnatural property. 
According  to  nonnaturalism,  when  we  make  justification  assertions  and 
attributions, we purport to refer to the unanalysable, sui generis, nonnatural property 
of  epistemic  justification.  Yet  again,  as  we  shall  see  in  Ch.5,  the  nonnaturalist 
approach seems to meet serious ontological and epistemological problems that make 
its  prospects  of  success  appear  bleak.  Thus,  the  serious  epistemological  and 
ontological  problems  of  nonnaturalism  motivate  the  plausibility  of  the 
‘Nonnaturalism-Denial  assertion’  (premise  4):  Justification  assertions  and 
attributions  do  not  purport  to  refer  to  a  certain  nonnatural  property  of  epistemic 
justification.
quixotic of the same order as the search for the Fountain of Youth’.
5  See, for example, J.Lenman (2003).
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Second,  as  we  shall  see  in  Chs.6-7,  we  have  expressivist  anti-reductionist 
approaches.  Expressivists  -  unlike  naturalistic  reductionist  and  nonnaturalist  anti-
reductionist  approaches-  are  nonreferential  approaches  that  reject  ‘the Referential  
Semantics Assumption’ (premise 2). As a matter of principle, expressivists are hostile 
to a ‘referential semantic strategy’ where the meaning of a sentence is supposed to be 
determined by what the subject-predicate of the sentence purport to refer to6. 
That  is,  if  the  subject  refers  to  an  individual  (e.g.  grass)  that  falls  within  the 
extension of the predicate (e.g. green), then the sentence satisfies its truth-condition 
and it is true (i.e. ‘Grass is green’ is true if and only if Grass is green). If the subject 
refers to an individual (e.g. my dog) that does not fall within the extension of the 
predicate (e.g. green), then the sentence does not satisfy its truth-condition and is 
false (e.g. ‘My dog is not green’ is true if and only if My dog is not green). 
Instead, expressivists appeal to a ‘use semantic strategy’ where the meaning of a 
sentence is supposed to be determined by how the agents use the subject-predicate of 
the  sentence  in  question.  For  example,  ‘Grass  is  green’  means  Grass  is  green, 
because this is how the subject-predicate of the sentence is used to mean, according 
to the semantic and syntactic linguistic conventions that govern English language. 
In this use-theoretic semantic picture, normative reference is set aside, as some 
expressivists debunk reference and truth-conditions completely and appear to slide to 
some form of normative expressivist relativism, while others are not willing to give 
up precious reference and truth-conditions and attempt to derive them from the use of 
normative  sentences7.  Whether  their  attempt  to  rescue  truth  within  such  an 
antirealist-expressivist  framework  is  successful  remains  contentious,  as  any 
theoretical approach to truth seems to be8. 
6  This is the tradition of G.Frege (1997), early L.Wittgenstein (2001) and D.Davidson (1996), among 
others, and the one that is assumed in formal logic and semantics textbooks; see C.Howson (1997) and 
Kearns  (2000).  Formal  logic  and  semantics  just  assume  that  semantics  are  referential  (or 
‘descriptive’). For discussion of Frege’s philosophy of language see D.Wiggins (1999) and C.Travis 
(2008).
7  Expressivists like A.J.Ayer (1946), J.Austin (1962) and A.Gibbard (1990) thought that normative 
discourse is not truth-apt. But more contemporary expressivists like S.Blackburn (1998), M.Timmons 
(1999),  A. Gibbard (2003) and R.Brandom (2000) attempt to rescue truth in such a use-theoretic 
framework.  Blackburn,  Timmons  and  Gibbard  whom  are  ideational  expressivists  appeal  to 
deflationism about truth in order to motivate what they call ‘quasi-realism’, namely,  an antirealist 
framework that aspires to account for all the realist-seemings of normative discourse. Brandom is an 
inferentialist expressivist and follows a different, Sellarsian strategy. He attempts to rescue truth by 
appeal to the social game of ‘giving and asking reasons’ for our normative claims. 
8  For arguments to this effect see J.Knanvig (2007), T.Cuneo (2007) and M.Lynch (2008). Note that 
Kvanvig,  Cuneo and Lynch argue only against  ideational  expressivists.  For  a critic  of Brandom’s 
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Expressivist approaches (broadly construed) split  again into two categories:  (a) 
Inferentialist expressivism and (b) Ideational (or Lockean) Expressivism9. As good 
use semanticists,  inferentialists and ideational expressivists suggest that  the whole 
project of searching for a property of epistemic justification (natural for naturalistic 
reductionism/nonnatural  for  nonnaturalism)  is  misguided  because  it  rests  on  the 
mistaken assumption of referential semantics. 
Contra  the  referentialists  who take  reference to  be  the  master  concept  of  the 
semantics  of  normative  discourse  (moral  and  epistemic),  expressivists  deny  that 
reference can be the master concept for the semantics of normative discourse. Both 
the  inferentialist  and  ideationalist  expressivist  agree  that  when we use normative 
sentences we don’t purport to refer to a certain corresponding normative property. 
Instead,  they  contend  that  use should  be  the  master  concept  of  the  semantics  of 
normative discourse.
But despite the shared hostility to referential semantics and the shared adherence 
to use semantics, inferentialist and ideational expressivism have serious differences 
on core theoretical issues. A key difference is that they interpret differently the claim 
that use is the master concept for a theory of the semantics of normative discourse. 
On  the  one  hand,  inferentialist  expressivists  contend  that  the  use  of  normative 
sentences indicates that  inference should be the master concept of the semantics of 
normative discourse while, on the other hand, ideational expressivists contend that 
the use of normative sentences indicates that expression should be the master concept 
of the semantics of normative discourse.
Yet, in spite of their substantial differences, both inferentialist and ideationalist 
expressivists  concur that  commitment  to  ‘the referential  semantics  assumption’  is 
unwarranted. They argue that expressivist semantics can accept the intuitive premises 
3 and 4 of the puzzle (the naturalism-denial and nonnaturalism-denial assertions) and 
avoid  the  respective  problems  referentialist  approaches  encounter  (Moorean 
unanalyzability  intuitions,  epistemological  and  ontological  problems,  epistemic 
supervenience etc.). 
inferentialism see C.Peacocke (2004).
9  The origins of Ideational Expressivism can, arguably, be traced back to at least J.Locke’s (1973) An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding  and D.Hume’s (1986, 2005)  A Treatise of Human Nature  
and Enquiries. Other notable Lockeans include J.Austin (1962), P.Grice (1989) and A.J.Ayer (1946). 
The origins of inferentialist expressivism are often traced back to the early American pragmatists like 
C.S. Pierce (1991), W.Sellars (1997) and Hegel.
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The rejection of ‘the referential semantics assumption’ comes at a price, though. 
Expressivists reject ‘the referential semantics assumption’ (premise 2 of the puzzle) 
that motivates the projects of naturalistic reductionism and nonnaturalism and this 
seems to have some obnoxious semantic implications. Because of these obnoxious 
semantic  implications,  some  philosophers  think  that  the  rejection  of  referential 
semantics for expressivist semantics comes to an unbearably high price10. 
The reason is that expressivism encounters problems (like ‘the Frege-Geach’ and 
‘truth’  problems)  in  handling  ‘semantic  facts’  like  validity,  consistency,  truth, 
objectivity  and  (dis)agreement  that  any  theory  of  semantics  must  accommodate. 
These problems instigate the belief that expressivism is an unpromising approach to 
the  semantics  of  normative  discourse  and,  hence,  we  should  instead  remain 
committed to referential semantics that can easily accommodate such semantic facts. 
So far, we have seen how the puzzle springs from the initially innocent Socratic 
question ‘What is epistemic justification?’ and what motivates the acceptance or the 
rejection  of  each  one  of  the  premises  2-4  of  the  puzzle.  Last  remains  the  least, 
perhaps, controversial premise: ‘the property assumption’ (premise 1). The property 
assumption states what seems to be simply a truism, namely, that all properties are 
either natural or nonnatural. In other words, the nature of reality can be explained 
either  by  appeal  only  to  natural  properties  or  to  both  natural  and  nonnatural 
properties11. A natural property is an empirical property or, as is sometimes put after 
S.Shoemaker  (2004)  and  D.Lewis  (2004),  a  property  with  independent  causal 
efficacy. As one might imagine, a nonnatural property is a non-empirical property or, 
alternatively  expressed,  a  property  with  no  independent  causal  efficacy12;  some 
people question this assertion but I don’t think they are right (see n.14)13.
10  For  discussion  of  (ideational)  expressivism’s  semantic  problems  see  P.Geach  (1972),  J.Searle 
(1969), W.Sinnot-Armstrong (2007), M.Schroeder (2008). For attempted solutions see S.Blackburn 
(1984, 1993, 1998), A.Gibbard (1990, 2003) and M.Ridge (2006).
11  This can be understood in terms of ‘the problem of universals’ and the perennial debate between 
Platonic realists and nominalists. The nominalist thinks that all existent properties are natural and the 
nature of reality can be adequately explained only by appeal to such natural properties (in various 
ways). The Platonic realist disagrees and claims that there must exist both natural and nonnatural 
properties  because,  in  order  to  adequately explain the nature  of  reality,  we need  to  postulate  the 
existence  of  nonnatural  properties.  For  the  problem of  universal  see  D.M.Armstrong  (1980)  and 
J.P.Moreland (2001).
12  For the natural/nonnatural distinction and the various ways being glossed in literature see M.Ridge 
(2003). For naturalism see M.Timmons (1999) and D.Papineau (2009).
13  Some philosophers like N.Sturgeon (2007) and R.Wedgwood (2007) have argued that normative 
properties have causal powers and therefore normative explanations are causal. Sturgeon, in particular, 
has engaged in dialectical sparring with G.Harman (2007) in a series of papers on this controversy. I 
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Now, let us retrace our steps. Premise 1 seems uncontroversial and premises 2-4 
are individually intuitive but jointly inconsistent and this gives rise to the puzzle. In 
order  to  solve  the  puzzle,  one  of  the  premises  2-4  must  be  dropped  and  then 
surmount  the  serious  difficulties  that  respectively  ensnare  each  one  of  the  three 
routes out of the puzzle14. These three routes out of the puzzle are the following:
• Drop  ‘the  referential  semantics  assumption’  (premise  2),  opt  for  the 
nonreferentialism  of  either  (a)  inferentialist  expressivism  or  (b)  ideational 
expressivism and fight through their respective semantic problems. 
• Drop ‘the naturalism-denial assertion’ (premise 3), opt for nonnaturalism and 
fight through its epistemological and ontological problems. 
• Drop  ‘the  nonnaturalism-denial  premise’  (premise  4),  opt  for  naturalistic 
reductionism  and  fight  through  its  constant  failure  to  accomplish  a  reduction 
(analytic or synthetic) of the notion of epistemic justification.
With the puzzle introduced and the possible routes out of it now in sight, a good 
question  at  this  juncture  is  which  theoretical  project  is  the  most  promising  in 
overcoming its respective problems and solving the puzzle. If we could decide which 
one is  the most  promising,  then obviously this  is  the solution we should pursue. 
Unfortunately, this is a very difficult question to be answered without first pursuing 
the projects themselves and seeing their theoretical virtues and resources in practice. 
As one might say, we want to swim (in the seas of argument) without having our legs 
wet. 
Still, we need to venture an answer if we are to explore a possible route out of the 
puzzle. Granted that the circumstances demand a choice, my choice is to opt for the 
expressivist  route  1  out  of  the  puzzle.  That  is,  drop  ‘the  referential  semantics 
assumption’ (premise 2) and explore a nonreferential solution. In particular, I will go 
for an ideational expressivist solution (1 (b)) to the puzzle and not an inferentialist 
(1(a))  one because I  am more  sympathetic  to  ideational  expressivism rather  than 
inferentialist expressivism. Discussion of inferentialist expressivism won’t show up 
in the limited space of this thesis, and will have to wait for another context. I will 
can’t touch this deep issue here but I don’t see how normative properties can have independent causal 
powers if they are not natural properties. For the same controversy see C.McGinn (1999), A.Gibbard 
(1990, 2003), S.Blackburn (1993, 1998) and R.Shafer-Landau (2003).
14  There are other routes out of the puzzle that I choose to ignore here: Error (or Fictionalist) theories, 
relativist theories etc. I explain the reasons for ignoring these two theoretical possibilities in Section 
1.4.
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simply assume that ideational expressivism is the most promising expressivist variant 
and  henceforth  with  expressivism  mean  ideational  expressivism15.  I  will  reserve 
inferentialism for inferential expressivism.
Also,  in  exploring  expressivism,  I  will  also  assume  that  expressivism  can 
somehow tackle its serious problems with semantic facts. My intention here is not to 
resolve expressivism’s semantic problems and vindicate expressivism as such, but to 
explore  what  could  motivate  an  expressivist  approach  to  epistemic  justification 
discourse and how such an expressivist approach could best go. Thus, discussion of 
these semantics problems won’t substantially appear in the thesis. 
Of course,  if  our assumption proves wrong and expressivism cannot  tackle  its 
semantic problems, then expressivism as an approach to normative semantics should 
put  to  rest.  But  even  if  this  unfortunate  for  this  thesis  result  obtains,  then  our 
exploration  won’t  be  entirely  worthless  as  it  could  stand  as  an  account  of  the 
pragmatics  of  epistemic  justification  discourse.  That  is,  of  the  mental  content 
expressed by speakers in various contexts where they make justification assertions 
and attributions16.
As I said, I find the rejection of standard referential semantics and the adoption of 
expressivist  semantics  the  most  attractive and  challenging way  for  exploring  a 
solution to the puzzle. Hence, this is the solution to the puzzle I will explore in the 
thesis.  If  some  justification  is  needed  why I  find  the  expressivist  solution  to  be 
intuitively  the  most  attractive  and  challenging,  the  answer  is  to  point  to  other 
intuitions  I  have17.  Very  briefly  (and  rather  unfairly  to  the  complexities  these 
intuitions touch), here are three intuitions that incline me to think that expressivism is 
the  most  attractive  possible  solution.  First,  I  intuitively  sympathize  with  a 
methodologically  naturalistic  framework  and  expressivism  comports  nicely  with 
such an ontologically parsimonious framework.
15  For the case in favour of inferentialist expressivism over ideational expressivism, see M.Chrisman 
(2010) whom argues contrary to my assumed theoretical superiority of ideational expressivism over 
inferentialist expressivism.
16  No doubt, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is not an easy to draw, but for present 
purposes I conveniently sidestep this issue. For discussion of the issue see Z.Gendler Szabo (2008).
17  I discuss a bit this methodological issue in my ‘Naturalism and Normativity’ (2008). Also, in the 
thesis I talk a lot of intuitions.  With an ‘intuition’ I mean what many philosophers, after G.Bealer 
(1998:  201-239),  call  ‘an  intellectual  seeming’. It  should  be  made  clear,  though,  that  appeal  to 
intuitions  does  not  commit  one  to  some  form  of  intuitionistic  epistemology.  For  a  nice 
disentanglement of these issues see B.Williams (1993:93-101). 
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Second, I find the expressivist project to be a very fertile, flexible and resourceful 
project  with  some  alluring  theoretical  virtues  (explains  Moorean  unanalyzability 
intuitions, explains epistemic supervenience etc.). Third, I find at least some of the 
discontents of the other approaches to be difficult  to be surmounted (‘ontological 
queerness’  and  ‘epistemological  spookiness’  of  nonnaturalism,  ‘open  question’ 
arguments  etc.).  Finally,  a  justificatory  intuition  for  being  inclined  to  think  of 
expressivism  as  the  most  challenging  possible  solution.  Simply,  it  is  because  it 
questions  the  predominant  ‘referentialist  paradigm’  (in  the  Kuhnian  sense)  and 
swimming  against  the mainstream current  (of  tradition  and arguments)  is  always 
challenging, albeit somewhat risky18.
Of course, these justificatory intuitions cannot be pressed too far because they are 
themselves highly controversial and, therefore, need to be backed up by arguments. 
They need to stand before the tribunal of reason and in the light of arguments be 
adjudicated whether they are justified or not. Quite possibly, the controversies these 
intuitions touch run so deep that they cannot be even directly judged at first sight, but 
need to be judged at the end of the journey from the theoretical fruit they ultimately 
produce. That is, they need to stand as working hypotheses and be judged in view of 
their theoretical implications, adequacy of explanatory power, theoretical virtues like 
simplicity and elegance etc. Besides, these intuitions are just preliminary ‘starting 
point’ intuitions and we know very well that prima facie reasonable intuitions often 
turn to have unpalatable implications or even be straightforwardly mistaken.
But at any rate, even when our intuitions are proven deceptive they are proven to 
be so in virtue of other intuitions. One way or another, as T.Williamson (2004) has 
put it, ‘intuitions are the boat we find ourselves in’. In other words, intuitions are not 
something that can be forced upon our psychology and, as a natural consequence, 
you either find yourself with certain intuitions or you don’t19. Since these starting 
point intuitions are the boat I found myself in, unavoidably, with these I am bound to 
set  sail  through the  roaring  seas  of  argument  ‘the  epistemic  justification  puzzle’ 
raises. I will set sail for the philosophical exploration with these intuitions as my boat 
and  -as Plato’s quote at  the beginning of the thesis says-  let  to be carried away 
wherever the wind of the argument leads.
18  Here I emulate Brandom (2000) who often talks in terms of ‘the referentialist paradigm’.
19  As Max Weber (1982) has said ‘intuition cannot be forced’.
9
The epistemic justification puzzle now introduced, this is what follows in the rest 
of this introductory chapter. In the next section 1.2, I outline the argumentative plan 
of the thesis. I explain in general terms what each chapter contains and also say a few 
things about the habits-endorsement expressivist approach I sketch in the end. Then 
in  section  1.3,  I  briefly  adduce  some  more  motivation  for  exploring  a  form of 
expressivism for epistemic discourse.  The motivation consists  of the fact  that  the 
debates  in  ethics  and  epistemology  seem  to  move  in  parallel.  This  ‘ethics-
epistemology  parallel’,  among  other  considerations,  fuels  the  intuition  that 
expressivism could also be fruitfully applied from moral- where it has predominantly 
been applied- to epistemic discourse.
Afterwards,  in  section  1.4,  I  devote  some  time  for  short  but  important 
clarifications. I briefly clarify my stance in relation to some important issues that ‘the 
epistemic justification puzzle’ directly or indirectly touches. These issues, inter alia, 
concern  the  epistemic  internalism/externalism distinction,  the  pragmatic/epistemic 
justification  distinction,  the  doxastic  voluntarism/nonvoluntarism  distinction  and 
more. Finally, in section 1.5, I summarize the argument of the chapter and prepare 
the ground for the imminent Ch.2. 
 1.2 The Argumentative Plan of the Thesis
In the first section, I introduced the epistemic justification puzzle. I explained how 
the puzzle arises from the seemingly innocent Socratic question ‘What is epistemic 
justification?’ and explained what motivates the acceptance or the rejection of each 
one of the intuitively plausible but jointly inconsistent premises 2-4 of the puzzle. 
Finally, I stated that my approach to the puzzle will be an expressivist one and very 
briefly cited some of the preliminary ‘starting point’  intuitions that  incline me to 
explore the expressivist route out of the puzzle. In this second section, I outline the 
argumentative plan of the thesis, namely, explain what the content of each chapter 
will  roughly  be  and  also  give  some  clue  about  the  contours  of  the  habits–
endorsement expressivist approach to the puzzle I intend to tentatively explore. Let 
us turn to that. 
In terms of general structure, the thesis can be divided into two parts. The first and 
larger part under the label of ‘The Problems of Epistemic Referentialism’ is mostly 
critical in character (Chs.2-5). It criticizes referentialist solutions to the puzzle and 
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prepares the ground for the advent of my favourite habits-endorsement expressivist 
proposal. This mostly critical part is supposed to make explicit the chronic problems 
of the rival referentialist approaches and prepare the ground for the introduction of 
the  expressivist  proposal.  The  second  part  under  the  label  ‘The  Possibility  of  
Epistemic Expressivism’ is constructive (Chs.6-7). 
The first constructive part comes in Ch.6, where I use a simple version of norm-
expressivism as a ‘toy’ expressivist theory in order to exhibit how expressivism can 
avoid the referentialist’s problems and thereby motivate an expressivist approach to 
the puzzle. But this simple norm-expressivist theory is only a theoretical ‘toy’ used 
to motivate expressivist semantics, as in Ch.7 I develop a more sophisticated version 
of norm-expressivism.
 In Ch.7 I sketch the basic contours of an original version of norm-expressivism, 
namely,  ‘habits-endorsement  expressivism’  that  exploits  the  versatile  notion  of 
habits.  Habits-endorsement  expressivism  is  motivated  by  means  of  arguing  that 
Gibbard’s (2003, 2008) later expressivist theory for knowledge discourse, namely, 
plan-reliance expressivism, if extended to cover the epistemic justification discourse, 
runs into difficulties that habits-endorsement expressivism can adequately address.
In  more  detail,  in  Chs.  2-4  I  criticize  naturalistic  reductionism  (analytic  and 
synthetic)  in order to motivate the plausibility of ‘the naturalism-denial  assertion’ 
(premise 3). In Chs.2-3, I criticize analytic naturalistic reductionism. In Ch.2 I make 
explicit  the  theoretical  commitments  of  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism,  clarify 
what conception of epistemic justification we are after, present the conditions that an 
adequate  reduction  of  epistemic  justification  by semantic  analysis  should  satisfy, 
gloss the vexing natural/nonnatural distinction and, finally, introduce what I call ‘the 
Moorean/Humean  lesson’.  That  is,  a  dialectical  lesson drawn from the  epistemic 
versions  of  G.E.Moore’s  ‘open  question  argument’  and  D.Hume’s  ‘is/ought 
argument’ meant to undermine the plausibility of analytic naturalistic reductionism. 
In Ch.3 I step forward to apply ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ against prominent 
attempts to reduce by semantic analysis the property of epistemic justification. These 
reductionist approaches (coherentism, foundationalism, reliabilism etc.) are seriously 
undermined by this application. In Ch.4, I first explain how the so-called ‘epistemic 
twin earth argument’ stands as a modernized ‘Moorean/Humean lesson’, this time 
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undermining sophisticated synthetic naturalistic reductionism. Second, I discuss and 
reject G.Sayre-McCord’s (1997a) interesting proposal of taking normative properties 
as ‘normative kinds’, that is, as properties irreducible to natural kinds, though, what 
the  exact  ontological  status  (natural  or  nonnatural)  of  such  normative  kinds  is 
supposed to remain open. 
In Ch.5, I criticize nonnaturalism in order to motivate this time the endorsement of 
‘the nonnaturalism-denial assertion’ (premise 4) of the puzzle. First, against what I 
call ‘naïve’ nonnaturalism, I exploit its ontological and epistemological difficulties: 
queerness, epistemic access and epistemic supervenience. I argue that it meets the 
‘queerness’ and ‘epistemic access’ objections and, in addition, that it seems to fail to 
satisfy the supervenience desideratum on epistemic discourse. 
As I explain, any account of epistemic justification should satisfy ‘the epistemic 
supervenience desideratum’ and evidently ‘naïve’ nonnaturalism does not seem able 
to  do so.  What  exactly  is  the epistemic supervenience desideratum and why is  a 
desideratum for any theory of epistemic justification is explained there.  Afterwards, 
I  discuss  J.McDowell’s  (1994,  1998)  more  sophisticated  ‘naturalism  of  second 
nature’ that with a quietist twist attempts to disguise nonnaturalism in naturalistic 
cloth and, therefore, evade its ontological and epistemological difficulties20.
The  upshot  of  the  critique  of  referentialist  approaches  (naturalistic  and 
nonnaturalistic) in Chs.2-5 is the motivation of the plausibility of ‘the naturalism-
denial  assertion’  and  ‘the  nonnaturalism-denial  assertion’  and  therefore  -by 
elimination-  the  rejection  of  the  remaining  ‘referential  semantics  assumption’ 
(premise 2) as a possible route out of the inconsistency of the puzzle. This task is 
undertaken, first, in Ch.6 where I motivate the possibility of an expressivist approach 
by means of showing how expressivism can evade the referentialist’s problems. That 
is,  explain  Moorean  ‘open  feel’  intuitions,  explain  epistemic  supervenience  and 
avoid any extra ontological and meta-epistemological burden. To that effect, I use as 
a  ‘toy’  expressivist  theory  a  simple  version  of  norm-expressivism,  albeit  to  be 
substituted by a more sophisticated one in Ch.7. 
Second, in Ch.7 I constructively introduce a more sophisticated version of norm-
expressivist  approach  to  ‘the  epistemic  justification  puzzle’,  namely,  habits-
20  Of course, this is a dialectical intention I attribute to McDowell and not one that he explicitly 
asserts or one that he would be glad, I think, to embrace,
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endorsement expressivism and sketch some of its basic features. I motivate habits-
endorsement expressivism by means of arguing that plan-reliance expressivism (as 
applied to epistemic justification discourse) faces problems, that is, it runs into direct 
counterexamples and also defies ‘the nonvoluntarism intuition’. That is, the intuition 
that (justified) belief-fixation is not directly voluntary.  Then I go on to introduce 
habits-endorsement expressivism as a theory that can tackle these problems. At the 
heart  of the theory lies the notion of epistemic habits,  namely,  habits  of justified 
belief-fixation that with its theoretical versatility and flexibility is meant to help us 
out of the problems.
Here,  three  preliminary points  should be made  clear,  though.  First,  the  whole 
thesis should be seen as an exploration of the concept of epistemic justification and, 
thereby,  ‘the  epistemic  justification  puzzle’  that  emerges  out  of  the  relevant 
background assumptions. As such it explores the concept of epistemic justification 
and the resources and potential of a certain theoretical approach to ‘the epistemic 
justification puzzle’. As an exploration, this is far from claiming to be a conclusive 
solution to the puzzle. Indeed, given the difficulty and complexity of philosophical 
problems  that  makes  them  persist  for  thousands  of  years,  it  would  have  been 
unforgivably naïve to claim anything else21. 
But although I am realistic enough to ascertain that I won’t reach the ‘Ithaca’ of a 
conclusive  solution,  I  do  hope  to  make  an  interesting  exploration  ‘full  of 
discoveries’. I do hope to explore and chart some new interesting ground. In the case 
that the reader does find this ground neither interesting nor new, then I hope that the 
discussion will at least stir him to think of the problem himself. Perhaps, stir him 
enough to embark and explore a different, more promising conceptual route to the 
‘Ithaca’ of a conclusive solution to the puzzle. Besides, if I may metaphilosophize, 
philosophy  is  perhaps  more  about  learning  through  the  dangerous  journey  of 
exploring different conceptual routes to the Ithacas of conclusive solutions than the 
ultimate arrival to the elusive Ithacas of conclusive solutions22. 
Second, I have myself serious worries about an expressivist solution to the puzzle, 
but  I  still  think  that  on  balance this  is  the  most  promising  research  project.  In 
21  Compare Moore (2000): ‘Philosophical questions are so difficult, the problems they raise are so 
complex, that no one can fairly expect, now, any more than in the past, to win more than a very 
limited assent’.
22  See B.Russell (2001) for some discussion of the beneficial effects of philosophy.
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particular, I am deeply sceptical about the semantic problems of expressivism but, 
alas,  I  am even more sceptical  about  the problems of the alternative approaches. 
However, philosophy demands a choice among unpalatable options (and perhaps this 
is one of the things that make it fascinating). Thus, if at some points the reader finds 
the  author  to  be  too confident  and complacent  about  the points  argued for,  then 
perhaps the enthusiasm of a novice has taken the most of me. I don’t mean to imply 
that I am all that confident about the views I expound.
Third, it is worth repeating that I largely assume that a solution to the semantic 
problems of expressivism can, one way or another, be found. But if such a solution 
cannot be found, as some seem to think, perhaps prematurely, then it seems that by 
pursuing an expressivist solution to the puzzle I am ‘flogging a dead horse’23. I am 
struggling to motivate a philosophical programme that despite being interesting, it 
ultimately leads to a dead end. Yet, although the semantic problems comprise  an 
issue of utmost importance that endangers the very intelligibility of expressivism, 
they will be scarcely touched in this thesis. Given the scope of the thesis, we must 
forgo the chance to explore these issues (like some other relevant issues e.g. sceptical 
challenges, epistemic internalism/externalism controversy etc.) in substantial depth 
here.
With the argumentative plan of the thesis outlined, in the next section 1.3, I put 
forward some more motivation for exploring the possibility of expressivist semantics 
for epistemic discourse.
1.3 Parallel Lives: Meta-Ethics and Meta-Epistemology
In section 1.1, I briefly adduced some preliminary ‘starting point’ intuitions that 
incline me to side with the exploratory option of expressivism. In this section 1.3, I 
present more of the motivation driving the exploration of an expressivist solution to 
‘the epistemic justification puzzle’. The motivation consists of the fact that ethics and 
epistemology are both normative discourses that in recent debates seem to move in a 
parallel trajectory24. The common normative character of the two discourses and the 
‘ethics-epistemology  parallel’  fuels  the  intuition  that  expressivism could  also  be 
23  I refer here to M.Schroeder (2008, 2009).
24  For a nice drawing of the ethics-epistemology parallel see L.Zagzebski (1996), H.Field (2000) 
M.Chrisman (2007), M.Ridge (2007b), T.Cuneo (2007) and K.Kappel (ms).
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fruitfully applied from moral to epistemic discourse.
Let me elaborate on this parallel between ethics and epistemology drawn in recent 
debates. This is the big picture of the narrative I am going to present.  Expressivism 
about moral discourse rose as a theoretical possibility in response to the difficulties 
that  referentialist  approaches  (naturalistic  reductionism/nonnaturalism)  to  moral 
discourse encountered. Similarly, expressivism about epistemic discourse arises as a 
theoretical  possibility  in  response  to  the  broadly  analogous  difficulties  that 
referentialist approaches to epistemic discourse encounter. 
Yet,  expressivism  about  moral  discourse  not  only  arrived  as  a  theoretical 
alternative to referentialist approaches but also had some relative success. Since the 
publication of C.L.Stevenson’s (1937) ‘The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms’ and 
A.J.Ayer’s  (1946)  Language,  Truth  and  Logic  and  their  expounding  of  a  crude 
expressivism in the form of ‘emotivism’, expressivist theories have been sprouting 
up  all  over  the  place25.  Presumably,  the  relative  success  of  expressivism can  be 
credited to the fact that it seems to explain many of the desiderata that a theory of the 
semantics  of  normative  discourse  must  explain  and  also  bears  some  alluring 
theoretical virtues. 
This relative success of expressivism about moral discourse stirs the suspicion that 
an  also  relatively  successful  expressivism  about  epistemic  discourse  might  be 
possible. If an expressivist solution to ‘the moral problem’ is an open possibility, 
then there is no reason to ignore the possibility of an expressivist solution to ‘the 
epistemic  justification  puzzle’26.  Besides,  if  I  am  right  of  my  reading  of 
W.Sellars’(1997)  Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,  this  propounds exactly 
such an inferentialist (expressivist) approach to perceptual knowledge discourse. 
This intuition is also backed by the expectation of a  unified semantic theory of 
normative discourse. Both moral  and epistemic discourses are normative domains 
concerned respectively with the practical ‘what one ought to do’ and the theoretical 
‘what one ought to believe’ and their common normative character stirs the suspicion 
that  they need the same semantic  treatment27.  Indeed,  arguably,  this  has been the 
working  hypothesis  of  referentialists  since  Plato,  whom  treated  both  moral  and 
25  See R.M.Hare (1952), S.Blackburn (1993, 1998), A.Gibbard (1990, 2003), M.Timmons (1999), 
M.Ridge (2007a) etc. 
26  I allude to M.Smith’s (1994) well-known book ‘The Moral Problem’.
27  See also L.Zagzebski (1996), T.Cuneo (2007) and K.Kappel (ms).
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epistemic notions in a unified referentialist way. Since both ‘the moral problem’ and 
‘the  epistemic  justification  puzzle’  concern  normative  issues  and  an  expressivist 
approach  to  moral  discourse  appears  possible,  then  an  expressivist  approach  to 
epistemic discourse should also appear possible. 
Actually, this is the intuition that inclines me to oscillate sometimes from talk of 
the  semantics  of  normative  discourse  to  talk  of  the  semantics  of  epistemic 
justification  discourse.  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  the  semantic  treatment  of 
normative discourse should be the same for both moral and epistemic discourse and 
stand or fall together28.  Let us now present a more detailed narrative of ‘the ethics-
epistemology parallel’ in contemporary debates29. 
The  parallel  can be crisply presented  in  terms  of  a  question:  How should we 
understand normative (moral and epistemic) concepts? In recent debates, attempted 
answers to  this  question  have led to  the  formulation  of a dilemma of theoretical 
approaches30. The first horn of the dilemma is Analytic Naturalistic Reductionism31. 
It suggests that normative concepts can and should be reductively analysed in terms 
of non-normative, natural properties. Following the analytic naturalistic reductionism 
project,  it  has  been  suggested  that  moral  concepts  like  ‘goodness’  and  ‘justice’ 
should be respectively analysed as ‘pleasure’ and ‘giving back what isn’t yours’32; or 
epistemic  concepts  like  ‘justification’,  ‘knowledge’,  and  ‘truth’  should  be 
respectively analysed in terms of ‘reliable belief-forming processes’, ‘true justified 
belief’,  and  ‘the  correspondence  relation  between  truth-value  bearers  and 
truthmaking or falsemaking facts’33.
Unfortunately,  such attempts  seem to  meet  Moorean ‘open question’  semantic 
intuitions that allow counterexamples to emerge and defeat the suggested definitions. 
Moore (2000) famously argued that is always possible for a clear-headed agent to 
28  Compare J.Kim (2008:548): ‘ In any event, once the normativity of epistemology is clearly taken 
note of, it is no surpirise that epistemology and normative ethics share the same metaphilosophical 
fate’.
29  The presentation of ‘the ethics-epistemology parallel’ draws from my ‘Naturalism and Normativity’ 
(2008). 
30  The dilemma is a very old one going all the way back to Plato. See my (2009) ‘Plato, Moore and 
Ethical Nonnaturalism’
31  I ignore here the recently arrived sophisticated synthetic naturalistic reductionism.
32  The analysis of goodness as pleasure has been suggested by Plato in Protagoras, J.S.Mill (1991) in 
Utilitarianism and in various ways by modern Utilitarians. The analysis of justice as ‘giving back 
what isn’t yours’ appears in  Plato’s Republic I and is subsequently refuted by the Socratic character.
33  The reliabilist analysis of justification has been prominently proposed by A.Goldman (1991) and 
the analysis of truth as a correspondence relation, among others, by B.Russell (2001).
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question,  without  any  semantic  confusion,  whether  a  moral  property  M  (e.g. 
goodness) is reducible to a natural property N (e.g. pleasure). In short, the reduction 
of a moral property to a natural property remains always an ‘open question’. Moore 
assumed that if there was such an a priori property identity,  a clear-headed agent 
wouldn’t fail to grasp it and carried on- from the fact that the semantic ‘openness’ 
founders  all  such  reductive  efforts-  to  draw the  conclusion  that  moral  properties 
cannot be reduced to naturalistic terms. He contended that all such reductive attempts 
have  committed  -what  he  called-  ‘the  naturalistic  fallacy’  because  there  are  no 
natural properties that could reduce moral properties. 
Analogous Moorean ‘open question’ semantic intuitions seem to apply to virtually 
all  core moral  and epistemic  concepts.  These ‘open question’  semantic  intuitions 
undermine  attempts  to  reduce  such  normative  concepts  to  naturalistic  terms  and 
allow  counterexamples  to  pop  up  and  refute  the  proposed  reductions.  Thus, 
intuitively, there are respective instances of bad pleasures e.g. sadistic cat killings, 
there are cases where the just thing to do is not to give back what isn’t yours e.g. 
when someone lends you a weapon and then she goes mad, there are E.Gettier (1963) 
cases of epistemic luck where true justified beliefs are not instances of knowledge 
e.g.  the classic cases with sheep-like dogs,  façade barns etc.,  cases where beliefs 
formed by reliable cognitive processes are not justified e.g. Euclidean geometry in 
the light of Einsteinian physics, cases where there are no natural truth-making facts 
of seemingly true beliefs e.g. mathematical, logical facts etc.  
What  all  these  examples  show is  that  such normative  concepts  seem to resist 
successful reductive analysis and this decisively undermines the project of analytic 
naturalistic reductionism. It appears then, that there are no natural properties that can 
reduce  such  normative  notions.  It  should  be  noted,  though,  that  Moorean  ‘open 
question’ considerations are,  as W.Frankena (1939) pointed out,  question-begging 
but still such considerations can be taken to be enthymatic34. 
As  Frankena  rightly  objected,  Moore’s  ‘open  question  argument’  begs  the 
question against the analytic naturalistic reductionist because it assumes that there is 
no such reductive analysis of moral concepts to be found. This seems to trivialize the 
‘open  question  argument’  because  it  might  be  the  case  that  we  just  didn’t  yet 
34  See also B.Williams (1993).
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discover the right analysis of moral (and other normative) notions and such reductive 
analyses will be discovered sometime in the future35. 
However,  many anti-reductionist  philosophers  (nonnaturalists  and  expressivists 
alike) think that there is something valuable in the argument that should not be lost 
by the, indeed, correct Frankena objection. The argument indicates that, intuitively, 
our constant failure to find such successful reductive analyses inspires a legitimate 
pessimism about the prospects of such a discovery.  Actually,  the anti-reductionist 
pessimism is so pervasive that, even if we find a reductive analysis that seems to be 
initially immune to counterexamples, what we will think is that we haven’t yet found 
the right counterexample, not that we have found the right analysis36. Despite the fact 
then  that  the  argument  is  question-begging  and  inconclusive  against  analytic 
naturalistic reductionism, it need not be taken to be trivial. It can be considered to be 
an  inference  to  the  best  explanation of  our  constant  failure  to  reach  reductive 
naturalistic analyses of normative notions37. 
The  constant  failure  to  provide  successful  analyses  of  normative  concepts  has 
frustrated many philosophers who accepted the verdict of Moorean ‘open question’ 
considerations  and  turned  to  the  second  -Platonic-  horn  of  the  dilemma: 
Nonnaturalistic  Anti-reductionism.  Nonnaturalistic Anti-reductionism  accepts  that 
normative  concepts  are  unanalysable  concepts  that  purport  to  refer  to  the 
corresponding  nonnatural  properties  (goodness,  justification  etc.).  Examples  of 
nonnaturalists  abound.  Plato  in  his  middle  period  dialogues  (Phaedo,  Republic,  
Theatetus), arguably, took the properties of goodness, justice and knowledge to be 
irreducible and nonnatural  (or in Platonic  jargon, ‘forms’) and G.E.Moore (2000) 
also famously proclaimed that the property of goodness is ‘simple, indefinable, and 
sui generis’ and any effort to reduce it in naturalistic terms commits ‘the naturalistic 
fallacy’. 
Finally,  T.Williamson (2000) has also argued that the concept of knowledge is 
basic  and  unanalysable.  Further,  philosophers  like  H.Putnam  (1978:107-9)  and 
E.Sosa (2001) have also directly appealed to Moorean ‘open question’ considerations 
35  This has led J.Searle (1969) to dub it ‘the naturalistic fallacy fallacy’.
36  Compare Williamson (2000: 30-1): ‘Even if some sufficiently complex analysis never succumbed 
to counterexamples, that would not entail that identity of the analysing concept with the concept 
knows. Indeed, the equation of the concepts might well lead to more puzzlement rather than less’.
37  For such refinements of the classical open question argument see M.Ridge (2003) and A.Miller 
(2005). 
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in order to claim that the property of truth is unanalysable while D.Davidson (2001a) 
has appealed to analogous Moorean considerations in the Platonic corpus in order to 
reach the same anti-reductionist conclusion. They all conclude that the property of 
truth is irreducible and nonnatural. 
Unfortunately again, the nonnaturalist horn meets some serious epistemological 
and ontological difficulties of its own that undercut its prospects of success. Here is 
the  rough  form  of  two  of  them.  First,  there  is  ‘the  epistemic  access  problem’. 
Nonnaturalists often posit a cognitive faculty of rational intuition that supposedly can 
track normative nonnatural properties through some sort of ‘intellectual seeing’. But 
given that we have epistemic access to natural properties, objects, events etc. with 
ordinary  causal-perceptual  processes,  it  appears  mysterious  how  we  can  have 
epistemic  access  to  acausal,  nonnatural  normative  properties.  Thus,  talk  of 
‘intellectual seeing’ appears epistemologically spooky, unless there is a way to cash 
out the ocular metaphor in naturalistic terms. 
Second,  there  is  ‘the queerness  problem’.  It  is  hardly clear  what  such acausal 
nonnatural  properties  could be and where these properties could be placed in the 
spatio-temporal, natural world. For surely they must be radically different from the 
mundane natural properties, objects etc. we perceive in our everyday life. If there 
were such properties, in J.Mackie’s (1977) often-quoted words, they would seem to 
be ontologically  ‘queer’.  They would be radically  different  from ordinary natural 
properties like being water, honey, chair, tree etc.
The  respective  difficulties  of  the  naturalistic  reductionism  and  nonnaturalistic 
anti-reductionism horns of the dilemma have ushered some philosophers to search 
for a different approach to normative concepts.  That is,  a different  approach that 
could avoid at least many of the difficulties that surround and undermine the two 
horns. One approach that was born from this endeavour (in C.L. Stevenson’s (1937) 
and A.J.Ayer’s (1946) hands) was expressivism. Stevenson and Ayer was, of course, 
applying expressivism only to moral discourse (though Ayer’s (1946) treatment of 
the a priori is, I suspect, an expressivist account in germ form). But contemporary 
expressivists  like  S.Blackburn  (1996)  AGibbard  (2003)  H.Field  (2000,  2009) 
M.Ridge  (2007b),  M.Chrisman  (2007)  and  K.Kappel  (2010)  have  also  applied 
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expressivism to epistemic discourse as well38. 
Expressivism, like nonnaturalism, accepts the verdict of Moorean ‘open question’ 
considerations  and takes such normative concepts to be irreducible  to naturalistic 
terms. Crucially, however, it denies ‘the referential semantics assumption’ that both 
horns of the dilemma share. Namely,  it  denies that there are normative properties 
and,  since  our  perceptual  mechanisms  do  not  indicate  the  existence  of  such 
normative properties (natural or nonnatural), it comports nicely with a parsimonious 
naturalistic  framework.  For  the  expressivist  approach,  there  are  no  normative 
properties  (natural  or  nonnatural)  that  normative  concepts  purport  to  refer  to. 
Actually,  expressivist  semantics  are  not  referential  at  all.  They  are  use-theoretic 
semantics  explaining  the  meaning  of  normative  sentences  in  terms  of  how  the 
sentences are being used.
Nevertheless, in spite of the rejection of ‘the referential semantics assumption’, 
sophisticated expressivists like, S.Blackburn (1984,1993,1998), M.Timmons (1999), 
A.Gibbard  (2003)  M.Ridge  (2007a)  and  M.Chrisman  (2007)  in  various  different 
ways claim that expressivism can have ‘the best of both worlds’. That is, can still 
latch  onto  normativity  and  reconcile  it  with  such  a  parsimonious  naturalistic 
framework.  They  claim  that  expressivism  can  mimic  the  realist-seemings  of 
normative discourse and adequately explain them without any loss of explanatory 
power.  To  that  effect,  they  propose  various  ways  in  which  this  could  be 
accomplished. Quasi-realists  like Blackburn (1996) and Gibbard (2003) endorse a 
minimalist ‘ontologically light’ reading of notions like ‘property’ ‘truth’ ‘fact’ etc. 
and claim that expressivism can legitimately ‘earn the right’ to talk about minimalist 
normative  properties,  truth  etc.  ‘as  if’  these  existed,  without  conceding  that 
traditional realism can do any better39. 
By  denying  ‘the  referential  semantics  assumption’  of  both  naturalistic 
reductionism and nonnaturalistic anti-reductionism, expressivism draws out the rug 
from under the feet of both horns of the dilemma and opens some interesting logical 
space between the horns of the dilemma. This new logical space promises to elude 
the difficulties of naturalistic reductionism and nonnaturalistic anti-reductionism. 
38  And it has been argued that it reaps some interesting explanatory fruit as well. Kappel (2010) 
argues that with an expressivist approach to knowledge discourse we can solve ‘the Meno problem’, 
namely, the problem asking why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.
39  For the classic exposition of deflationism about truth see P.Horwich (1990).
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On  the  one  hand,  expressivism  comports  nicely  with  a  broadly  naturalistic 
framework, as naturalistic reductionism would like it to be, while at the same time 
explains our ‘open question’ semantic intuitions concerning our efforts to analyse 
normative concepts. For expressivists, ‘open question’ semantic intuitions indicate 
that  there  are  no  natural  properties  that  can  successfully  reduce  our  normative 
concepts. On the other hand, sophisticated expressivists like A.Gibbard, S.Blackburn 
and M.Ridge, M.Chrisman attempt to show that we can uphold the realist-seemings 
of  normative  discourse  in  an  expressivist  context,  as  the  traditional  realist 
nonnaturalist  would like it  to  be,  while  at  the same time remain  committed  to  a 
broadly naturalistic framework that evades -among others- ‘the epistemic access’ and 
‘queerness’ problems of nonnaturalism. 
In  conclusion,  what  ‘the  ethics-epistemology  parallel’  indicates  is  that 
expressivism  about  epistemic  discourse,  as  expressivism  about  moral  discourse, 
comes to the fore as a response to the problems of analytic naturalistic reductionism 
and nonnaturalism. Accordingly, motivated by the relative success of the application 
of expressivism to moral discourse, I aspire to explore an application of expressivism 
to epistemic justification discourse that could have at least the same relative success. 
Prima facie at  least,  the common normative character of the moral  and epistemic 
discourses  calls  for  the  same  unified  semantic  treatment  and  the  parallel  drawn 
between ethics and epistemology in recent debates spurs this intuition. 
With  the  presentation  of  ‘the  ethics-epistemology parallel’  and how it  confers 
some more motivation for the pursuit of epistemic expressivism explained,  in the 
next section I make some clarifications about several issues related to the epistemic 
justification puzzle. 
1.4 Some Important Clarifications 
The  epistemic  justification  puzzle  touches  a  number  of  issues  (some  more 
important, some less important) that we should better clarify a bit before we set sail 
for our conceptual exploration. These clarifications concern the formulation of the 
puzzle and other issues related to the notion of epistemic justification.
First  of  all,  I  adopt  the  more  natural  way  of  talking  and  use  only  the  term 
‘justification’  instead  of  ‘epistemic  justification’  but,  of  course,  mean  epistemic 
justification. Other species of justification like pragmatic, prudential etc. justification 
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is  something that  does not interest  us and remains  entirely  off  the picture  of the 
thesis. However, a short note on the epistemic/pragmatic justification distinction is 
needed for reasons of demarcation. With epistemic justification I mean the kind of 
justification that aims at truth while with pragmatic justification I mean the kind of 
justification that does not aim at truth but at personal benefit or advantage. A good 
example of a case where pragmatic justification is meant to be in play is Pascal’s 
Wager (though the exact details of the argument need not concern us here)40. 
Pascal’s wager invites epistemic agents to believe in the existence of God quite 
independently  of  whether  they think  such belief  is  epistemically  justified  or  not. 
Rather,  they  are  asked  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  God  purely  on  pragmatic 
grounds:  maximum  expected  utility.  Other  examples  of  pragmatically  justified 
beliefs  are  convenient  self-deception  cases  where  the  agent  holds  epistemically 
unjustified beliefs about himself, but these beliefs are pragmatically justified because 
they  seem  to  benefit  him  in  some  way  (e.g.  enhance  his  social  or  athletic 
performance). 
Second, someone might think that the formulation of the puzzle is still somewhat 
strained in terms of ordinary language. We don’t seem to often use sentences like ‘S 
justifiedly believes  that  p’ or ‘My belief  that  p is  justified’ in ordinary linguistic 
practice.  Epistemic  justification  is  ‘a  philosopher’s  concept’  and it  is  not  all  that 
frequently used in ordinary epistemic discourse. But this should not be seen as a 
problem because, although it is more of a philosopher’s concept, it stands out for 
many mundane epistemic expressions of laymen like ‘S’s belief is well-grounded’, ‘p 
is  well-supported’,  ‘p is  evidence-based’ etc.  It  is just  that  philosopher’s have an 
umbrella term of art that covers all these epistemic expressions. This leads to the next 
point.
Third, the formulation of the puzzle is in terms of epistemic justification but the 
same positive proposal, namely, habits-endorsement expressivist approach is meant 
to  account  for  the  semantics  of  other  epistemic  sentences  conferring  positive 
epistemic status. Such other epistemic sentences are ‘S’s belief is well-grounded’ or 
‘S’s belief is supported by good or sufficient reasons’ or ‘ S’s belief is reasonable or 
rational’ etc. For reasons of simplicity and clarity, though, I will be talking only in 
40  For the argument itself see A.Hajek (2004).
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terms of justification.
Fourth, critics might complain that my thesis – as outlined in section 1.3- totally 
ignores two well-known approaches to normative issues: error (or fictionalist) and 
relativist  approaches.  Both approaches accept  all  four premises  of the puzzle  and 
therefore there is not really a philosophical puzzle. It has the appearance of a puzzle 
but is rather a straw man, they might say. 
Let  us first  take  up the error approach.  Critics  might  claim that  I  am helping 
myself  because  from the  criticism of  reductionist  and  nonnaturalist  approaches  I 
jump  to  the  conclusion  that  ‘the  referential  semantics  assumption’  is  plausibly 
mistaken.  But this  jump is unwarranted (or at  least  too quick) because there is  a 
referentialist approach, namely,  error theory that claims that although there are no 
such normative properties, we nonetheless purport to refer to such properties41. Thus, 
referential semantics are actually consistent with the claim that there is no natural or 
nonnatural  epistemic  justification  property  and,  therefore,  we  need  an  argument 
against error theories before we conclude that ‘the referential semantics assumption’ 
should better be rejected.
This is true as far as it  goes. I don’t discuss the possibility of an error theory 
approach to epistemic justification. One reason that I ignore ‘error theory’ is because 
I  don’t  really  know  anyone  propounding  the  view  about  epistemic  justification, 
though, the logical space for such view is wide open (and has been applied to at least 
moral,  modal  and mathematical  discourses).  A second reason is  the scope of the 
thesis that is already quite extended. The breadth of the topic I am addressing is vast 
and for this reason I have to be a bit selective of the positions I examine. This second 
reason is related to a third. I consider the error theoretic approach to be one of the 
least attractive and given that I need to be selective I chose unashamedly to ignore 
this position. This might seem unfair but I am afraid is the plain truth. 
Two more reasons in support of the view that error-theory approaches are one of 
the  least  attractive  are  the  following.  First,  error  theories  seem to  explain  away 
objectivity  too  easily  and  this,  I  think,  is  a  liability.  Any  theory  of  normative 
discourse is expected to accommodate certain desidarata, rather than try to sidestep 
them  by  providing  a  debunking  explanation  that  simply  refuses  to  take  them 
41  Error theories about moral discourse have been defended by J.Mackie (1977) and R.Joyce (2007).
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seriously.  One of those desiderata of normative discourse is surely objectivity and 
error theories seem to give a debunking explanation to this desideratum. 
Of  course,  raising  this  worry  against  error  theorists  might  surprise  some 
philosophers  because  my  favoured  expressivist  approach  to  ‘the  epistemic 
justification puzzle’ is also anti-realist and therefore they might presume that it meets 
the same problem. This is I think too quick. True enough, the standard picture is that 
precious  truth and objectivity  can be safeguarded only within a  traditional  realist 
framework.  Yet,  this picture has been contested by expressivists of various kinds 
who although  remain  staunch  antirealists  don’t  relinquish  truth  and  objectivity42. 
Indeed, this is what I think expressivism’s great promise is as a research programme: 
to  account  for  the  realist-seemings  of  normative  discourse  in  an  antirealist 
framework. I have already referred to such expressivists that want to have it both 
ways in the last section 1.343. 
Second, although error theorists do reap some important explanatory fruit (e.g. 
dodge the ontological and meta-epistemological burden etc.) their way of thinking 
does not go deep enough because it still remains referentialist in character. By my 
lights,  this  is  mistaken  because  the  root  of  the  problem  lies  in  our  taking  the 
referentialist  pretensions  of  normative  language  too  seriously  and  this  way  of 
thinking should be abandoned completely. Error theory only goes half the way and 
retains relics of ‘the referentialist  paradigm’. Obviously,  this is way too brief and 
entirely inadequate to dispose of error theory, but I can’t here go any deeper into the 
substance of the approach. On this point, I am afraid that all I can say is that I will 
assume the falsity of error theory approaches and cite the work of other philosophers 
who have argued against the possibility of an error theory approach44. 
Let us now turn to relativism. It is true again that I ignore a relativist approach to 
the epistemic justification puzzle and people with relativistic leanings might find this 
partiality  disappointing.  Perhaps,  they  will  find  this  partiality  especially 
disappointing because they are in agreement  with the view I intend to argue for, 
namely,  that epistemic justification is neither reducible to a natural property or an 
42 This attitude has also raised the question of how then we can tell the difference between traditional 
realists and expressivists realists. J.Dreier (2004) calls this ‘the problem of creeping minimalism’. For 
some discussion see M.Chrisman (2008).
43  See also M.Chrisman (2008) on the realism/antirealism distinction.
44  See J. McDowell (1998: 131-151), S.Blackburn (1993 : 149-166) and M.Timmons (1999).
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irreducible sui generis property. 
Relativists typically agree that, one the one hand, there is no justification property 
to  be  reduced  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  sui  generis,  nonnatural 
justification property45. They then proceed to propound relativist theories of various 
sorts where justification assertions and attributions are taken to be relative to a single 
person, community, society, and in extreme cases perhaps even gender, social class, 
nation, race etc. But what unequivocally unites these various relativist theories is the 
shared feature that justification assertions and attributions are relative to a certain 
variable,  no  matter  which  variable  is  this.  Their  entrenched  intuition  is  that 
justification  assertions  and  attributions  cannot  somehow  be  disengaged  from  a 
certain point of perspective, context or variable as the realist dreams. There can be no 
Archimedean point of view.
Different relativists would solve or dissolve the epistemic justification puzzle in 
different ways. S.Stich (1998) would, for instance, I think, accepts all four premises 
of the puzzle and claim that relativism defuses any tension between the premises of 
the  puzzle.  He  would  accept  that  we  purport  to  refer  to  a  certain  property  of 
epistemic justification (P2) but that actually there is none, natural or nonnatural (P2 
and P4), and that we ultimately have to confront and accept ‘the problem of cognitive 
diversity’,  if  we are  not  to  be ‘epistemic  xenophobes’,  as  an inextricable  fact  of 
social life. Rorty (1979) would probably deny the very existence of such a puzzle 
from the start and would contend that there is a puzzle if and only if we assume the 
referentialist ‘language game’ of analytic philosophy but, of course, we need not do 
this.  It  is  only  when  we  accept  the  referentialist  ‘language  game’  of  analytic 
philosophy that the puzzle  forces its  way to the scene but once we become self-
conscious and renounce this language game the puzzle simply dissolves46. 
Nevertheless,  the  reason I  chose  to  sideline  relativistic  approaches  is  because 
again they seem to explain away our truth and objectivity intuitions too easily. Like 
error-theory, they don’t seem able to account for the truth and objectivity intuitions 
that our epistemic claims seem to imply. And as I also said above, it has been argued 
that  these  realist  intuitions  need  not  be  tied  to  reference  as  standard  referential 
45  See for S.Stich (1998) and R.Rorty (1979).
46  There are also expressivist relativistic approaches. H.Field (2000, 2009) for example is happy to 
propound a form of expressivism about epistemic justification justification that is ‘moderately 
relativistic’.
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semantics assume. Nonreferential  semantics could also claim truth and objectivity 
intuitions for normative sentences; or at least this is what they argue for. 
Fifth,  the  notion  of  epistemic  justification  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  epistemic 
internalism/externalism  controversy  and  whatever  we  might  say  about  epistemic 
justification, inescapably, will have some bearing on this controversy. Let us briefly 
see  what  the  controversy  is  about  and  then  what  our  stance  on  it  is.  There  are 
different ways to draw the line between internalism and externalism but for present 
purposes  we  can  ignore  such  complications  and  understand  it  in  pretty  much  a 
standard way47. Simplifying somewhat, the internalist  claims that for an epistemic 
agent to have a justified belief it is necessary to have access to the good grounds or 
basis  for  that  belief  (e.g.  L.Bonjour  (1985)).  Call  this  internalist  claim  ‘the 
accessibility requirement’.  
The externalist contests ‘the accessibility requirement’ and denies that access to 
good grounds or basis is necessary for a justified belief. He points out that we can 
have justified beliefs formed by reliable processes or faculties, though the grounds of 
these beliefs are beyond our conscious grasp (e.g. Goldman (1991)). The internalist’s 
rejoinder  then  is  to  resist  the  claim  that  such  beliefs  should  count  as  genuine 
instances of justified belief.
Accordingly, internalists think that epistemic justification is a necessary condition 
for knowledge and externalists counterclaim that justification need not be a necessary 
condition for knowledge, if knowledge is based on reliable belief-forming processes 
(Goldman  (1991)).  In  other  occasions,  externalists  might  accept  that  epistemic 
justification is necessary for knowledge but clarify that epistemic justification should 
be understood not in a ‘Cartesian’ way but in an ‘anti-Cartesian’ externalist  way. 
That is, in the ‘anti-Cartesian’ terms of reliable belief-forming processes where the 
epistemic agent is not in a ‘Cartesian’ way expected to have access to the grounds or 
basis of the belief.  
My stance on the controversy is reconciliatory. Like other philosophers that have 
a reconciliatory approach to this perplexing controversy (Blackburn (1993:33-52), 
Brandom  2000,  Alston  2005  etc.),  I  think  the  best  way  to  go  forward  is  to 
compromise the two valuable intuitions that respectively internalist and externalist 
47  See G.Pappas (2005).
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positions emphasize. The internalist emphasizes that is epistemically good to have 
access and be able to provide reasons or grounds for your beliefs. The externalist 
emphasizes  that  often we seem to hold justified beliefs  for which we don’t  have 
access and can’t provide good reasons or grounds. 
The two intuitions at work in both sides of the controversy are important and can 
be reconciled in a ‘mixed’ approach aspiring to transcend the controversy. This is, of 
course,  easier  said than  done but  I  think  is  a  plausible  approach and the  habits-
endorsement expressivist proposal will tend to presuppose such a ‘mixed’ stance on 
the controversy. For present purposes I think that is sufficient.
Sixth, a short note is needed on why I am pursuing an account of the nature of the 
notion of epistemic  justification and not knowledge itself,  the golden but elusive 
dream of every epistemologist. The motivation stems from my sympathy to the idea 
that we should better start with the weaker notion of epistemic justification and from 
there proceed to establish, if we can, a weak relation to knowledge itself rather than 
conversely. This view is not novel in the literature, though, of course as much else is 
contentious48. Here is C.Wright (1991:88) explaining such a stance: ‘knowledge is 
not the proper central  concern of epistemologico-sceptical  enquiry… We can live 
with the concession that we do not, strictly,  know some of the things we believed 
ourselves to know, provided that we can retain the thought that we are fully justified 
in accepting them’ (Wright’s emphasis)49.
Unlike other approaches that conversely take the notion of knowledge as basic, 
‘the unexplained explainer’ we must postulate in order to explain the rest epistemic 
phenomena (e.g.  T.Williamson 2000), I am inclined to think that we should start 
from the weaker notion of epistemic justification and from there cautiously try to 
build bridges to knowledge. The order of explanation that starts from the assumption 
that knowledge is basic seems to my eyes to take thinks backwards, to put the cart 
before the horse as one might say.
One of the difficulties for ‘the knowledge first view’ is that in Moorean fashion 
takes knowledge as something ‘given’, as a foundation form where we can proceed 
to understand the rest epistemic phenomena (belief, justification, evidence etc). But 
48  Compare J.Pollock (1985:9) ‘The central topic of epistemology is epistemic justification rather than 
knowledge’ and L.Bonjour (1985: 5) : ‘The concept of epistemic justification is clearly the central 
concept in the whole theory of knowledge…’. See also R.Fumerton (2002).
49  Wright calls this stance ‘the Russelian retreat’ because it is advocated in B.Russell (2001).
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surely this will raise the eyebrows of people with sympathy for sceptical challenges. 
For such philosophers hold that knowledge is something that needs to be argued for, 
not  just  to  be assumed as a ‘given’.  Thus,  the  existence  of  knowledge is  a  very 
controversial and important premise to be conceded ‘on the cheap’.
In contrast, one of the advantages of taking the ‘epistemic justification first view’ 
is  that  it  exactly  gives  full  heeding  to  sceptical  challenges  about  knowledge and 
worries  and  from  there  attempts  to  build  bridges  with  the  valuable  notion  of 
knowledge. In this way, I think, knowledge might be established even contra to at 
least  some radical  scepticism scenarios.  I am quite sympathetic  to self-defeat  and 
transcendental argument responses to scepticism that try to stress that the sceptic in 
order to even articulate his sceptical challenge in the first place needs to presuppose 
at least some knowledge50. Yet, although I am optimistic that at least some sceptical 
challenges could be defused, once again this task lies outside the topic of the thesis, 
though, this does not affect the argument of the thesis. For our stance on epistemic 
justification  is  compatible  with  both  sceptical  and  anti-sceptical  scenarios  about 
knowledge.
 Surely, on the one hand, if we can respond to sceptical challenges and show that 
at least some of our justified beliefs amount to knowledge that would be beneficent. 
We would be in a position to show that at least some of our justified beliefs ‘hit the 
target’  and  amount  to  knowledge.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  even  if  we  cannot 
adequately respond to the sceptical challenges, this should not adversely affect our 
position. For our position remains compatible with sceptical challenges.
 We are not defending the inconsistent with sceptical scenarios claim that at least 
some of our beliefs amount to knowledge. We are only defending (or better we will 
be defending) the by far weaker claim that at least some of our beliefs are justified. 
This claim might raise some eyebrows, since I have already committed myself  to 
expressivism that renounces the existence of an epistemic justification property. The 
contention  that  we  can  have  justified  beliefs  without  postulating  an  epistemic 
justification property is one of the claims of the thesis that will come in Ch.6 and 
Ch.7. 
50  See for example Putnam’s (1981) argument against the brain-in-a-vat scenario. A similar argument 
exists in Kant’s (2003) ‘The Refutation of Idealism’. Why Putnam/Kant style anti-sceptic argument 
cannot refute all forms of scepticism see Williamson (2000: ch.7).
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If the sceptical challenges cannot be defused and our justified beliefs cannot be 
shown to amount to knowledge, then at least we do in the best possible way what is 
up to us. We form beliefs in a responsible and considerate way. Demon world or not, 
it  is  what  we  have  some  control  over  and  lies  firmly  within  our  sphere  of 
responsibility. What is not up to us and lies beyond our control is something that we 
shouldn’t be held responsible for.
Seventh, a short note on the doxastic voluntarism/nonvoluntarism controversy that 
seems to touch the issue of belief-fixation and epistemic responsibility just canvassed 
above. The discussion of belief-fixation as something ‘firmly lying within our sphere 
of responsibility’ might convey the wrong signals. I don’t mean to imply that I am 
committed to some form of doxastic voluntarism, though I don’t want to imply either 
that I am committed to some form of doxastic nonvoluntarism. 
Once again my stance to such sharp distinctions is reconciliatory with a hope of 
transcending  the  distinction.  Both  sides  of  the  divide  seem to  emphasize  a  right 
intuition. Doxastic nonvolutarism emphasizes the intuition that we don’t really seem 
to decide what to believe when we form a belief. Doxastic voluntarism emphasizes 
the intuition that we don’t really seem to be just mechanically forming beliefs either. 
The two intuitions could be reconciled in a ‘mixed’ approach that accommodates 
both stances and also ensures the viability of epistemic responsibility.  If we have 
some control on belief-fixation, then epistemic responsibility is not endangered and 
this is the assumption that we will be working on in the thesis. 
Actually,  if  the hard-line doxastic  nonvoluntarist  (e.g.  W.Alston 2005:Ch.4)  is 
right  that  there  is  no sufficiently  rich control  of our doxastic  attitudes  to  ground 
epistemic responsibility,  then this seems to lead to a quite paradoxical conclusion. 
Namely, that the normative discipline of epistemology itself is just ‘idle talk’ because 
it  cannot really make any real difference in terms of our everyday belief-fixation 
practices. For one of the main aims of epistemology is to prescribe what, if anything, 
‘one ought to believe’.  How we should transform our epistemic lives in order to 
become better epistemic agents. 
Interestingly, people who espouse such a hardline doxastic involuntarism view, go 
on to talk about epistemic justification (and perhaps knowledge) as if their view has 
no implications on the field of epistemology. But if they are right that there is no 
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epistemic  responsibility,  then  they  shouldn’t  be  writing  treatises  on  epistemic 
justification. Properly, since belief-fixation it is not up to us, they should not only be 
committed  to  doxastic  nonvoluntarism  but  also  scorn  debates  on  epistemic 
justification and ‘what one ought to believe’. We will touch this problem again in 
Ch.7 where I will suggest that the habits-endorsement expressivist approach to the 
semantics of justification assertions and attributions could illuminate the debate.
These  clarificatory  points,  admittedly,  touch  immensely  complex  issues  in  an 
entirely cursory and inadequate manner. Yet the predicament is such that we can’t 
really pursue many of these issues to substantial depth. But in order to avoid leakages 
(or even shipwreck) before we even leave port for our philosophical exploration, we 
needed  to  plug  some holes  by clarifying  some of  our  commitments.  In  the  next 
section 1.5, I summarize the work been done in this first chapter and explain how the 
argument unfolds in the next chapter.
1.5 Conclusion and Summary of the Argument
In  this  first  introductory  chapter  I  have  performed  four  basic  things.  First,  in 
section  1.1,  I  introduced  ‘the  epistemic  justification  puzzle’  and  explained  what 
motivates each one of the individually plausible but jointly inconsistent premises of 
the puzzle. Then I explained how I intend to explore an expressivist solution to the 
puzzle and briefly provided some of the ‘starting point’ intuitions that incline me to 
sympathize with this approach. Second, in section 1.2, I outlined the argumentative 
plan  of  the  thesis,  said  a  few things  about  the  content  of  each  chapter  and also 
presented some clue of the contours of the habits-endorsement expressivist I  will 
deploy.  Third,  in section  1.3,  I  provided some more  motivation  for  exploring an 
expressivist solution to the puzzle by drawing ‘the ethics-epistemology parallel’ in 
recent debates. Finally, in section 1.4, I closed the chapter with some clarifications 
concerning  the  formulation  of  the  puzzle,  the  epistemic  internalism/externalism 
distinction, the epistemic/pragmatic justification distinction etc.
In the next chapter 2, I take the first step of my discussion of analytic naturalistic 
reductionism. I undertake to introduce what the theoretical commitments of analytic 
naturalistic reductionist are, clarify what conception of epistemic justification we are 
after, what conditions an adequate reductive analysis of epistemic justification should 
satisfy and provide a gloss of the natural/nonnatural distinction. Finally, I introduce 
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what I call ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’. A lesson intended to undermine attempts 
to reduce by a priori semantic analysis the notion of epistemic justification (and other 
normative  notions).  Chs.3-4  will  complement  the  discussion  of  naturalistic 
reductionism (analytic and synthetic) and ultimately motivate the plausibility of ‘the 
naturalism-denial assertion’ (P3) of the puzzle
31
Chapter 2 Analytic Naturalistic Reductionism Introduced 
2.1 Introduction
This  chapter  covers  largely  preparatory  ground for  the  critical  examination  of 
analytic  naturalistic  reductionism,  following  in  Ch.3.  It  introduces  the  project  of 
analytic naturalistic reductionism and prepares the ground for its imminent critique. 
More generally, Chs.2-4 inveigh against the plausibility of -what I call- ‘referential 
naturalism’ in order to motivate the plausibility of the premise three of the epistemic 
justification  puzzle.  That  is,  ‘the  naturalism-denial  assertion’  (P3):  justification 
assertions and attributions do not purport to refer to a certain  natural  property of 
epistemic justification. Analytic naturalistic reductionism is criticized in Ch.3 and its 
synthetic sibling in Ch.4.
With the term of art  ‘referential naturalism’, I designate the realist  naturalistic 
approach that accepts ‘the referential semantics assumption’ (P2) and based on this 
assumption  explores  an  account  of  epistemic  justification  that  either  (a)  reduces 
epistemic justification by semantic analysis to a natural property (analytic naturalistic 
reductionism)  or (b) reduces epistemic  justification to a  natural  property in  the a 
posteriori pattern of the Kripke-Putnam reduction of natural kinds and other science-
theoretic terms (synthetic naturalistic reductionism)51. 
Referential naturalism should be cautiously demarcated from what we may call 
‘expressivist  naturalism’.  With  the  term ‘expressivist  naturalism’,  I  designate  the 
antirealist  naturalistic  approach  that  denies  ‘the  referential  semantics  assumption’ 
(P2),  (namely,  that  justification  assertions  and  attributions  purport  to  refer  to  a 
certain property of epistemic justification),  opts for an ontologically parsimonious 
framework  that  denies  the  existence  of  an  epistemic  justification  property  and 
explores an expressivist understanding of the semantics of justification assertions and 
attributions  (and  other  normative  notions).  The  habits-endorsement  expressivist 
theory of epistemic justification that will be sketched in Ch.7 falls under this label. 
With  the  demarcation  of  referential  from expressivist  naturalism  at  hand,  the 
51  Error theory is an antirealist, referential naturalistic theory, but given that I have set error theory 
aside I ignore this approach.
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overall  plan  for  this  introductory  and preparatory chapter  on  analytic  naturalistic 
reductionism is  the  following.  First,  in  section  2.2,  I  do  some  preparatory  work 
essential for the discussion following in the next chapter. That is, I make explicit 
what  the  theoretical  commitments  of  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism are,  what 
particular conception of epistemic justification we are after, what conditions need to 
be  satisfied  for  a  successful  reduction  by  semantic  analysis  of  the  epistemic 
justification  property and,  eventually,  shortly  canvass  and suggest  a  gloss  of  the 
vexing  natural/nonnatural  distinction  underlying  the  discussion  for  ‘naturalistic 
reduction’.
Second, in section 2.3, as a prelude to the critical discussion in Ch.3, I broach the 
first  argument  against  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism.  That  is,  I  broach  the 
metaepistemic versions of two classic metaethical arguments, namely, G.E.Moore’s 
(2000) ‘open question argument’ and D.Hume’s (1986) ‘is/ought argument’ and from 
these  arguments  draw  –what  I  coin-  ‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’  whose 
application,  I  think,  seriously  undermines  analytic  naturalistic  reductionist 
pretensions. The undermining application of ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ comes in 
the next chapter 3. Let us now turn to the first section.
2.2 Analytic Naturalistic Reductionism Introduced 
In this section, we lay out some clarificatory and preparatory work (essential for 
the ensuing discussion of Ch.3) in the four steps just mentioned above. First, let us 
try  to  make  the  theoretical  commitments  of  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism 
explicit. The analytic naturalistic reductionist starts from the implicit adoption of ‘the 
referential semantics assumption’ (P2). He accepts that justification assertions and 
attributions purport to refer to a certain property of epistemic justification. 
Unlike error theorists (or ‘fictionalists’), though, he also accepts that not only our 
justification  assertions  and  attributions  purport  to  refer  to  such  an  epistemic 
justification property,  but that this property exists. The reductionist  thinks that an 
epistemic  justification  property  exists  because  assumes  that  at  least  some of  our 
allegedly justified assertions and attributions are indeed justified. Call this assertion 
‘the  existential  assertion’.  But  if  there  are  at  least  some  justified  beliefs,  he 
continues, then there must be a property of epistemic justification in virtue of which 
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these  justified  beliefs  are  justified52.  Call  this  assertion  ‘the  realist  ontological  
assertion’.
The analytic naturalistic reductionist  then thinks that this property of epistemic 
justification that, if at least some of our beliefs are to be justified, must somehow be 
‘out there’ could in principle be reduced by a priori semantic analysis to a certain 
natural  property.  We can reductively analyse epistemic justification in terms of a 
natural property, a property that exists ‘out there’ in nature. In other words, we can 
reduce (in terms of necessary and sufficient  conditions)  by semantic  analysis  the 
property of epistemic justification to a natural property constitutive of its essence. 
Call this assertion ‘the naturalistic analysability assertion’. 
To  wrap  up,  these  are  the  theoretical  commitments  of  analytic  naturalistic 
reductionism:
• The  Referential  Semantics  Assumption:  ‘Justification  assertions  and 
attributions purport to refer to a certain epistemic justification property’.
• The Existential Assertion: ‘There are at least some justified beliefs’.
• The Realist Ontological Assertion: ‘There must be an epistemic justification 
property in virtue of which justified beliefs are justified’.
• The  Naturalistic  Analysability  Assertion:  ‘The  epistemic  justification 
property  (in  virtue  of  which  justified  beliefs  are  justified)  can,  in  principle,  be 
reduced by semantic analysis to a certain natural property’.
The  aspiration  for  a  naturalistic  reduction  by  semantic  analysis  of  epistemic 
justification has some prima facie plausibility. We often aspire to provide reductive 
definitions of many things in scientific practice and sometimes even in everyday life 
and,  hence,  it  is  not  at  first  instance  unreasonable  to  search  for  an  analysis  of 
epistemic justification in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. For, arguably, 
an economist  can endeavour to define what inflation is,  a sociologist  what social 
class  is,  a  psychologist  what  depression  is,  a  biologist  what  reproduction  is,  a 
physicist what energy is and even a layman what tomato, game or fishing is. 
The obvious reason why both scientists and even sometimes laymen search for 
reductive  definitions  is  that  reductive  definitions  supply  us  with  an  informative 
52  Compare A.Goldman (1991: 106): ‘I do assume that a justified belief gets its status of being 
justified from some processes or properties that make it justified. In short, there must be some 
justification-conferring processes or properties.’ 
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account of what the property, event, state of affairs etc. in question is. If the reductive 
definition is successful, then this will apply invariantly across contexts and help us 
identify instances of the property, event etc. in question. It will be used as a criterion 
for identifying instances of the property, event etc. in question53. This could be really 
useful  in  the  case  of  highly disputed  properties,  like  normative  ones,  that  is  not 
sufficiently  clear  what  they  are  or  what  they  involve  and  often  cause  a  lot  of 
disagreement54. 
Of course, as one might guess, reductive definition is not something that can be 
easily unveiled, especially about abstract and multifarious notions like, for instance, 
social  class55.  Those with some background in social  theory know exactly what I 
mean, but even those that do not can see what I am driving to. The point I am driving 
to it is that reductive definitions are often hard to find because counterexamples lurk 
in the next corner refuting these definitions. And this is not just the case for abstract 
science-theoretic  and  philosophical  terms.  Even  in  the  seemingly  simple  case  of 
ordinary notions like ‘tomato’ or ‘game’ a reductive definition might prove to be 
much more difficult that one can initially surmise.
 For example, this is the definition of what a tomato is found in a dictionary: ‘a 
round red sharp-tasting fruit with a lot of seeds which is eaten cooked or raw as a 
savoury food’. As a reductive definition this is inadequate because there are tomatoes 
with a non-round shape like oblong tomatoes.  As a result,  it  is not necessary for 
being a tomato to be round-shaped. And I am confident that the definition fails in 
other respects because there are so many different varieties of tomatoes with varying 
characteristics; not to mention genetic engineering. The moral here is that, as it is 
sometimes said, philosophers are not lexicographers and dictionaries are not much 
help in philosophical matters. 
But  despite  the  fact  that  reductive  definitions  are  difficult  to  be  discovered, 
53  As various philosophers have noted (L.Bonjour (1985); R.Fogelin (1994)) the whole debate on the 
nature of epistemic justification could be set in terms of ‘the problem of the criterion’, as applied to 
epistemic justification. I have avoided this way of structuring the discussion because it involves 
scepticism and, as I said in section 1.4, I set aside the scepticism issue.
54  Analytic naturalistic reductionism was early Plato’s project. In the early ‘Socratic’ dialogues, the 
Socratic character strives to reduce moral properties, alas, always unsuccessfully. I sketch early Plato’s 
views on knowledge in ‘Early Plato on Knowledge’ (ms).
55  Compare the words of a physicist: ‘Coming in so many guises, energy is difficult to define. Even 
now, physicists do not know intrinsically what it is, even though they are expert at describing what it 
does and how to handle it’ J.Baker (2007:20).
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searching for a reductive definition is in principle not unreasonable for sometimes we 
do succeed to provide successful definitions. Physicists, for instance, say that mass is 
a measure of how much matter an object contains, that is, the sum of the matter of all 
the  atoms  of  the  object  in  question.  Unfortunately,  though,  like  other  normative 
properties epistemic justification is in all evidence not one of those successful cases. 
For it  eventually turns out  that  the efforts  for a reductive definition  of epistemic 
justification are quixotic. No matter how hard we try to find a natural property that 
reduces epistemic justification, this does not seem to be forthcoming.
We always seem to run into counterexamples that dash our hopeful efforts. And as 
we already discussed in section 1.2, this seems to be the case for all key normative 
(moral  and epistemic)  properties.  Although the search for reductive  definitions  is 
often hard business, the search for reductive definitions of normative notions proves 
to be even harder. Normative notions like goodness, truth, knowledge, rationality etc. 
for some almost enigmatic reason seem to tenaciously resist reductive analysis.
 I say almost enigmatic reason because the reason that impedes reductive analysis 
of normative notions is not enigmatic at all. It is a  semantic  reason. But the proper 
explication of this semantic reason plaguing analytic reductionist efforts can wait for 
the next section 2.3. For the time being, we can confirm that epistemic justification 
stands as no exception to this, I dare say, rule. It is another  irreducible  normative 
notion.
Let  us  now take  the  second  step  and  elucidate  what  conception  of  epistemic 
justification we are after.  The notion of epistemic justification is often employed by 
different  epistemologists  in  different  contexts  with  different  meanings  and 
accompanied with different presuppositions. Because ‘there are so many notions of 
justification in the literature that is difficult to identify a single target of dispute,’ 
some philosophers have observed that the concept of epistemic justification ‘seems 
to be in a conceptual muddle’ 56. 
These  philosophers  are  not  overstating,  I  think.  Philosophers  often  distinguish 
between objective and subjective justification (J.Pollock 1985), internal and external 
(E.Sosa 1991), between strong and weak (A.Goldman 1991), egocentric and socially-
based (R.Brandom 1995) etc. At the same time, some tie epistemic justification to 
56  I quote from L.Zagzebski (1996: 29-31). R.Fumerton (2002) also briefly makes the same 
observation.
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epistemic  duty  and  permissibility  (R.Chisholm  1966;  H.Vahid  2005),  others  to 
rationality and sensitivity to evidence (R.Feldman and E.Conee 2004; R.Wedgwood 
2007) and others to epistemic responsibility (R.Foley 2002) etc. 
It seems then that epistemic justification can be employed in a wide variety of 
senses and it is not easy to pull the strings of all these senses together and identify 
one target concept of epistemic jusitfcation. I don’t say that this is impossible,  as 
there  might  be  a  way  to  show  that  all  these  ways  of  speaking  about  epistemic 
justification can be pulled together in a nice systematic way that makes sense of this 
wide variety of talking about epistemic justification. But pursuing such a systematic 
and unified target concept of epistemic justification would have proven here a time 
and space-consuming enterprise. For reasons of economy then, I will make a fresh 
start of my own on the target concept of epistemic justification. 
By my lights, the account of epistemic justification we should be after needs to be 
rooted in our platitudinous  understanding of the concept.  As such,  an account  of 
epistemic justification should satisfy two minimal intuitions surrounding the concept 
in  ordinary  usage:  (a)  truth-conducivity  and  (b)  fallibility57.  A  conception  of 
epistemic  justification  running  against  what  these  two  minimal  intuitions  permit 
seems to me to be too revisionary to be of any substantial philosophical interest. For 
any  theory  of  epistemic  justification  should  be  continuous  with  our  ordinary 
understanding and use of the notion and thereby ‘save the epistemic phenomena’. 
Of course, there might be good independent argument for going revisionary about 
epistemic justification but I don’t see what this argument could be. Thus, I set aside 
the possibility of a revisionary conception of epistemic justification and remain allied 
to our platitudinous understanding of epistemic justification. Let me elaborate a bit 
more on the two identified minimal intuitions.
 The first key intuition, truth-conducivity, suggests that epistemic justification is a 
means to truth58. Justified beliefs, theories etc. are more likely to track the truth and 
get thinks right than beliefs and theories that are unjustified (e.g. depend on wishful 
thinking, mere fancy, lucky processes like guesses, premonitions and hunches etc.). 
57  K.Kappel (2010; ms) makes a nice distinction between knowledge-norms (‘k-norms’) and 
justification norms (‘j-norms’) and explains how these norms differ. My target concept of epistemic 
justification here is in agreement with his ‘j-norms’.
58  Compare L.Bonjour (1985:7): ‘The basic role of justification is that of a means to truth, a more 
directly attainable mediating link between our subjective point and our objective goal’.
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Intuitively, it is more likely that you will find your way to Larissa based on a reliable 
map (and your map reading skills) than by following a hunch or tossing a coin at 
every juncture. 
Many  would  add  that  it  is  an  analytic  (or  ‘conceptual’)  truth  that  epistemic 
justification  entails  truth-conducivity.  L.Bonjour  (1985:8),  for  instance,  says  that 
epistemic  justification  is  ‘essentially’  and  ‘internally’  related  to  truth.  That  is,  it 
seems to be true in virtue of the meaning of epistemic justification that it is a means 
to truth. An agent that has acquired the concept of epistemic justification can grasp 
that justification is conducive to truth acquisition. If he fails to grasp this, then we 
would be inclined to think that he does not really have acquired the concept, as he 
does not grasp what the concept minimally implies. 
The second key intuition, fallibility, suggests that any justified belief, theory etc. 
no matter how thoroughly justified might be it could turn out to be false. In ordinary 
discourse,  we take  it  that  although a  belief  may be thoroughly justified  it  might 
ultimately fail to be true. Although we may have a justified belief this might not be 
sufficient  to  deliver  truth  either  because  it  is  based  on  insufficient  evidence  or 
circumstantial, misleading evidence.
It should also be made clear that these two intuitions must be satisfied by any 
proposed theory of epistemic justification, not just analytic naturalistic reductionism. 
Even if analytic  naturalistic reductionism is not the right approach to a theory of 
epistemic  justification  (and  ‘the  epistemic  justification  puzzle’),  as  we  intend  to 
support, any other adequate theory must satisfy the intuitions of truth-conducivity 
and  fallibility.  Otherwise,  the  theory  will  seem  to  run  against  our  ordinary 
understanding of what epistemic justification as a notion involves. 
We  can  now  take  the  third  step  and  clarify  the  conditions  for  a  successful 
reduction by semantic analysis of the property of epistemic justification. The phrase 
‘naturalistic reduction by semantic analysis’ implies the identification of a property 
with a natural one. That is, the semantic analysis of a property to a natural one in 
terms  of  necessary  and sufficient  conditions.  If  the  target  property  is  adequately 
reduced to  a  natural  property,  then the  property is  nothing ‘over  and above’  the 
natural property itself.
 As any successful reduction by semantic analysis, the proposal must be immune 
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to counterexamples. If the analysis is to identify the essential property constitutive of 
the nature of epistemic justification, then surely this analysis should be unassailable. 
No possible case could be found defeating this analysis. Any belief instantiating the 
property of the proposed analysis should be epistemically justified, that is, likely to 
be true. Call this ‘the immunity requirement’.  
In  addition,  the  analysis  of  epistemic  justification  should  be  interestingly 
informative, if it is to have any genuine epistemic value. Many people assume that 
any such analysis of a normative epistemic property -if it is to be fully interesting and 
informative- must be non-circular. It must analyse the normative epistemic property 
of justification to a non-normative, non-epistemic, natural property59. Otherwise, the 
suggested analyses will threaten to be rendered uninformative or if informative only 
trivially  so.  For  example,  we  can  say  that  what  is  (epistemically)  justified  is 
evidence-based  or  that  what  is  rational  is  reasonable  or  that  what  is  good  is 
honourable  or  praiseworthy,  but  these  analyses  are  rather  superficial  and  only 
trivially informative (if at all)  because they circularly analyse normative terms to 
other normative terms. 
But other philosophers are more sanguine and point out that we can distinguish 
between narrow circular and wide circular analyses. While narrow circular analyses 
are trivial and vacuous and therefore uninteresting and uninformative, wide circular 
analyses  are  sometimes  both  philosophically  interesting  and informative.  A good 
example for such informative wide circular analysis constitutes the case of colour 
concepts.  Some philosophers  like  J.McDowell  (1994)  analyse,  let  us  say red,  by 
saying  that  for  something  ‘to  be  red’  is  for  that  thing  ‘to  look  red  to  normal 
perceivers in ideal environmental conditions’60. This analysis  is obviously circular 
because the term in question reappears in the proposed analysis but it still seems to 
be informative. It informs us of what it takes for something ‘to be red’. 
But  though  circular  this  analysis  may  be  ‘innocent’,  they  claim,  because  our 
account is wide enough to be interesting and informative as an adequate analysis 
59  Compare A.Goldman (1991:105) : ‘…I want a theory of justified belief to specify in non-epistemic 
terms when a belief is justified’ and J.Kim (2008 :532) : ‘...the criteria of justified belief must be 
formulated on the basis of descriptive or naturalistic terms alone, without the use of any evaluative or 
normative ones, whether epistemic or of another kind’. See also R.Chisholm (1966: 11): ‘If we are to 
solve the problem, we must find a definition of knowledge that is not patently circular’ (Chisholm’s 
emphasis).
60  See J.McDowell (1994: 29-31).
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should be. Besides, as McDowell suggests, colour concepts ‘come only as elements 
in a bundle of concepts that must be acquired together’ (McDowell 1994:31) and this 
seems to imply that  they take such concepts to be inter-definable.  That  is,  to be 
unanalysable  in  non-circular  terms  but  still  to  be  adequately  analysable  in  wide 
circular terms. Given that what really matters in analyses is informativeness and that 
not only non-circular analyses could be interesting and informative but wide-circular 
analyses as well, any non-circular or wide-circular account is properly informative 
will do. Call this ‘the informativeness requirement’. 
To wrap up, first, these are the intuitions we found that need to be satisfied by any 
adequate theory of epistemic justification:
• Truth-conducivity  Intuition:  Any  theory  of  epistemic  justification  must 
account  for  its  truth-conducive  nature.  That  is,  how  epistemic  justification  is 
conducive to truth-acquisition.
• Fallibility  Intuition:  Any theory of  epistemic  justification  must  satisfy the 
fallibility  intuition.  That  is,  how epistemic  justification  does  not  entail  truth (nor 
knowledge).
Second, these are the conditions we found that need to be satisfied if we are to 
discover a successful semantic analysis of the property of epistemic justification:
• The Immunity Requirement: ‘A successful semantic analysis of the property 
of epistemic justification (in necessary and sufficient conditions) must be immune to 
counterexamples’.
• The  Informativeness  Requirement:  ‘A successful  semantic  analysis  of  the 
property  of  epistemic  justification  (non-circular  or  wide-circular)  must  be 
informative’.
Finally, the difficult question that now confronts us is how to exactly understand 
the somewhat vague notion of a natural property and overall the natural/nonnatural 
distinction. This is the fourth and last preparatory step we take in this section. It is a 
delicate  question  that  has  perplexed  Moore  (2000)  himself  and  still  perplexes 
philosophers ever since. Moore (2000:13) gave (at least) three different accounts of 
what a natural property is and later on humbly recognised that his ‘attempts to define 
‘natural  property’  are  hopelessly  confused’61.  The  question  is  still  perplexing 
61  See T.Baldwin’s introduction in Moore (2000).
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philosophers  who provide  a  wide array of  different  accounts  of  how to  define  a 
natural property and how, more broadly, to gloss the natural/nonnatural distinction62. 
I will here briefly suggest an account of natural property and attempt a gloss of the 
natural/nonnatural distinction, drawing from one of Moore’s own accounts. The one 
he later thought to be the correct one63.
As you might recall from section 1.1, I there very quickly endorsed the popular 
Shoemaker-Lewis account of a natural property and suggested that a natural property 
is an empirical property,  one with independent causal efficacy.  But this definition 
might  not  seem  very  helpful  because  the  paradigmatic  candidate  analyses  of 
epistemic justification do not seem in a straightforward, undisputed manner to be 
empirical properties. That is, properties with independent causal efficacy. They are 
not properties ‘out there’ in the natural world that impinge and causally interact with 
our senses and they are not studied by natural science in any straightforward way. 
Think,  for  example,  of  the  property  of  finding  a  belief  (rationally)  intuitive  or 
coherent. 
Rather, they are mental (or psychological) properties and it is a matter of heated 
dispute  whether mental  properties  are themselves  natural  or nonnatural.  They are 
properties instantiated by the cognitive architecture (or the ‘mind’) of a person and it 
is not clear whether the ‘mind’ of a person is reducible to natural properties (like 
brain states) or not. Mental properties like finding a belief to be coherent or finding a 
belief to be rational or being a person with reliable belief-forming processes etc. are 
properties instantiated by the cognitive architecture of a person and, as such, they are 
not directly empirical or publicly observable (unless someone adheres to some form 
of obsolete by now Rylean behaviourism)64.
These  mental  properties  can  be  seen  as  natural  if  and  only  if  we  accept  a 
minimally naturalistic picture of the mental65. A minimally naturalistic picture of the 
mental, if it is to remain broadly naturalistic, must at least accept these two central to 
naturalism claims: ‘the causal closure of the natural realm’ and ‘the supervenience of 
the mental on the natural’. These are claims, of course, that any picture of the mental 
must satisfy if it is to have any luck, not just a naturalistic one and accordingly few if 
62  For discussion see M. Ridge (2003).
63  Moore (2000: 13) acknowledges this in his preface to the second edition.
64  I allude to G.Ryle (1949).
65  See J.Kim (2000, 2005) and D.Chalmers (1996).
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any philosophers of mind explicitly deny or even question these claims66.
 The causal closure of the natural realm suggests that for any natural effect E there 
is an independent and sufficient natural cause C. It states that every natural event has 
a certain independent and sufficient natural cause. Nothing from outside the natural 
realm  need  causally  intervene  with  happenings  within  the  natural,  though,  the 
principle  by itself  does  not  logically  or  metaphysically  preclude  such  nonnatural 
causal  interventions.  That would beg the question against  dualists  who think that 
there is such causal interaction67. 
All  causal  closure  says  is  that  we need  not  postulate  such  nonnatural,  causal 
intervention  for  explaining  natural  events.  Such  postulation  of  nonnatural  causal 
intervention  is  shown  to  be  explanatorily  gratuitous  and,  therefore,  redundant 
because there are sufficient natural causes that can do the explanatory job quite well 
on their own. No invocation of nonnatural causes is required for explaining natural 
phenomena. The causal closure of the natural underlies empirical scientific inquiry 
and  abandoning this  would  imply  the  rejection  of  empirical  scientific  inquiry  as 
such68. 
The second claim, the supervenience of the mental on the natural suggests that a 
mental property (like being in pain or having a belief) necessarily supervenes on a 
natural property (like C-fibers firing or other brain states), though, the converse does 
not  hold69.  As philosophers of mind say,  mental  properties  are  being  realized on 
natural  properties.  Unlike  normative  (moral  and  epistemic)  supervenience,  this 
supervenience claim is not an a priori conceptual one. It is rather an a posteriori one 
bolstered  by  our  empirical  findings  in  neuroscience  showing  a  clear  correlation 
between  mental  and  natural  properties.  For  this  reason,  the  necessity  operator  is 
usually construed in nomological and not logical (or conceptual) terms.
The supervenience claim marks the weakest a naturalistic theory of the mental can 
66  Even property dualists like emergentists often want to accept these.
67  See Kim (2005) for how such strong formulation of the causal closure should be avoided because it 
begs the question against dualists.
68  Some philosophers, though, with dualist sympathies bite the bullet and reject causal closure. See 
for example how T.Crane’s (2001) emergentism rejects causal closure.
69  Philosophers of mind speak in terms of physical properties instead of natural properties but I will 
speak in terms of natural properties in order to avoid any possible complications. There is big 
controversy of course over whether natural (social, biological, chemical, meteorological, geological 
etc.) properties are or will ever be reducible to physical properties. See Kim (2005) for some 
discussion.
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get.  If  we  deny  the  psychonatural  supervenience  claim,  then  we  deny  that  a 
naturalistic picture of the mental is on the right track (or indeed any picture of the 
mental) because we accept that mental properties are not being instantiated (and are 
not being ontologically dependent) on natural properties. Thus, we open the road to 
strong dualist positions. That is, positions considering mental properties to be ‘free-
floating’, distinct and irreducible to natural properties. 
Supervenience is, of course, a weaker notion than reduction and reduction is also a 
weaker  notion  than  elimination  and naturalistically  minded  philosophers  of  mind 
sometimes go after such stronger positions. But these complications need not (and 
cannot) concern us in this context. For the purposes of our discussion here, I assume 
that such a broadly minimal naturalistic picture of the mental should be on the right 
track,  though, I  remain neutral  on what  exactly naturalistic  picture  of the mental 
might be the correct one. 
With the conceded assumption of a minimal naturalistic picture of the mental in 
hand,  we  now  have  the  tools  for  a  reinterpretation  of  the  natural/nonnatural 
distinction. In Moore’s (2000) footsteps, I reinterpret the notion of natural property 
in terms of scientific inquiry.  I propose that  a natural property is one that can be 
studied by the natural sciences and psychology, where psychology is -according to 
our  minimal  naturalistic  understanding  of  the  mental-  understood  as  a  broadly 
naturalistic  discipline.  Accordingly,  a  nonnatural  property  is  one  that  cannot  be 
studied  by  the  natural  sciences  and  psychology  e.g.  being  an  angel.  If  there  are 
angels, they cannot be studied by natural sciences and psychology. 
This interpretation of a natural property is consistent with the initial gloss in terms 
of  independent  causal  efficacy  because  these  mental  properties  are  themselves 
considered to be broadly natural properties and, as such, to be causally efficacious. 
Of  course,  how  to  spell  out  and  defend  this  claim  is  a  complicated  and  very 
contentious story in the debates of mental causation. Causal role functionalists like 
J.Kim (2000,  2005)  and  D.Chalmers  (1996)  defend  this  thesis  about  intentional 
properties (though not about phenomenal properties) but this is something that need 
not (and cannot) directly concern us here. The conundrum of mental causation is one 
that, admittedly, we quickly have to sidestep.
This fourth step signals the end of this preparatory section. With the explication 
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of, first, the theoretical commitments of analytic naturalistic reductionism, second, 
the conception of epistemic justification we are after, third, the necessary conditions 
for a successful reduction by semantic analysis of epistemic justification and, fourth, 
the gloss of the natural/nonnatural distinction in hand, we can go on to introduce the 
two classic metaethical arguments and apply them to metaepistemic terrain: Moore’s 
‘open question argument’ and Hume’s ‘is/ought argument’.  I  think they create an 
interesting  case  against  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism.  The  interesting  case 
against naturalistic reductionism will, I hope, become evident from the theoretical 
introduction of the next section, although the practical application proper to analytic 
reductionist approaches will come in the next chapter 3.
2.3 The Moorean/Humean Lesson
The preparatory work being completed in the last section, the way opens for the 
argument against the plausibility of analytic naturalistic reductionism; the argument 
that seems to support the conclusion that analytic naturalistic reductionism is really a 
quixotic project.
In this section, I introduce the argument that stems from two well-known classic 
arguments:  Moore’s ‘open question argument’ and Hume’s ‘is/ought argument’.  I 
then elicit from these classic arguments what I call ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’. I 
go on in the next chapter 3 to apply ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ elicited from 
these arguments to theories with analytic reductionist aspirations and examine how 
they cope. As I have already divulged in section 2.1, they won’t cope very well; but 
first to the introduction of the argument itself. 
It  is  common  knowledge  that  the  analytic  reductionist  literature  on  epistemic 
justification is virtually vast and, hence, impossible to explore in its utmost limits in 
the  current  context;  and  not  just  vast,  but  also  deeply  complicated  because  it 
addresses delicate issues. But we won’t be seduced by the temptation to explore this 
literature to its utmost limits and in substantial depth here. If we, indeed, had opted to 
explore this literature to its utmost limits and to some detailed substantial depth here, 
this would surely have drifted us out of our course for a more comprehensive picture 
in  the  debates  surrounding  epistemic  justification.  In  the  light  of  the  reasonably 
limited  scope  of  a  thesis,  it  would  seriously  vitiate  our  more  comprehensive 
aspirations. 
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Hopefully, though, this won’t blunt the sharpness of the argument of the thesis 
because we have a dialectical ‘ace up our sleeve’. This ace makes unnecessary the 
exploration of this vast literature to its utmost limits and to detailed substantial depth 
without, I think, adversely affecting the sharpness of the argument of the thesis. The 
dialectical ace up our sleeve is that we can deliver a strike of surgical accuracy that 
goes directly to the root of the issue and exposes the misguided analytic reductionist 
pretensions of all these positions. 
The arguments that ‘deliver this strike of surgical accuracy’ are the metaepistemic 
versions of two classical arguments first applied to metaethical discourse: Moore’s 
‘open question argument’ and Hume’s ‘is /ought argument’. These arguments seem 
to show that the analytic naturalistic reductionist  project is rather  unlikely to ever 
succeed. In all evidence, it is only a quixotic task that is doomed to endless repetition 
and constant failure. 
Of course, the view that epistemic justification is irreducible and that the project 
of analytic naturalistic reductionism is quixotic is not new in the literature. There are 
a  number  of  philosophers that  have subjected analytic  reductionist  approaches  to 
scrutiny and found them to succumb to counterexamples (J.Pollock 1985; W.Alston 
2005). From the adduction of counterexamples and motivated by frustration and the 
pessimistic  feeling that no successful reductionist  approach looms in the horizon, 
they  concluded  that  we  should  dump  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism  as  a 
theoretical project. 
But I think what, perhaps, is not so new (or at least not so well appreciated) by 
these anti-reductionist philosophers in the literature is the almost enigmatic reason 
that epistemic justification (and the other key normative notions), in all evidence, 
will continue to resist reduction by semantic analysis. The reason, as is hinted in the 
previous  section,  is  semantic,  and  goes  deeper  than  mere  refutation  by  way  of 
invocation of counterexamples. Actually, it is the reality of this semantic reason that 
is the heart of the matter because it is what gives rise to counterexamples in the first 
place. This semantic reason is revealed by the two well-known classical arguments: 
Moore’s ‘open question argument’ and Hume’s ‘is/ought argument’.
These two classic arguments seem to bring to the open the semantic reason that 
explains why analytic reductionist approaches are vulnerable to counterexamples and 
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failure.  Once the semantic  reason motivating  counterexamples  is  unveiled in  this 
section,  in  the  next  chapter  we  concisely  go  through  some  of  the  main 
counterexamples  and  objections  that  some  of  the  prominent  analytic  reductionist 
approaches run into. 
But even this enumeration of problems for prominent reductionist approaches is 
not  meant  to  be  exhaustive.  Something  like  that  would  have  required  an  entire 
monograph exclusively devoted to this negative portrayal. Rather, it is only meant to 
make sufficiently clear the semantic reason revealed by Moore’s and Hume’s classic 
arguments that leaves analytic reductionist theories exposed, open and vulnerable to 
counterexamples. But let us now turn to the two arguments that reveal the semantic 
reason  leaving  reductionist  approaches  exposed  and  vulnerable  and  explain  why 
normative concepts, in all evidence, resisted, resist and will keep resisting reduction 
by semantic analysis.
We are already familiar  from section 1.3 with Moore’s (2000) ‘open question 
argument’.  It  was  first  applied  to  the  moral  property  of  goodness  and  with  this 
argument, Moore sought to dissolve the analytic naturalistic reductionist pretensions 
of various kinds of naturalists, among others, 19th ce. utilitarians like J.S.Mill, social 
Darwinists like H.Spencer, hedonists etc. With his exploitation of ‘the open question 
argument’, he reached the conclusion that any effort to reduce goodness to a certain 
naturalistic  property  committed  what  he  (infelicitously)  dubbed  ‘the  naturalistic  
fallacy’. There is no such natural property to be found and the quest for it -like the 
part of moral philosophy that adheres to it- is constantly committing ‘the naturalistic 
fallacy’. That is, fallaciously striving to reduce goodness to a natural property.
Moore’s argument appeals to the semantic intuitions of competent users of moral 
language. It claims that a clear-headed and thoughtful agent, without any semantic 
confusion, can always raise doubts and resist the reduction of a moral property M 
(e.g. goodness) to a natural property N (e.g. usefulness). He can always raise doubts 
and resist the reduction because there is an inherent semantic ‘open feel’ in any such 
reduction.  In  the  face of this  inherent  semantic  ‘open feel’,  an agent  can always 
question and resist the alleged reduction with expressions like: ‘I understand what 
desirability or usefulness is, but I don’t see how or why desirability or usefulness is 
good’.
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 A few centuries earlier than Moore, Hume (1986) with his ‘is/ought argument’ 
pointed to the same anti-reductionist conclusion with Moore. In a famous passage in 
the  Treatise, he claimed that any moral  ‘ought’ deduced from a certain referential 
‘is’ remains always doubtful and, hence, resistible70. Given that one acts only under 
‘the guise of the good’, no matter whether something is pleasant, desirable, useful, 
reputable, profitable etc. there is always an inherent semantic ‘open feel’ between 
this referential ‘is’ and the normative ‘ought to do’. A clear-headed and thoughtful 
agent  can  always  question  and  resist  a  normative  injunction  of  the  form  ‘x  is 
pleasant, therefore, you ought to x’ because stumbles on an inherent semantic ‘open 
feel’. 
It  is  this  inherent  semantic  ‘open  feel’  ubiquitously  accompanying  efforts  to 
reduce normative properties to a natural property or deduce a normative injunction 
from  a  natural  property  that  explains  the  constant  failure  of  such  reductionist 
approaches.  This  is  the  semantic  reason  that  we  had  been  talking  about.  This 
inherent semantic ‘open feel’ impedes a clear-headed and thoughtful agent from any 
quick reduction of a normative property to a natural property or any quick deduction 
of a normative injunction (an ‘ought to do’ or ‘ought to believe’)  from a natural 
property71.
But  we should  be  careful  not  to  exaggerate  the  exact  logical  import  of  these 
arguments. It should be made clear that, as we already noted in section 1.3 in relation 
with Moore’s argument, these classic arguments do not provide a  conclusive case 
against analytic naturalistic reductionism. Although Moore was impressed enough by 
his  argument  to go on and infelicitously call  any attempt for analytic  naturalistic 
reduction of goodness as committing ‘the naturalistic  fallacy’,  there  is  no logical 
fallacy involved in such reductionist attempts. 
Analogously,  Hume’s  ‘is/ought  argument’  is  also  sometimes  referred  to  as 
‘Hume’s Law’ but this is equally infelicitous. In any case, it is infelicitous if we take 
the meaning of the notion of ‘law’ to be nomological. In the discussion following 
below, I discuss only the exact logical import of Moore’s ‘open question argument’ 
70  See Hume (1986:  521). The argument appears in Book III, Part I, Section I.
71  Similar attitudes are sometimes expressed in literature. Compare F.Dostoyevsky (2003: 813): ‘What 
kind of belief is it that is forced upon a man? What is more, in the matter of belief no proof is of any 
avail, especially the material sort. Thomas believed not because he saw the risen Christ, but because 
he already desired to believe’.
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but  the  same  points  evidently  can  be  transposed  and  applied  to  the  equally 
infelicitous calling of Hume’s ‘is/ought argument’ a ‘law’. 
Obviously, it is logically possible that there might be a natural property reducing 
goodness  or  epistemic  justification  but  we didn’t  yet work  hard  and ingeniously 
enough to discover it; at least there is no prima facie incoherence in envisaging such 
a logical possibility. Moore (2000:5-6) himself later acknowledged that ‘it was a pure 
mistake’ to treat the argument as conclusive and took it to be only ‘very probably 
so’. Moreoever, the argument has also nothing to do with the natural in particular 
either. Moore (2000) himself applied his ‘open question argument’ to theological-
nonnatural analyses of goodness (like divine command theory) and find them failing 
for the same reasons.  
But although Moore was too quick to seize on his argument and infelicitously 
speak about ‘the naturalistic fallacy’, his argument does seem to capture something 
intuitively deep. It captures the fact that the inherent semantic intuitions of ‘open 
feel’ constantly undermine reductionist efforts. In the light then of these ‘open feel’ 
semantic  intuitions  and  the  2,500  years  record  of  failure  in  analysing  epistemic 
justification  (since Plato’s  Theatetus)  it  is  reasonable  to  be pessimistic  about  the 
prospects  of  naturalistic  reductionism.  This  pessimism,  though,  should  not  be 
mistaken for something that it is not. 
It is not a conclusive rebuttal of reductionism. It can be only seen as an inference  
to the best explanation  for our inherent semantic intuitions of ‘open feel’ and the 
long history of failures in reducing epistemic justification (and other key normative 
terms),  though, no ‘naturalistic  fallacy’  is involved.  Thus, although it  is  logically 
possible  that  there  is  ‘out  there’  in  nature  a  certain  property  that  does  reduce 
epistemic  justification  and patiently  waits  to  be discovered,  in  all  evidence,  it  is 
rather unlikely that the existence of such a property is metaphysically possible (as I 
said, the same considerations apply to Hume’s ‘is/ought argument’).  
To end this short digression on the logical import of the classical arguments and 
revert  back to our discussion, the idea is that  an epistemic version of these well-
known classic arguments can be applied with equal aptitude to epistemic discourse 
and undermine analytic reductionist approaches to epistemic justification. 
The epistemic version of Moore’s ‘open question argument’ claims that a clear-
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headed epistemic agent, without any semantic confusion, can always raise doubts and 
questions about the reduction of an epistemic property E (e.g. epistemic justification, 
rationality)  to  any  natural  property  N  (e.g.  coherence,  self-presentation).  The 
reduction will always seem to have an inherent semantic ‘open feel’ that makes it 
appear wide open whether the suggested natural property can successfully reduce the 
epistemic property. Taking advantage of this ‘open feel’ an epistemic agent can resist 
the reduction with expressions like ‘So what?’, ‘But this is not really compelling’ etc.
It is this inherent semantic ‘open feel’ that stirs the sceptical suspicion that for any 
proposed reduction of an epistemic property to a natural property,  no matter  how 
elaborate and complex, there is an adequate counterexample just around the corner. 
The sceptical suspicion surrounding any reductive effort is actually so pervasive that 
as T.Williamson (2000:31) has nicely put it (in terms of knowledge):
‘[E]ven  if  some  sufficiently  complex  analysis  never  succumbed  to 
counterexamples, that would not entail the identity of the analysing concept 
with the concept knows. Indeed, the equation of the concepts might well lead 
to more puzzlement rather than less’. 
Williamson’s  point,  I  think,  goes  deep  because  it  captures  the  intuition  that 
analytic reductionist approaches to normative notions do not just fail because of the 
emergence of defeating counterexamples; as many antireductionists about epistemic 
justification in the literature  seem to presume.  They fail  because of the semantic 
reason we identified, the inherent semantic ‘open feel’ ubiquitously concomitant of 
such  reductive  efforts.  Counterexamples  are  just  the  inevitable  outcome  of  this 
inherent semantic ‘open feel’. As Williamson says, even if we found an analysis that 
seems to resist counterexamples, this would ‘lead to more puzzlement rather than 
less’  because the inherent  semantic  ‘open feel’  prepares  us  for nothing less  than 
counterexamples.  
Of course, in practice, analytic reductionist approaches to normative properties are 
not so resistant to counterexamples. If they were, then perhaps we would be puzzled 
-as  Williamson  foresees  -  or  even  tempted  to  have  second  thoughts  about  the 
irreducibility of normative properties, despite the inherent semantic ‘open feel’. But 
the fact that they are not so resistant to counterexamples saves us the trouble. For 
instance, suppose we propose that epistemic justification is reducible to coherence. 
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The inherent semantic ‘open feel’ of the identification of epistemic justification to 
coherence will, initially, prevent a thoughtful, though clear-headed, agent from any 
quick identification of the two. Call this initial stage ‘the semantic halt step’. 
Subsequently, the semantic ‘open feel’ will stir sceptical suspicion that this can’t 
be the right analysis. Once sceptical suspicion intrudes, it is pretty much an exercise 
of  creativity  and  imagination  finding  emergent  counterexamples  that  defeat  the 
reduction. This is bread and butter for fastidious philosophers that always relish in 
defeating  theories  with  exotic  (and  sometimes  plain  simple)  counterexamples. 
Someone can claim, for example, that there are cases of coherent beliefs that are not 
epistemically justified and then proceed to adduce such cases. 
Take  for  example  the  case  of  an  epistemic  agent  who  thinks  that  a  belief  is 
justified because it coheres and it is supported by his web of beliefs while at the same 
time overlooks substantial evidence (reliable testimony etc.) against this belief. This 
is a belief that although coherent, it seems epistemically unjustified and what this 
shows is that mere coherence is not sufficient for justification. Call this second stage 
‘the defeating step’.
The defeating step could also be put in terms of ‘multiple realizability’.  As in 
philosophy  of  mind  debates,  type-identity  reductionism  has  been  considered 
implausible because mental properties are multibly realizable, that is, realized by the 
different  natural  properties  of  different  brain  structures72,  analytic  naturalistic 
reductionism  is  to  be  considered  implausible  because  normative  properties  are 
equally multibly realizable by different natural properties.  For example, goodness 
might  supervene in different  contexts  on varying  natural  properties  like pleasure, 
usefulness,  rational  intuitions,  desire  satisfaction  etc.  and  epistemic  justification 
might supervene in different contexts on coherence,  rational intuitions,  reliability, 
epistemic character and virtues etc.  
Multible  realizability  vitiates  reductionism because  it  shows  that  higher  order 
properties (mental and normative) being realized by different natural properties in 
different  contexts  cannot  be  reduced  to  any  single  natural  property.  Mental  and 
normative properties are being realized by and supervene on many, perhaps infinite, 
natural  properties  and this  vitiates  the possibility  of reduction  to  a  single  natural 




The  same  conclusion  is  driven  by  the  epistemic  version  of  Hume’s  ‘is/ought 
argument’. Given that one ought to believe only what is (best) justified, no matter 
what natural property a certain belief instantiates we cannot deduce that one ought to 
endorse  that  certain  belief.  A belief  might  be  coherent,  rationally  intuitive,  self-
presenting, formed by reliable cognitive processes, motivated by epistemic virtues 
etc.  but  it  won’t  be  compelling  that  one  ought  to  endorse  that  certain  belief  in 
question. Let us call this anti-reductionist lesson drawn from the epistemic version of 
Moore’s  ‘open  question  argument’  and  Hume’s  ‘is/ought  argument’  ‘the 
Moorean/Humean lesson’.
It  seems  then  that  there  is  a  semantic  gap that  needs  to  be  bridged  between 
assigning a natural property to a belief and the necessary endorsement of that belief. 
The ‘necessary endorsement’ is what this semantic gap of inherent ‘open feel’ allows 
a  clear-headed  and  thoughtful  agent  to  question  and  resist.  This  is  a  crucial 
repercussion  of  all  reductionist  approaches  that  assume ‘the  referential  semantics 
assumption’.  Referentialists/reductionists  think  that  the  element  of  necessary 
endorsement will follow from the correct identification of the property of goodness, 
rightness etc. (in the moral case) and epistemic justification, rationality etc. (in the 
epistemic case). But such identification is constantly elusive (if  we are right that 
naturalistic reductionism fails, at least) and, hence, they constantly miss this element 
of necessary endorsement. 
The failure to capture the element of endorsement is important to be recognised 
and specified because our positive story in Ch.7 will reverse the referentialist order 
of explanation that seems to take the order of explanation backwards and ‘put the 
cart  before  the horse’.  That  is,  instead  of  starting  with ‘the  referential  semantics 
assumption’ and seeking to reduce justification in order to capture the element of 
73  Two points are in order here. First, someone might suspect that my talk of multiple realizability 
of mental properties clashes with my commitment to a minimally naturalistic picture of the mental. 
Yet, this is not the case as multiple realizability clashes only with type-identity reductionism and is 
consistent  with  functionalist  pictures  of  the  mental.  Causal  role  functionalism  as  defended  by 
D.Chalmers (1996) and J.Kim (2000, 2005) is a robustly naturalistic picture of the mental –at least 
as far as intentional  mental properties are concerned. Second, as it  has happened in the case of 
mental  properties,  someone  might  suspect  that  epistemic  justification  is  after  all,  a  wildly 
disjunctive property. That is, a belief if justified if and only if it is either coherent or self-presenting 
or produced by reliable belief-forming processes or… etc.’. Again, this is too quick, as disjunctive 
properties do not seem to be explanatorily fruitful. I can’t expand on this point here but for some 
good discussion see Kim (2000: 107-9). 
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endorsement,  it  will  jettison  the  referential  semantics  assumption,  opt  for  a  ‘use 
semantic strategy’ and start from how we use justification assertions and attributions 
and the element of endorsement. That is, it will put things right and place ‘the horse 
before  the  cart’;  or  so  I  will  argue.  Keep  this  in  mind  because  it  is  a  crucial 
dialectical manoeuvre that will surface again in Chs.6-7.
With  the  introduction  of  an  epistemic  version  of  Moore’s  ‘open  question 
argument’  and  Hume’s  ‘is/ought  argument’  and  the  drawn  anti-reductionist 
‘Moorean/Humean lesson’ under our belt, in the next chapter we turn to the practical 
application  of  this  theoretical  lesson  to  various  approaches  with  reductionist 
aspirations.  It  remains  to  be seen whether,  indeed,  theory meets  practice,  for we 
know very  well  that  often  abstract  theory  does  not  square  with  ‘down to  earth’ 
practical application.
Let us now take stock before we move on to the practical application task.
2.4 Conclusion and Summary of the Argument 
In  this  preparatory  chapter,  I  have  strived  to  accomplish  two things.  First,  in 
section 2.2, I made explicit the theoretical commitments of naturalistic reductionism, 
specified  the  conception  of  epistemic  justification  we  are  after,  clarified  the 
conditions for a successful reduction of epistemic justification and proposed a certain 
gloss  of  the  natural/nonnatural  distinction.  This  discussion  was  incumbent  on  us 
because  these  issues  underlie  the  critique  of  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism 
following in the next chapter. 
Second, in section 2.3, as a prelude of the ensuing critique of analytic naturalistic 
reductionism in Ch.3, I introduced an epistemic version of two classical arguments: 
Moore’s ‘open question argument’ and Hume’s ‘is/ought argument’.  As I argued, 
these  classical  arguments  explain  the  semantic  reason  that  efforts  to  reduce 
normative  concepts  (like  epistemic  justification)  systematically  founder.  The 
semantic reason is the inherent semantic ‘open feel’ ubiquitously accompanying any 
attempted reduction of a normative property to a natural  and any deduction of a 
normative injunction from a natural property. 
Based  on  this  semantic  reason,  I  then  elicited  from  these  arguments  ‘the 
Moorean/Humean lesson’,  an anti-reductionist  lesson intended to  be applied with 
pernicious effect on analytic reductionist aspirations. The ‘Moorean/Humean lesson’ 
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suggests that any such analytic reduction of a normative property and any analytic 
deduction  of  a  normative  injunction  initially  meet  ‘the  semantic  halt  step’  and 
subsequently ‘the defeating step’. 
Whether this application of ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ can indeed have this 
allegedly undermining and pernicious effect on analytic reductionist aspirations, it is 
something that needs to be decided in the next chapter. Let us turn page to examine 
whether in this case abstract theory does meet ‘down to earth’ practice.
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Chapter 3 The Problems of Analytic Naturalistic 
Reductionism
3.1 Introduction
With the preparatory work of Ch.2 in hand, in this chapter we are ready to apply 
‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ on analytic naturalistic reductionism. The argument 
has already been introduced in section 2.3 and what remains is simply its practical 
application. Thus, in sections 3.2-3.3, I step forward to apply ‘the Moorean/Humean 
lesson’  -as  elicited  from the  Moorean/Humean  classic  arguments  in  section  2.3- 
against the persistent effort to reduce by semantic analysis the property of epistemic 
justification.
The practical application of ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ comes in two stages. 
First,  in  section  3.2,  I  apply  the  lesson  to  the  internalist  analytic  reductionist 
approaches of (classical and non-classical) foundationalism, holistic coherentism and 
L.Zagzebski’s  (1996)  virtue  epistemology74.  Second,  in  section  3.3,  I  apply  ‘the 
Moorean/Humean lesson’ to the externalist reductionist approaches of A. Goldman’s 
(1991)  process  reliabilism  and  E.Sosa’s  (1991,  2007)  virtue  reliabilism.  This 
application seriously undermines both internalist and externalist analytic naturalistic 
reductionism. All these efforts are called into question. 
Finally, in section 3.4, I close with a conclusion and summary of the argument and 
prepare the ground for the critique of synthetic naturalistic reductionism following in 
the next Ch. 4. This conclusion and summary will mark the end of the first part of 
our critical exploration of referential naturalism. 
But an important clarification is incumbent on us before we start examining these 
approaches.  By  calling  the  approaches  just  mentioned  above  ‘reductive’  I  have, 
admittedly, taken some liberties with these theories, as it is not clear that all these 
74  I follow the mainstream view and consider the third option of Agrippa’s trilemma, infinitism, to be 
entirely implausible and therefore ignore it.  Infinitism is the view that the justification of a belief 
requires  the  pursuit  of  justificatory reasons  ad  infinitum.  One  important  reason  counting  against 
infinitism is that it is cognitively too demanding for cognitively finite beings like us. As Wittgenstein 
(1953:136)  has  said:  ‘Justification comes  by experience  to  an  end.  If  it  did  not  it  would  not  be 
justification’. Another reason is that it seems to be self-defeating, as it claims that belief in infinitism 
is  justified but  this  very belief  does  not  pursue  justificatory reasons to  infinity.  But  for  a  heroic 
defence of infinitism against all odds see P.Klein (2008).
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approaches  were  meant  to  be  reductive  by  their  proponents.  I  have  taken  these 
liberties  because  the  literature  explicitly  on  meta-epistemology  is  at  this  stage 
somewhat sparse, and much of it is on expressivism rather than reductionist analyses. 
Part of the problem is that meta-epistemology is a relatively nascent field of inquiry 
and the distinction between first-order, substantive epistemology and second-order, 
meta-epistemology is not always clearly marked, in a way that is reminiscent of the 
state of ethics in the early days of meta-ethics75. 
The  standard  view  is  that  meta-ethics  is  independent  of  first-order  ethics  as 
someone  could  be  an  expressivist  about  metaethics  but  a  consequentialist  or 
deontologist about first-order ethics. The same view should hold about the epistemic 
domain,  as  someone  could  be  an  expressivist  about  meta-epistemology  and  a 
coherentist or foundationalist about first-order epistemology. Thus, given the sparse 
literature on meta-epistemology and that the distinction between metaepistemology 
and substantive  epistemology is  often not  clearly  marked,  the  characterization  of 
these theories as ‘reductive’ should be taken with a pinch of salt. I simply speculate 
about what certain prominent theories would look like if transposed into reductive 
analyses,  without  insisting  that  their  actual  defenders  intend  their  views  to  be 
understood in this way.
With  this  important  clarification  drawn,  we  can  now  turn  to  the  critical 
examination of reductionist theories; or at least theories that speculatively could be 
seen as reductionist.
3.2 The Moorean/Humean Lesson Applied to Internalist Theories
Before starting the examination of internalist positions, three points pertinent to 
our discussion should be made clear. The first two points have already been touched 
in section 2.3, but I will reiterate them because they are important. First, this list of 
theories is far from exhaustive (and it is not meant to be). The literature, for example, 
only on virtue epistemology is vast and diverse and, reasonably, I can’t linger here 
for too long. 
Second,  the  brief  objections  cited  to  each  approach  are  again  far  from being 
75  Moore’s  (2000)  own  reductionist  targets  about  goodness,  perhaps,  couldn’t  be  classified  as 
‘reductive’ (hedonists,  utilitarians,  social  Darwinists etc.)  themselves.  The distinction in the moral 
domain still causes disagreements sometimes. See the debate between G.Sayre-McCord (1997b) and 
M.Smith  (1997)  on  whether  M.Smith’s  (1994)  is  about  ‘the  moral  problem’ or  ‘the  metaethical 
problem’.
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exhaustive. Each of the theories I examine is venerable and, thus, deserves a fairly 
much  longer  and  more  attentive  treatment  than  the  concise  one  provided  here. 
Unfortunately, this cannot be done in this inopportune context. This is the reason that 
in  the preface  I  warned that  the  thesis  intends  to  capture  a  more  comprehensive 
picture and, hence, aspires to provide breadth of scope rather than substantial depth. 
However, as I explained in section 2.3, I don’t think that either the privileging of 
breadth  of  scope  over  substantial  depth  or  the  examination  of  only  some 
paradigmatic reductionist approaches instead of all, adversely affects the sharpness 
of the argument of the thesis. I think it does not, due to the dialectical ace of ‘the 
Moorean/Humean  lesson’.  As  we  have  already  argued  in  Ch.2,  the 
‘Moorean/Humean  lesson’  both  strikes  with  surgical  accuracy  at  the  semantic 
‘Achilles’  heel’  of  these  analytic  reductionist  approaches  and,  further,  in  all 
evidence, it can be used to devastate any other such approach.
 Thus, we employ a guerilla ‘hit and run’ tactic. We hit hard and with surgical 
accuracy at the semantic Achilles’ heel of these prominent theories and disengage 
quickly. For, otherwise, a full contact engagement with each one of these venerable 
theories  would  have  proven perniciously time  and space-consuming,  unavoidably 
suspending  our  aspiration  for  a  more  comprehensive  picture  in  the  debates 
surrounding epistemic justification.
Third,  although  these  approaches  founder  as  reductive  analyses  of  epistemic 
justification, this is not to imply that they are valueless from an epistemic point of 
view. Surely, the notions of coherence, rational intuitions, epistemic virtues, reliable 
cognitive  processes  and  faculties  etc.  can  sometimes  be  truth-conducive.  But 
although they may sometimes be truth-conducive,  these approaches do not reduce 
epistemic  justification  and this  is  what  really  matters  in  this  context.  They don’t 
satisfy the conditions for a successful reduction by semantic analysis of the property 
of epistemic justification, as these were made explicit in section 2.2.  They don’t fill 
the analytic reductionist’s bill, as one might put it.
With these three preliminary points covered, we are now ready for raiding the 
internalist  reductionist  camp.  Foundationalism  is  the  first  internalist  analytic 
reductionist  approach  to  be  raided.  Foundationalism  has  been  perhaps  the  most 
prominent  approach  in  the  history  of  epistemology,  cutting  across  of  even  the 
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everlasting rationalism/empiricism dichotomy.  Both rationalists like Descartes and 
empiricists like Hume were, arguably, in some appropriate sense foundationalists76. 
The central  idea of foundationalism is that there are certain ‘foundational’  beliefs 
that confer justification to other ‘non-foundational’ beliefs. In what is often called 
‘classical  foundationalism’,  the  foundational  beliefs  are  those  that  in  virtue  of  a 
specified property are considered to be infallible and the non-foundational are those 
that in virtue of the absence of that specified property are considered to be fallible. 
In  virtue  of  that  specified  property and (alleged)  infallibility,  the foundational 
beliefs  are  considered  as  themselves  justified  and  as  capable  of  conferring 
justification to the fallible non-foundational beliefs. Fallible non-foundational beliefs 
lacking this specified property are considered justified if and only if they are based 
on  the  bedrock  of  the  infallible  foundational  beliefs.  With  the 
foundations/superstructure architecture of justification, foundationalism is often (in 
philosophical consciousness) figuratively compared with the structure of a pyramid, 
where  the  stable  foundations  are  at  the  bottom  of  the  building  supporting  the 
superstructure all the way to the top77. 
An  influential  defence  of  classical  foundationalism  came  from  R.Chisholm 
(1966). Drawing from Leibniz,  Chisholm (1966:27-9) suggested that the specified 
property in  virtue  of  which a  belief  is  infallible  and,  therefore,  foundational  and 
justified is ‘self-presentation’. As he (1966: 29) says ‘... what is directly evident to a 
man is always some state of affairs that ‘presents itself to him’. Thus, my believing 
that Socrates is mortal is a state of affairs that is ‘self-presenting’ to me’.
 Let us measure Chisholm’s suggestion against ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’. Is 
a  self-presenting  belief  justified?  (and  therefore  infallible  and  foundational). 
Unfortunately, it seems clear that the account is less than satisfactory. First comes 
‘the  semantic  halt  step’.  A  clear-headed  and  thoughtful  agent  can  appeal  to  the 
inherent semantic ‘open feel’ and halt any quick identification of self-presentation 
and justification. ‘I can understand that p is self-presenting, but I am not quite sure 
whether it is justified’, he might retort. Stirred by these inherent semantic ‘open feel’ 
intuitions, he can then take ‘the defeating step’ and with the help of some creative 
76  See E.Sosa (2008) and R.Fumerton (2010) for this categorization. Arguably, Plato and Aristotle 
were also foundationalists.
77  See E.Sosa (2008)
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imagination adduce counterexamples.
 He can contend, for instance, that often beliefs that are ‘self-presenting’ to the 
eyes of many people do not really seem to be justified. For example, the belief that 
‘Stoke city is the best team in Premier League’ might be considered ‘self-presenting’ 
by many Stoke city fans but most people would think that, although ‘self-presenting’, 
it  is  not  really  justified.  It  is  not  justified  because it  is  based on the  feelings  of 
affection for one’s favourite team rather than evidence.  What this example shows is 
that self-presentation is not sufficient for justification, as there are ample cases of 
self-presenting beliefs that are not justified78. 
The same corollary follows from Hume’s ‘is/ought argument’. A belief may be 
‘self-presenting’  but  an  agent  can  legitimately  resist  inferring  that  he  ought  to 
endorse that certain belief. Just because a certain belief is ‘self-presenting’, does not 
necessarily imply that we ought to endorse that belief. For example, for a biased anti-
Semite  it  might  surely appear  ‘self-presenting’  that  the holocaust  is  a convenient 
Zionistic  myth.  But still,  he might  be open-minded and honest  enough to  give a 
sceptical heeding to the abundant evidence undermining this belief and, hence, resist 
endorsement  of  the  belief.  ‘Conspiracy  theory’  mania  aside,  there  is  compelling 
evidence (survivors, Nazi documents, concentration camps etc.) that the holocaust 
did occur and even a biased anti-Semite might feel the pressure -stemming from this 
evidence- to resist endorsement of that belief. 
The Moorean/Humean lesson seems to leave classic foundationalism exposed to 
the  emergence  of  counterexamples.  Thus,  it  does  not  satisfy  ‘the  immunity 
requirement’  for  a  successful  reduction  by  semantic  analysis  of  epistemic 
justification,  as this  was put forward in section 2.2. That is,  it  fails  to deliver an 
analysis that yields the essential property constitutive of epistemic justification and, 
therefore, fails to deliver an analysis immune to counterexamples.
What the inherent semantic ‘open feel’ of ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ exploits 
in  order  to  invoke  counterexamples  and  defeat  classical  foundationalism,  is  the 
question  of  in  virtue  of  which  property the  foundational  beliefs  are  coined 
foundational and the non-foundational coined non-foundational. The easy answer of 
78  Self-presentation can also fail to the other direction too. We can have justified beliefs that are not 
‘self-presenting’ and therefore self-presentation is  not  even necessary for  justification. Thus,  self-
presentation  is  neither  necessary  nor  sufficient  for  epistemic  justification.  But  in  any  event, 
insufficiency alone shows that self-presentation cannot reduce epistemic justification.
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classic  foundationalism  is  that  the  foundational/non-foundational  dichotomy  is 
respectively symmetric with the infallibility/fallibility dichotomy. He then specifies a 
property  (e.g.  self-presentation)  that  is  supposed  to  identify  the  infallibility  of 
foundational beliefs. But this can’t be a persuasive answer because, as we have seen 
with Moore’s and Hume’s arguments, it is not clear at all which property can identify 
the infallibility of foundational beliefs. Thus, we need the precious property in virtue 
of  which  we  can  discern  between  infallible  and  fallible  beliefs.  Call  this  ‘the 
discernibility problem’. 
Things get very quickly complicated at this juncture. Some foundationalists think 
that this discerning property of infallibility is self-presentation, or Cartesian ‘clarity 
and distinctness’ of ideas or Humean ‘vividness’ of ideas while others that is self-
justification (or warrant) etc. Yet they all agree that these foundational beliefs are in 
some  intuitive  way ‘immediately  compelling’.  The  very  thought  of  these  beliefs 
directly  inclines  the agent  to  endorse them as  true.  The fallible  non-foundational 
beliefs  are  not  so  difficult  to  discern.  They are  the  beliefs  that  are  not  in  some 
intuitive way ‘immediately compelling’ themselves and, therefore, their justification 
must ultimately rest on the bedrock of the foundational beliefs.
But  these  proposals  cannot  really  blunt  Moore’s  and  Hume’s  arguments.  No 
matter  whether  we think the discerning  property is  self-presentation  or  Cartesian 
clarity  and  distinctness  etc.,  Moore’s  and  Hume’s  arguments  show  that  these 
accounts  are  less  than  cogent.  In  the  same  way  ‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’ 
undermines  taking  ‘self-presentation’  to  be  the  precious  discerning  property  of 
infallibility, it also undermines the rest of the proposals. This is easy to understand, if 
you have followed the application of ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ on the proposal 
of ‘self-presentation’ and grasped how it works. 
Thus, discovering which property is the discerning property of infallibility has 
proven difficult and this has cast some serious doubt on classical foundationalism79. 
The point was quickly seized and exploited by W.Quine (1953, 2008) and W.Sellars 
(1997)  in  their  famous  critiques  of  (respectively  a  priori  and  empirical) 
foundationalism.  The  Sellars/Quine  influential  critique  of  ‘the  framework  of 
givenness’ has been largely conducive to the waning (at least for some time) of the 
79  For discussion see R.Fumerton (2008), E.Sosa (2008) and W.Quine (2008).
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popularity of foundationalism. 
In the face of ‘the discernibility problem’ and the Sellars/Quine critique,  some 
philosophers  abandoned  foundationalism  altogether.  Others,  though,  were  more 
sanguine and have attempted to defend a refined form of foundationalism that could 
avoid the bugbear of ‘the discernibility problem’. These more sanguine philosophers 
thought that we can disjoin foundationalism from the commitment to the problematic 
infallibility/fallibility dichotomy and, thus, dodge the bugbear of ‘the discernibility 
problem’. 
These philosophers concede that is difficult to discern in virtue of which precious 
property some beliefs are infallible and foundational and claim that we can weaken 
the theory’s commitment in order to make it more flexible and, hence, viable.  In 
order  to  make  the  theory  more  flexible  and  viable  we  can  reconstitute  the 
infallibility/fallibility dichotomy in terms of prima facie infallibility/fallibility. That 
is, of prima facie infallible foundational beliefs and fallible non-foundational beliefs. 
This version of foundationalism is often called  ‘Non-classical foundationalism’.  A 
recent subtle and influential  defender of such a version of non-classical (a priori) 
foundationalism has been L.Bonjour (1998)80.  
Bonjour (1998:102) suggests that :
‘… [a priori] justification… apparently depends on nothing beyond an 
understanding  of  the  propositional  content  itself,  a  proposition  whose 
necessity  is  apprehended  in  this  way…[it]  may  be  correlatively 
characterized as  rationally self-evident:  its very content provides,  for one 
who grasps it properly, an immediate accessible reason for thinking that it is 
true’. Such (a priori) propositions are ‘…seen, or grasped or apprehended as 
an act of rational insight or rational intuition…(1998:102)’.
Let us put Bonjour’s (1998) version of non-classical foundationalism to the test of 
‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’. Is a belief grasped by ‘rational insight or intuition’ 
justified? Again, this does not really blunt the classical arguments. A clear-headed 
agent can appeal to the inherent semantic ‘open feel’ and resist the identification of 
‘rational self-evidence’ (or grasp by ‘rational intuition’) and justification. Then he 
can  take  ‘the  defeating  step’,  exploit  ‘the  discernibility  problem’  and  adduce 
80  Bonjour (1998) addresses specifically the species a priori epistemic justification but for our present 
purposes I will assume that his account generalizes and addresses the genus of epistemic justification.
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counterexamples.
 He can contend, for instance, that often beliefs that are supposedly ‘rationally 
self-evident’ in the course of due time (additional reflection, full-information etc.) 
are shown to be unjustified. Think, for example, of the biased Zionist vehemently 
denying the brute historical fact that, in order for the state of Israel to be founded 
after  World War II,  many native  Palestinians  suffered forced displacement  while 
being replaced by Israeli settlers from all over the world. For him, this historical fact 
is ‘rationally self-evident’ that never took place and, perhaps, this belief has been 
instigated be anti-Semites. Yet, this belief conflicts with compelling evidence and 
cannot  be  considered  epistemically  justified  (though,  it  is  perhaps  pragmatically 
justified). 
The same corollary follows from Hume’s ‘is/ought argument’. A belief may be 
‘rationally self-evident’ but an agent can legitimately resist inferring that he ought to 
endorse that certain belief. Just because a certain belief is ‘rationally self-evident’, 
does not necessarily imply that we ought to endorse that certain belief. Think, for 
instance, of an agent who thinks that the belief that his wife is not cheating on him is 
‘rationally  self-evident’  but  still  resists  endorsement  of  the  belief  because  he 
understands  that  overwhelming  evidence  suggests  otherwise.  Thus,  like  classical 
foundationalism,  non-classical  foundationalism  also  fails  to  meet  ‘the  immunity 
requirement’.
Yet,  this  conclusion  is  rather  unfair  to  Bonjour’s  proposal  because  it  neglects 
Bonjour’s commitment to the prima facie infallible/fallible dichotomy and not to the 
infallible/fallible  dichotomy.  Bonjour  can  legitimately  respond  that  ‘the 
Moorean/Humean  lesson’  should  not  be  a  problem  for  his  non-classical 
foundationalism because it is unashamedly fallibilist and, therefore, can absorb the 
inherent ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions and the ensuing counterexamples. 
These beliefs are only prima facie infallible and if they eventually fall prey to 
counterexamples  and  turn  fallible,  this  does  nothing  to  vitiate  his  proposal. 
Counterexamples are consistent with his fallibilist non-classical foundationalism and 
should  not  spoil  its  attractions.  Actually,  Bonjour  (1998)  is  sensitive  to  the 
occurrence  of  mistaken  ‘prima  facie  infallible’  beliefs  and  based  on  coherence 
considerations has suggested an account explaining how we can track and correct 
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false ‘rational insights’.
However, the rejoinder from anti-foundationalist epistemologists is not far away. 
First, taking refuge to a form of refined fallibilist foundationalism seems to lose ‘the 
Cartesian motivation’ for being a foundationalist in the first place. For, ‘the Cartesian 
motivation’ was to justify our (non-foundational)  beliefs  by appeal to certain and 
infallible grounds that can adequately support the edifice of our knowledge. But now 
we are forced to compromise with something much less promising and ambitious. 
We are forced to compromise with uncertain and fallible grounds that may not so 
adequately  support  the  edifice  of  our  knowledge.  With  this  weakening  of  the 
commitments  of  foundationalism,  it  is  not  clear  whether  what  is  left  in 
foundationalism is what was initially both attractive and desirable. 
Second, it seems that non-classical foundationalism in principle cannot meet ‘the 
immunity  requirement’  because  denies  that  it  can  identify  the  essential  property 
constitutive of the nature of epistemic justification and, hence, be able to identify 
justified beliefs. As a result, he accepts the reality of counterexamples by means of 
fallible  prima  facie  infallible  beliefs  and,  hence,  cannot  satisfy  ‘the  immunity 
requirement’  in  the  first  place.  It  cannot  because  it  accepts  the  inescapability  of 
mistaken  prima  facie  infallible  foundational  beliefs  which  are  supposed  to  be 
themselves justified and also justification-conferring to non-foundational beliefs. 
Thus, non-classical foundationalism does not seem to raise high enough to meet 
the requirements for a successful reduction of epistemic justification. And this is the 
inconvenient predicament because the foundationalist diagnosing that –due to ‘the 
discernibility problem’- cannot possibly meet the stringent standard of ‘the immunity 
requirement’,  opts  to  accept  the  inescapability  of  counterexamples  by  means  of 
fallible prima facie infallible beliefs.
In conclusion, despite the masterful defence of non-classical foundationalism by 
Bonjour,  the  thought  that,  on  the  one  hand,  we  fail  to  satisfy  ‘the  immunity 
requirement’ and that, on the other hand, we might ground our edifice of knowledge 
on possibly shaky grounds is disquieting, and some philosophers have preferred to 
try out some other approaches to justification. They felt disappointed enough from 
foundationalism’s curtail of aspiration and promise and decided to explore a different 
and, perhaps, more promising account of justification. 
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The  other  prominent  traditional  approach  to  epistemic  justification  has  been 
coherentism. Coherentism has been the option of choice for Hegelian idealists (like 
F.H.Bradley) but the disillusionment with Hegelianism at the start of 20th ce. and the 
ensuing rise of early analytic philosophy (through the largely foundationalist work of 
B.Russell,  G.E.Moore and L.Wittgenstein),  ushered the popularity of coherentism 
along the  same  road  with  the  waning fate  of  Hegelian  idealism.  However,  since 
Quine’s (1953) attack on analyticity and a priori foundationalism and Sellars’ (1997) 
attack on a posteriori foundationalism, coherentism has not only reappeared on stage, 
but  also  enjoyed  some  rediscovered  popularity,  especially  in  the  sophisticated 
Quinean form of ‘holistic coherentism’81. 
As the name of the approach immediately betrays, the central idea in coherentism 
is that epistemic justification can be analysed in terms of the notion of ‘coherence’. 
The idea is that justification is a function of some relationship between beliefs, none 
of  which  are  of  privileged  epistemic  starus  (as  in  foundationalism).  This 
‘relationship’ is then understood in terms of consistency, probabilistic support and 
explanatory power. That is, the web of beliefs must avoid internal inconsistencies, 
form  a  probabilistically  inter-supporting  structure  and  be  able  to  provide  good 
explanations of phenomena that call for an explanation82.
Unlike the epistemic elitism of foundationalism that bestows certain beliefs with 
privileged epistemic status (‘basic’ perceptual beliefs, a priori first principles etc.) 
and  thereby  runs  into  ‘the  discernibility  problem’,  coherentism  is  epistemically 
egalitarian. It does not bestow privileged epistemic status to any sort of beliefs, but 
takes all beliefs to have equal epistemic standing. All beliefs are justified as long as 
they avoid inconsistency and are inter-supported by other beliefs and, equally,  all 
beliefs  are  fallible  and  hence  susceptible  to  revision.  As  Quine  (1953:43)  has 
notoriously put it ‘…no statement is immune to revision’. 
If a belief (or its inferential implications) does not contradict other beliefs (or their 
inferential implications) of the overall ‘web of belief’ and it is also inter-supported 
by other beliefs, then the belief is unquestionably justified and can be endorsed by 
81  For another defence of a version of holistic coherentism see D.Davidson (2008). Note that Sellars, 
although a severe critic of foundationalism was not a holistic coherentist, as it is sometimes thought. 
For he (1997: 79) famously says: ‘One seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant 
which rests on a tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian a serpent of 
knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?). Neither will do’. 
82  See J.Kvanvig (2007). 
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the  agent  who adheres  to  coherentism.  With  ‘the  inter-supporting  web of  belief’ 
architecture  of  justification,  coherentism is  often (in  philosophical  consciousness) 
figuratively compared with the structure of a raft where the planks are all at the same 
level inter-supporting each other, tied with durable threads from the one edge to the 
other83. 
Coherentist  positions can be broadly distinguished into linear and holistic.  The 
linear coherentist claims that there is a linear chain of individual beliefs that justify 
each  one of  our  justified  beliefs.  But  linear  coherentism has  largely been out  of 
favour and philosophers sympathetic to coherentism don’t usually attempt to spell 
out an account of coherentism along these tracks. 
It  has  been  rather  unpopular  because  it  seems  to  lead  to  an  uncomfortable 
dilemma: either to an unpalatable infinite regress of individual beliefs or to a narrow 
and, therefore, profoundly vicious circularity. This is the case because we either have 
to push back the chain of individual justifying beliefs ad infinitum or we have to 
break this infinite regress with a narrow justifying loop. That is, we have to justify 
one of the supporting individual beliefs with one of the beliefs that were initially in 
need for justification and, thus, come full circle. 
But  as  with  infinitism,  an  infinite  regress  of  justifications  is  psychologically 
impossible  for  cognitively  finite  beings  like  us  and,  therefore,  unpalatable  and a 
narrow justifying loop seems entirely question-begging. For it is question-begging to 
justify a belief p by reference to a belief q and then justify belief q with the belief p 
again84. For these reasons, I follow the standard practice and hasten to sideline linear 
coherentism with the intent to turn my attention to the more interesting and popular 
holistic  coherentism85.  Linear  coherentism is  currently  out  of  favour  and,  thus,  I 
unashamedly choose to save my time and space and don’t even take the pains to test 
it again ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ (but this can be left as a conceptual exercise 
to the fastidious reader).
Let  us now turn to the more interesting and popular holistic coherentism.  The 
holistic coherentist claims that what justifies each one of our justified beliefs is not 
83  See E.Sosa (2008).
84  That was Hume’s (1986) response to the pragmatic justification of induction by reference to its 
inductive success. Arguing that inductive beliefs are justified because they tend to get things right and 
then justify that they get things right because they are inductive is entirely question-begging.
85  Compare J.Kvanvig (2007: section 1): ‘Since the primary examples of coherentism in the history of 
the view are holistic in nature, I will focus in the remainder of this entry on this version of the view’. 
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just a chain of other individual beliefs that either leads to an infinite regress or to a 
narrow circle, but the whole ‘web of our beliefs’ at once. A justified belief stands or 
falls with the whole ‘web of belief’ that inherits its justified status. Thus, holistic 
coherentism, arguably, does not meet either of the problems of linear coherentism. It 
is neither committed to infinite regress nor to a narrow vicious circularity. 
But it is unavoidably committed to wide circularity, though, holistic coherentists 
claim  that  there  is  a  world  of  difference  between  narrow  and  wide  circularity. 
Narrow circularity is supposed to be vicious while wide circularity is supposed to be 
virtuous. Narrow circularity is vicious because the justification loop appeals to only 
one individual belief at a time and this cannot hold the burden of justification on its 
own because, as we have seen, it is entirely question-begging.
 In contrast, wide circularity is considered to be virtuous because the justification 
loop appeals to the whole ‘web of belief’ at once and this, allegedly, can hold the 
burden of justification on its own; or at least this is what holistic coherentists think. 
The issue of circularity has been a persistent point of criticism against coherentism, 
but I won’t press it here because I think the Moorean/Humean lesson can adequately 
do the job and put coherentism to rest86.
The question now is how holistic coherentism fares against ‘the Moorean/Humean 
lesson’.  Is  a  belief  (holistically)  coherent  justified?  Again,  the  result  is  I  think 
disappointing. First, comes ‘the semantic halt step’. It seems again that there is an 
inherent semantic gap of ‘open feel’ that prevents the identification of justification 
with (holistic) coherence. From the inherent semantic gap of ‘open feel’ an agent can 
take the second ‘defeating step’ and proceed to exercise his imagination and adduce 
counterexamples.
 For instance, think of the biased historian, anthropologist or sociologist that has 
internalized  a Marxist  world-view, has a  broadly Marxist  ‘web of beliefs’  and is 
always  keen  on  devising  Marxist  explanations  of  historical  events  and  social 
phenomena.  He believes,  let  us say,  that  crime is  the outcome of the rise of the 
money-mongering capitalist economic system that sacrifices everything, even human 
lives, to the altar of its thirst for money. His belief is surely consistent and inter-
suported  by  the  rest  of  his  Marxist  ‘web  of  belief’  and  helps  providing  a  neat 
86  For a defence of moral coherentism against the circularity objection D.Brink (1989).
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explanation of a phenomenon asking for an explanation. 
However, this does not really make it justified. Intuitively, crime cannot be solely 
explained  by  appeal  to  just  economic  reasons  and  the  emergence  of  capitalism. 
Surely, there are other psychological, sociological, historical, biological etc. reasons 
that play a role and this is indicated from the fact that crime has appeared both in 
societies in pre-capitalist eras and in socialist socioeconomic systems in the capitalist 
era. Thus, holistic coherence is not sufficient for justification. 
The same conclusion is  obtained with Hume’s  ‘is/ought  argument’.  No matter 
whether a belief is holistically justified, the agent may legitimately take advantage of 
the inherent semantic ‘open feel’ and resist endorsement of that certain belief. For 
instance,  a  Marxist  agent  might  acknowledge  that  the  belief  that  ‘the  proletariat 
revolution is imminent’ is holistically coherent with the rest of his web of beliefs but 
still  resist  endorsement  of the belief,  perhaps,  because he suspects  that  the belief 
lacks evidential support. Thus, holistic coherentism also fails to raise high enough to 
meet ‘the immunity requirement’.
What  the  inherent  semantic  ‘open  feel’  -through  the  Marxist  world-view 
counterexamples- exploits is what it is often called ‘the isolation problem’87. Like the 
exploitation of ‘the discernibility problem’ for foundationalism, the exploitation of 
‘the isolation problem’ allows counterexamples to pop up and shoot down holistic 
coherence. As the example implies, the isolation problem basically points out that no 
matter how consistent is our ‘web of belief’, we might be ‘cut off’ from reality and 
fail to reliably ‘get things right’ in the world. In other words, coherence does not 
seem  to  be  sufficient  for  justified  beliefs88.  Reaching  ideal  Rawlsian  ‘reflective 
equilibrium’ does not on its own put much weight on having justified beliefs that 
reliably ‘get things right’ in the world89. 
The reason seems to be that coherence is a purely internal affair that neglects how 
the  external  world  might  be.  Different  coherent  theories  can  be  devised  for 
explaining certain phenomena, although these theories, ironically, due to coherence 
87  The problem is pressed, among others, by J.Pollock (1985), J. McDowell (1994) and J.Kvanvig 
(2007).
88  Again, holistic coherentism could fail in the other direction too, as there could be justified beliefs 
that are not coherent with one’s web of beliefs. This would show that coherence is not even necessary 
for justification. But in any event, insufficiency alone shows that coherence considerations do not 
reduce epistemic justification.
89  I allude here to J.Rawls’ (1999) version of moral coherentism.
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considerations  cannot  all  be  true.  As  one  might  put  it,  different  theories  are 
‘underdetermined  by  the  same  phenomena’.  That  is,  different  theoretical 
explanations are called in to account for the very same phenomena90.
 A Freudian, for example, might explain the existence of criminal behaviour by 
appeal to, let us say, unresolved conflicts between the psychological mechanisms of 
‘the ego, the superego and the id’. A Nietzschean might appeal to the ‘will to power’, 
the instinct of dominating others and so on. Yet, the three stories are inconsistent and 
they can’t all be true (though, perhaps, each might contain grains of truth that could 
be synthesized in a more complex theoretical explanation). 
With the discussion of holistic coherentism to an end, I conclude that coherentism, 
in  the  light  of  ‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’,  fails  to  satisfy  ‘the  immunity 
requirement’  and,  thus,  does  not  successfully  analyse  epistemic  justification.  The 
next  theory  we  consider  is  a  virtue  theoretic  approach.  Virtue  theories  exactly 
appeared on the theoretical map as an attempt to overcome the unsuccessful efforts 
of  the  more  traditional  approaches  of  foundationalism  and  coherentism91.  The 
approach  we  consider  is  an  influential,  broadly  internalist  approach,  inspired  by 
Aristotle’s virtue ethics: L.Zagzebski’s (1996) virtue epistemology. 
According to Zagzebski (1996:241): 
‘A justified belief is what a person who is motivated by intellectual virtue 
and who has the understanding of his cognitive situation a virtuous person 
would have, might  believe in like circumstances.  An unjustified belief  is 
what  a  person who is  motivated  by intellectual  virtue,  and  who has  the 
understanding  of  his  cognitive  situation  a  virtuous  person  would  have, 
would not believe in like circumstances’. Such intellectual virtues include 
‘intellectual carefulness, perseverance, humility, vigour, flexibility, courage, 
and  thoroughness,  as  well  as  open-mindedness,  fair-mindedness, 
insightfulness, and the virtues opposed to wishful thinking, obtuseness, and 
conformity.  One  of  the  most  important  virtues,  I  believe,  is  intellectual 
integrity’ (1996:155). 
The notion of virtue is then glossed along broadly Aristotelian lines:
 ‘A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired excellence 
90  See E.Sosa (2008).
91  See L.Zagzebski (1996) and E.Sosa (2008).
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of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired 
end  and  reliable  success  in  bringing  about  that  end.  What  I  mean  by 
motivation is a disposition to have a motive; a motive is an action-guiding 
emotion with a certain end, either internal or external’ (1996:137).
Let  us  measure  Zagzebski’s  account  against  ‘the  Moorean/Humean lesson’.  Is 
justified belief ‘what a person who is motivated by intellectual virtue and who has 
the understanding of his  cognitive situation a  virtuous  person would have,  might 
believe in like circumstances’? Once again, this analysis is off the mark. The first 
thing to strike the eye is ‘the semantic halt step’. It is to notice the inherent semantic 
‘open feel’ that halts any quick identification of epistemic justification with ‘what a 
person  motivated  by  intellectual  virtue  and  with  understanding  of  his  cognitive 
situation a virtuous person would have, might believe in like circumstances’. The 
second ‘defeating step’ is to proceed to exploit this inherent semantic ‘open feel’ and 
adduce  counterexamples.  For  instance,  a  belief  might  be  motivated  by  open-
mindedness and vigour but, nonetheless, might not be justified. 
Think, for instance, of the medieval alchemist who is open-minded because he 
takes seriously the possibility that can discover ‘the elixir of life’ (or transmute dust 
to  gold),  he  is  intellectually  careful  because  takes  all  steps  in  an  attentive  and 
thorough way and is courageous, patient and perseverant, because he keeps trying 
despite  constant  failure.  But  in  spite  of  the  virtuous  motivation  and his  virtuous 
understanding of his cognitive situation, his belief in the discoverability of ‘the elixir 
of life’  is  unjustified.  It  is  unjustified because wishful  thinking and not evidence 
drives  the  conviction  that  alchemist  practices  can  discover  ‘the  elixir  of  life’.  It 
seems  then  that  motivation  by  intellectual  virtue  in  conjunction  with  the 
understanding of the cognitive situation a virtuous agent would have is insufficient 
for epistemic justification. 
What  the  inherent  semantic  ‘open  feel’  -through  the  medieval  alchemist 
counterexample- exploits is what we may call ‘the virtue insufficiency problem’. The 
idea  is  that  we  can  keep  adding  epistemic  virtues,  but  this  long  conjunction  of 
epistemic virtues will still be insufficient for an analysis of justification. No matter 
how many or which intellectual virtues we add, there will be a semantic gap that will 
allow  counterexamples  to  emerge.  With  all  the  epistemic  virtues  of  the  world 
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involved, an epistemic agent can still not be able to form justified beliefs. 
The same conclusion is  obtained with Hume’s  ‘is/ought  argument’.  No matter 
whether a belief is ‘what a person who is motivated by intellectual virtue and who 
has the understanding of his cognitive situation a virtuous agent would have, might 
believe in like circumstances’, the agent might legitimately resist endorsement of that 
certain  belief.  Take,  for  instance,  the  alchemist  again.  The  alchemist  might  be 
motivated by intellectual virtue to endorse the belief that ‘the elixir of life’ can be 
discovered  and yet  resist  endorsement  of this  belief  because he suspects  that  his 
whole alchemist errand is driven by wishful thinking, self-deception etc. rather than 
evidence.
 In the face of counterexamples, we conclude again that Zagzebski’s virtue theory 
does  not  satisfy  ‘the  immunity  requirement’.  Like  (classical  and  non-classical) 
foundationalism and holistic coherentism, it does not succeed to deliver a successful 
semantic analysis of the property of epistemic justification.
Interestingly,  however,  the  failure  of  the  internalist  approaches  is,  I  think, 
instructive because all these approaches stumble on problems flowing from the very 
same  source.  The  source  of  the  ‘discernibility,  isolation  and virtue  insufficiency 
problems’, respectively,  for foundationalism, holistic coherentism and Zagzebski’s 
virtue  epistemology  is  the  abject  failure  to  stably  connect  the  epistemic  agent’s 
beliefs with the external world and reliably ‘get things right’. They seem to fail to 
disengage epistemic justification from the internal mental states and character traits 
of  an agent  (what  beliefs  entertains  and/or  his  epistemic  virtues)  and engage the 
external world and this seems to spoil their attempts to reliably ‘get things right’ in 
the world. 
Quite  independently  of  what  one  finds  self-presenting,  rationally  intuitive  or 
explanatorily  coherent,  or  what  epistemic  virtues  motivate  the  endorsement  of  a 
certain belief, the belief in question might fail to be justified and the world might be 
very  different  from  what  these  certain  beliefs  purport  to  depict.  But  epistemic 
justification  seems  to  be  truth-conducive  and,  therefore,  an  adequate  analysis  of 
justification should not just be a function of the internal states and character traits of 
an agent, simply, because these internal states might be ‘cut off’ from the external 
world and thus be very often misguided.
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This cues the end of our criticism of internalist approaches. We have found that 
they are plagued by ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ and fail to satisfy ‘the immunity 
requirement’  for  a  successful  semantic  analysis  of  the  property  of  epistemic 
justification.  Interestingly,  we  also  found  their  failure  instructive  because  these 
internalist  theories  seem to  exactly  fail  due  to  problems  flowing  from the  same 
spring. Namely,  they seem to fail to somehow establish a reliable and stable link 
between the epistemic agent’s beliefs with the external world. We can now turn to 
externalist theories. 
3.3 The Moorean/Humean Lesson Applied to Externalist Theories 
The  most  prominent  exponent  of  externalism  has,  perhaps,  been  A.Goldman 
(1986, 1991, 2002). A.Goldman has done the most work to propound and refine an 
externalist theory of justification and his work has been to some degree influential. 
The presentation of his externalist theory will mostly follow his by now classic paper 
‘What is Justified Belief?’(1991), though, he has been emending and polishing his 
theory  ever  since92.  But  the  kernel  idea  of  his  externalist  approach  escapes 
unmolested from his constant emendations and, hence, we need not follow all his 
constant refinements.
The kernel idea of Goldman is that epistemic justification might be reducible not 
to  a  property  of  beliefs  (self-presentation,  holistic  coherence,  motivation  by 
epistemic virtues) one has ‘ready at hand’ access to (as internalists are assuming), but 
to  reliable  belief-forming  cognitive  processes  that  function  reliably,  quite 
independently of whether one has ‘ready at hand access to’ it or not. Such reliable 
belief-forming  processes  are  supposed  to  be  perception,  memory,  inferential 
reasoning, introspection, even a priori justification (as he argued later in (2002)). 
 Goldman explicitly sets out for a reductive analysis of epistemic justification, for 
he does explain that (1991:106) ‘I want a set of substantive conditions that specify 
when a belief is justified… [in] necessary and sufficient conditions… I want a theory 
of justified belief  to specify in non-epistemic terms when a belief  is justified…’. 
Goldman starts from the intuition that unjustified beliefs must share a property in 
virtue of which are unjustified and, equally, justified beliefs must share a property in 
virtue of which they are justified. This is basically what in section 2.1 we called ‘the 
92  See for example A.Goldman (1986).
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realist ontological assertion’: ‘There must be an epistemic justification property in 
virtue of which justified beliefs are justified’. Then he goes to identify what these 
justification-conferring properties are.
But let us allow Goldman to explain his train of thought on his own (1992:113):
 ‘…confused  reasoning,  wishful  thinking,  reliance  on  emotional 
attachment,  mere hunch or guesswork, and hasty generalization.  What do 
these  faulty  processes  have  in  common?  They  share  the  feature  of 
unreliability: they tend to produce error a large proportion of the time. By 
contrast, which species of belief-forming (or belief-sustaining) processes are 
intuitively  justification-conferring?  They  include  standard  perceptual 
processes,  remembering,  good  reasoning  and  introspection.  What  these 
processes seem to have in common is  reliability: the beliefs they produce 
are  generally true.  My positive proposal,  then,  is  this.  The justificational 
status of a belief is a function of the reliability of the process or processes 
that  cause  it,  where  (as  a  first  approximation)  reliability  consists  in  the 
tendency of  a  process  to  produce  beliefs  that  are  true  rather  than  false’ 
(Goldman’s own emhasis).
He  sharpens  this  kernel  idea  in  various  ways  and  he  finally  arrives  at  the 
following (1992: 124): 
‘Person S is ex ante justified in believing p at t if and only if there is a reliable 
belief-forming operation available to  S which is such that if  S applied that 
operation to his total cognitive state at  t,  S would believe  p at  t-plus-delta 
(for a suitably small delta) and that belief would be ex post justified’.
Goldman  understands  the  technical  distinction  between  ex  ante/ex  post 
justification in this following way.  Ex ante justification is used in cases where the 
agent does not yet endorse a belief, (perhaps, because he is suspending judgement) 
but reflects on whether a certain belief is justified or not. Ex post justification is used 
in cases where the agent does endorse a belief, yet still reflect on whether the belief 
is truly justified or unjustified.
With this brief outline of Goldman’s process reliabilism, let us now measure his 
analysis  against  ‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’.  Goldman’s  jargon of  technicality 
aside,  is  a belief  induced by a reliable  belief-forming process justified? The first 
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thing to observe is ‘the semantic halt’ that impedes any thoughtful and clear-headed 
agent  from a  quick  reduction  of  epistemic  justification  to  reliable  belief-forming 
processes. Then the semantic gap stirs ‘the defeating step’ and all the agent has to do 
is to exercise his imagination for counterexamples. 
The  old  story  repeats  itself  and  counterexamples  are  looming  just  round  the 
corner. For instance, think of the miserly man that, though, he has a generally very 
reliable cognitive process of memory (e.g. remembers where he puts his stuff, easily 
memorizes poems, bank PIN numbers etc.), perhaps even the formidable memory of 
a mnemonist,  when it comes to remembering his financial  obligations,  due to his 
emotional  attachment  to  the  accumulation  of  money etc.,  is  prone  to  mistakenly 
remembering that has fulfilled them93.  This is a case where the generally reliable 
process of memory seems to go astray and produces a belief  we would count as 
unjustified. Analogous counterexamples where a generally reliable cognitive process 
goes astray can be devised for perception, introspection and inferential reasoning.
The same result is delivered by Hume’s ‘is/ought argument’. Any belief produced 
by generally  reliable  belief-forming  cognitive  processes  can  be  resisted.  Take  an 
example from Sellars’ (1997:37-9) critique of sense-data theories of perception and 
‘the myth of the (perceptual) Given’:  John the sales’ consultant of a necktie shop. 
John ‘has learned the use of colour concepts in the usual way, with one exception… 
he has never looked at an object in other than standard conditions’. But then electric 
lighting is invented. ‘His friends and neighbours rapidly adopt this new means of 
illumination, and wrestle with the problems it presents. John, however, is the last to 
succumb. Just after [electricity] has been installed in his shop, one of his neighbours, 
Jim, comes in to buy a necktie.’
‘Here is a handsome green one’ says John.
‘But it isn’t green’ says Jim, and takes John outside.
‘Well,’ says John, ‘it was green in there, but now it is blue.’
‘No,’ says Jim, ‘you know that neckties don’t change their colour merely as a 
result of being taken from place to place.’
‘But  perhaps  electricity  changes  their  colour  and  they  change  back  again  in 
93  Such examples occur in real life. S.Freud has described how some of his patients behaved in this 
way. If I am not mistaken, a case like the one I use as an example has been described in his  The 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life.
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daylight?’
‘That would be queer kind of change, wouldn’t it?’ says Jim.
‘I suppose so’ says bewildered John. ‘But we saw that it was green in there.’
‘No, we didn’t see that it was green in there, because it wasn’t green in there, and 
you can’t see what isn’t so!’
‘Well, this is a pretty pickle,’ says John. ‘I just don’t know what to say.’(Sellars’ 
emphasis).
The moral of Sellars’ story is that no matter how things appear to be to an agent 
with a generally reliable perception, he cannot deduce that he ought to endorse the 
belief that they are the way they appear to be94. I conclude, therefore, that Goldman’s 
process reliabilism fails because it runs into counterexamples and thereby does not 
satisfy ‘the immunity requirement’.
Let  us  now  turn  our  attention  to  E.Sosa’s  (1991,  2007)  externalist  virtue 
reliabilism. Sosa’s externalist virtue theory is not like Zagzebski’s (1996) internalist 
virtue theory that bases justification on what a person motivated by intellectual virtue 
and who has the understanding of his cognitive situation a virtuous person would 
have,  might  believe  in  like  circumstances95.  Instead,  Goldman-style  it  bases 
justification  on  the  reliability  of  belief-forming  ‘virtues’  where  virtues  are 
understood in terms of cognitive competence or ability. Virtues are considered to be 
relatively reliable and deep-seated intellectual excellences of character. 
His initial introduction of intellectual virtue runs as follows (1991:138-139): 
‘Let us define an intellectual virtue or faculty as a competence  in virtue 
of which one would mostly attain the truth and avoid error in a certain field 
of propositions F, when in certain conditions C… a faculty or virtue would 
normally be a fairly stable disposition on the part of a subject relative to an 
environment’.
His later work still moves in the same trajectory. As he says: 
‘In holding a certain belief you are foundationally justified in the virtuous 
94  Rather, for Sellars (1997: 39): ‘…this is the heart of the matter. For to say that a certain experience 
is a seeing that something is the case, is to do more than describe the experience. It is to characterize it 
as, so to speak, an assertion or claim, and – which is the point I wish to stress- to endorse that claim’ 
(Sellars’ emphasis).
95  An important difference is that Zagzebski, following Aristotle, takes the intellectual virtues to be 
largely acquired through moral education. In contrast, Sosa does not seem to pay much attention to the 
learning aspect.
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way to the extent that  you are then justified because in so believing you 
manifest a certain epistemic competence…’ (2007:51) and 
‘The attraction or belief  is justified because it is competent… [t]his is 
why those rational mechanisms are intellectual  competences because they 
systematically lead us aright. All seemings delivered by such competences 
are thereby epistemically justified’ (2007:59-60) (Sosa’s own emphasis).
For  the  last  time,  let  us  measure  Sosa’s  virtue  reliabilism  against  ‘the 
Moorean/Humean lesson’. Is a belief formed by a reliable belief-forming competence 
(or  virtue)  justified?  The  answer  is  in  the  negative  for  the  very  same  reasons 
Goldman’s broadly similar reliabilism failed. First, there is ‘the semantic halt step’ 
that undermines any quick identification and then ‘the defeating step’ where we can 
exercise our creativity and imagination and adduce counterexamples. 
Reliable  belief-forming  competences  like  perception,  memory,  introspection, 
reasoning etc. often produce beliefs that cannot be seen as epistemically justified by 
any means. Think, for example, of the fan with a reliable visual mechanism whom is 
nonetheless prone to unconsciously overlook referee’s mistakes in a football game 
insofar  these  are  in  favour  of  his  team  and  against  the  rival  team.  He  is  also 
unconsciously prone to mistakenly attribute wrong decisions to the referee insofar as 
these are in favour of the rival team and against his own team. 
This might happen because the agent’s desire for seeing his team winning the 
game has overwhelmed his desire for truth and perhaps, also, because perception is 
theory-laden.  That  is,  what  you  see  is  being  to  some  extent  influenced  by  the 
background theory and beliefs, desires, emotions etc. you have. At any rate, what 
matters  here is that  although such beliefs  are being produced by a reliable visual 
mechanism they surely do not count as justified. Therefore, such counterexamples 
show that Sosa’s proposal cannot meet ‘the immunity requirement’ for a reductive 
analysis.
Hume’s ‘is/ought argument’ delivers the same conclusion. For example, even if a 
belief is produced by a reliable belief-forming cognitive competence, an agent can 
resist  the  normative  injunction  that  he  ought  to  endorse  that  belief.  Think,  for 
example,  of  cases  of  inferential  irrationality  that  undeniably  beset  all  reasoning 
agents (others more,  others less). Wishful thinking is a paradigmatic case of such 
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inferential irrationality.  Often, agents with a reliable belief-forming competence of 
reasoning are seduced by wishful thinking either to draw unjustified conclusions or 
to resist justified conclusions. Often, on the one hand, we irrationally infer what we 
desire to infer and not what we ought to infer or, on the other hand, we irrationally 
resist inferring what we ought to infer because it does not comport with what we 
desire to infer.
These incidents might occur because we are somehow disposed to unconsciously 
protect  our  feelings,  self-esteem,  sense  of  dignity  etc.  We unconsciously  protect 
ourselves from being traumatized by the acknowledgement of either a legitimate but 
painful inferential outcome of certain of our beliefs or illicitly infer what we ought 
not to infer from certain of our beliefs just in order to assuage a worry, protect our 
self-conceited egoism etc. 
Now, an agent might resist endorsement  of a belief  produced by his generally 
reliable  reasoning  competence,  if  he  suspects  that  the  belief  is  based  on wishful 
thinking, self-deception etc. Take the example of the unhappy mother that her soldier 
son has been declared ‘missing in action’ during a war concluded ten years ago. The 
distraught  mother  infers  that  her  son  is  probably  still  alive,  held  hostage  by the 
enemy, and yet she finds the courage and wisdom to realize that what inclines her to 
infer that her son is still alive are her motherly instincts of love and affection. In this 
case, although a reliable belief-forming process produces the belief that her son is 
probably still alive, the mother resists endorsement of the belief because she realizes 
that it is motivated by wishful thinking. 
In the light of this discussion, I conclude that Sosa’s externalist virtue reliabilism 
-like Goldman’s process reliabilism- does not seem to make much progress. More 
generally,  the  corollary  of  our  examination  of  externalist  analyses  of  epistemic 
justification (Goldman’s process reliabilism, Sosa’s virtue reliabilism) is that  they 
fall short of a satisfactory reduction by semantic analysis of epistemic justification. 
They  fail  to  satisfy  ‘the  immunity  requirement’.  That  is,  they  fail  to  provide  a 
successful analysis immune to counterexamples and, as a result, they fail to provide a 
successful semantic analysis of the property of epistemic justification (in necessary 
and sufficient conditions). 
Interestingly,  however,  like  the failure  of  internalist  approaches,  the  failure  of 
75
externalism is  instructive.  While  internalists  seem to  neglect  and marginalize  the 
external  dimension  in  justification-conferring,  the  externalists  neglect  and 
marginalize  the  internal  and  assume  that,  for  the  most  part,  our  belief-forming 
processes are reliable and do ‘mirror’ the external reality. The internalist rejoinder 
here is that this externalist assumption is just an unsupported article of good faith. 
This is an assumption for which cogent reasons must be given, if it is to be taken 
seriously, and not just be granted ‘on the cheap’. 
The  overall  moral  of  the  application  of  ‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’  on 
internalist  and externalist  reductionist  approaches  is  that  both sides  of the  divide 
seem to lack something essential for a successful analysis of justification. Intuitively, 
an analysis of epistemic justification must, on the one hand, supply some relatively 
stable and reliable link with the external world but, on the other hand, this relatively 
stable link must somehow- at least often- be placed within the internal. That is, the 
internal mental states and character traits of an agent (what beliefs entertains and/or 
his epistemic virtues). 
How this  is  to  be done remains  unclear,  perhaps even enigmatic.  But,  for the 
habits-endorsement expressivist account that we pledged to present in Ch.7, there is 
nothing unclear or even enigmatic because this task is illusory. It is simply a fool’s 
errand that cannot be fulfilled. There cannot be a successful analysis of epistemic 
justification in necessary and sufficient conditions that, as a result, bridges reliably 
the internal with the external and confers epistemic justification. That is, what we 
believe (or what is ‘in the head’) with what is likely to be in the world. The search 
for such an analysis is only a futile ‘wild goose chase’. 
The ‘wild goose chase’ for such an analysis is initially stirred – and this is  the 
crux  of  the  matter-  from the  adoption  of  ‘the  referential  semantics  assumption’: 
justification  assertions  and  attributions  purport  to  refer  to  a  certain  property  of 
epistemic justification. From there the analytic naturalistic reductionist moves on to 
also embrace ‘the existential assertion’, ‘the realist ontological assertion’ and, finally, 
‘the naturalistic analysability assertion’.
 As we shall see, for the expressivist all the trouble can be avoided by renouncing 
‘the referential semantics assumption’ that motivates this too stringent and, hence, 
illusory project in the first place. But again we make a long jump forward because 
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this is not yet the right time for this discussion. 
Besides, just because analytic naturalistic reductionism does not fare well, it does 
not  mean  that  the  entire  rich  and  resourceful  theoretical  tradition  of  referential 
semantics is misguided. And in any case, although there are some subtle and staunch 
defenders of traditional semantic analysis as the proper philosophical method, not all 
philosophers  in  our  days  believe  that  semantic  analysis  is  the  appropriate 
philosophical method96. Surely,  there are other more plausible ways to spell out a 
referentialist approach that does not cast doubt on  the cornerstone of their project: 
the referential semantics assumption.
These remarks signal the end of the argument against naturalistic reductionism. 
The  reached  conclusion  is  that,  in  the  light  of  ‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’, 
probably, no analytic naturalistic reductionist approach will ever succeed. Let us now 
turn to the conclusion and summary of the chapter.
3.4 Conclusion and Summary of the Argument
In this chapter, I have argued that analytic reductionist approaches fail to reduce 
epistemic  justification.  In  sections  3.2-3.3,  I  stepped  forward  to  apply  ‘the 
Moorean/Humean lesson’ with devastating results for some of the most influential 
and  popular  (internalist  and  externalist)  reductionist  accounts  of  epistemic 
justification. Foundationalism, coherentism, process reliabilism and Zagzebski’s and 
Sosa’s virtue approaches have suffered from this application. We, thus, concluded 
that analytic naturalistic reductionism is, perhaps, not a very promising theoretical 
project  and  therefore  ‘the  naturalism-denial  assertion’  (P3),  namely,  that 
‘justification assertions and attributions do not purport to refer to a natural property 
of epistemic justification’ maybe should be seen as plausible.
But  as  some  philosophers  sympathetic  to  referential  naturalism will  hasten  to 
object, this conclusion is way too quick. To play the devil’s advocate, this is what 
they would probably complain about: ‘You make a high jump from the implausibility 
of analytic naturalistic reductionism to the implausibility of referential naturalism. 
But this is not quite right. The irreducibility of epistemic justification to a natural 
property does not impugn reference to a natural property of epistemic justification. 
96  Notable defenders of semantic analysis as the proper philosophical method include M.Smith 
(1994), F.Jackson (1998) and G.Bealer (1998), though, they are often under attack e.g. by S.Lawrence 
and E.Margolis (2006).
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Irreducibility would be fatal  for referential  naturalism only if  analytic  naturalistic 
reductionism  was  the  only  option  for  referential  naturalism,  but  actually  is  not. 
Analytic  naturalistic  reductionism  is  committed  to  some  obsolete  semantic 
assumptions that can be jettisoned without a nascent theory abandoning its broadly 
referentialist and naturalistic character’.  
In the next chapter, we examine exactly such a theory claiming that we can have 
referential  naturalism  without  analytic  reductionism.  This  more  sophisticated 
naturalistic approach exploits ‘the synthetic naturalism turn’ of the 60’s and 70’s and 
the  pioneering  work  of  S.Kripke  and  H.Putnam in  semantics,  epistemology  and 
ontology in order to build a theory that dodges the problems of analytic naturalistic 
reductionism, though, remains to the core referentially naturalistic.
 On how this dialectical manoeuvre can be done and whether it can save the day 
for referential naturalism, you should turn to the next page. ‘Naturalistic reference 
without  reduction  by semantic  analysis’  will  be the  motto  under  which  synthetic 
naturalistic reductionism will have a last stand for the cause of referential naturalism. 
But as a last stand, despite the heroic defence, referential naturalism will eventually 
succumb; or so I will argue.
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Chapter  4  The  Problems  of  Synthetic  Naturalistic 
Reductionism 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we continue our critical exploration of referential naturalism. But 
this time we raid a different species of referential naturalism: synthetic naturalistic 
reductionism  (H.Putnam  1981;  D.Brink  1989;  N.Sturgeon  2007;  R.Boyd  2007; 
H.Kornblith 2005, 2007). This sort of referential naturalism is equipped with more 
sophisticated  dialectical  armour  than  old  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism. 
Sophisticated  dialectical  armour  exactly  prepared  to  shield  referential  naturalism 
from the semantic problems of analytic naturalistic reductionism that, as we saw in 
Chs.2-3, are being exposed by ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’. This is the key driving 
idea of the project of synthetic naturalistic reductionism. It is to deploy sophisticated 
ideas  that  defuse ‘the  Moorean/Humean lesson’  and rescue  referential  naturalism 
from ignominy. 
Synthetic  naturalistic  reductionists  (often  called  ‘Cornell  realists’)  advocate  a 
form of referential naturalism. Their  core insight is that the normative property in 
question exists in nature and we do can refer to it but, crucially, we can’t reduce it by 
a priori semantic analysis. We can’t reduce it by a priori semantic analysis because it 
could only be reduced in terms of an a posteriori  identity by means of scientific 
inquiry97.  This core insight,  as I  will  explain in the next  section 4.2, is  meant  to 
defuse  ‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’  and  rescue  referential  naturalism  from 
ignominy. 
The theoretical approach of synthetic reductionusm has grown out of, on the one 
hand,  the semantic  problems of  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism (brought  to  the 
open in Chs.2-3 with ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’) and, on the other hand, what we 
may coin ‘the synthetic naturalistic turn’ in philosophy that largely took place in the 
97  Also, some synthetic reductionists do no just leave open the logical possibility of an a posteriori 
reduction of a normative property to a natural kind, but go on to firmly postulate the existence of such 
a natural kind property. H.Kornblith (2005, 2007), for example, asserts that knowledge is a natural 
kind. Nothing turns on this difference and in the following discussion I will ignore it. 
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70’s. ‘The synthetic naturalistic turn’ emerged principally out of the groundbreaking 
work of  S.Kripke  (1981)  and H.Putnam (1975,  1981)  in  philosophy of  language 
(reference,  semantics  etc.).  Kripke  and  Putnam  criticized  traditional  ‘descriptive 
theories of reference’ as inadequate to accommodate our intuitions about reference to 
natural kinds and proper names and, instead, introduced ‘causal-historical theories of 
reference’. 
The introduction of the causal-historical theories of reference was quite influential 
(though, as usual, not uncontroversial) and brought a wave of important (some would 
say revolutionary) changes in our way of thinking about semantics and language and, 
through their ramified implications, to epistemology, metaphysics and mind98. This 
wave of important changes opened some new and interesting logical space where 
subtle dialectical manoeuvres could take place with the intent to save the day for 
referential naturalism99.
This is what synthetic reductionists shrewdly grasped. They grasped the opening 
of  this  new  logical  space  and  envisaged  that  we  could  exploit  causal-historical 
theories of reference in order to defuse the problematic semantic commitments of 
analytic naturalistic reductionism and construct a new theory, a theory unburdened 
by these problematic  semantic  commitments.  Indeed,  in  the face of  the semantic 
problems  of  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism exposed by ‘the  Moorean/Humean 
lesson’, they set out to exploit the newly opened logical space by causal-historical 
theories  of  reference  and launch a  revamped  form of  referential  naturalism.  Yet, 
despite  the  sophisticated  emendations,  this  new theory  would  still  remain  firmly 
within the camp of referential naturalism. 
Synthetic reductionists’ novel and sophisticated ideas were first introduced and 
applied exclusively on moral properties (H.Putnam 1981; D.Brink 1989; N.Sturgeon 
2007; R.Boyd 2007). Although at first sight there is nothing inhibiting an application 
of these ideas to epistemic (or other) properties, these philosophers weren’t really 
concerned with such an application. But other philosophers where, indeed, concerned 
with  the  application  of  these  novel  ideas  to  epistemic  discourse.  These  other 
98 For  some  of  the  standard  objections  to  causal-historical  theories  of  reference  see  W.Lycan 
(2006:Ch.6).
99 Compare  G.Sayer-McCord  (1997a:  280-1):  ‘Naturalists  in  ethics  have  found  hope  in  these 
developments. If property identity does not require synonymy, then whatever the force of the open 
question argument may be, it does not establish that our moral terms fail to refer to natural properties’. 
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philosophers in a similar vein have taken up analogous ideas and applied them to 
epistemic discourse (H.Kornblith (2005) on knowledge; and in some way J.Pollock 
(1985) on epistemic justification;100). 
In  what  follows,  I  will  speak  as  if  the  synthetic  reductionist  ideas  have  been 
specifically applied to the property of epistemic justification, although this -as far as 
I know- has not yet been attempted. Kornblith (2005, 2007) has applied synthetic 
reductionism to knowledge (rather than epistemic justification) because he takes ‘the 
knowledge first view’ and Pollock’s (1985) account of epistemic justification is not 
strictly speaking a synthetic reductionist approach (see n.100 on why). 
This much about how synthetic reductionism came to the fore, its core insight and 
the  key  driving  idea  behind  this  core  insight.  The  current  chapter  presents  and 
examines  the  argument  of  synthetic  reductionism.  This  is  the  plan  for  this 
presentation  and  examination:  in  section  4.2,  I  present  synthetic  naturalistic 
reductionism in some detail. I introduce its theoretical commitments and explain how 
these theoretical commitments purport to defuse ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ and 
rehabilitate a sophisticated form of referential naturalism. Afterwards, in section 4.3, 
I critically examine the plausibility of the theory. 
In  section  4.3,  I  argue  that  despite  the  employment  of  sophisticated  semantic 
assumptions  by  synthetic  reductionists  with  the  intent  to  defuse  ‘the 
Moorean/Humean  lesson’,  an  equally  sophisticated  version  of  Moore’s  classical 
‘open question argument’ can be constructed to show that their efforts do not make 
much progress. This equally sophisticated version of ‘the open question argument’ is 
‘the epistemic twin earth argument’101. 
Afterwards, in sections 4.4-4.5 I introduce, examine and reject a subtle kind of 
normative realism developed by G.Sayre-McCord (1997a) which concedes that ‘the 
epistemic twin earth argument’ shows that normative properties are not natural kinds, 
100 Pollock’s  (1985) approach is  not  strictly speaking a synthetic  reductionist  approach.  While he 
argues that epistemic justification is irreducible by semantic analysis (1985:123), he does not appeal 
to causal-historical theories of reference and a posteriori property identities in order to launch a viable 
form of referential naturalism about epistemic justification. But he does seem to hint to that general 
direction when, in passing, he talks about epistemic norms as natural kinds and the conceptual roles of 
epistemic concepts discovered by ‘a  posteriori conceptual analysis’(1985:168-175). 
101 A sophisticated Humean ‘is-ought argument’ can be constructed in the same ‘twin earth’ pattern the 
Moorean ‘open question argument’ follows. For reasons of simplicity, though, in section 4.3 I forgo 
this theoretical construction because the sophisticated Moorean ‘open question argument’ is already 
complex enough and, in addition, can tackle the issue on its own. But this theoretical construction can 
be left as a conceptual exercise to a willing reader.
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but still aspires to resist the antirealist conclusion Timmons and Horgan (2007) draw 
from  it.  Sayre-McCord’s  argument  is  concerned  with  moral  properties  but  I 
conveniently reinterpret  the argument in terms of epistemic properties,  as nothing 
hinges on this reinterpretation.  He calls his theory ‘normative kinds realism’ and, 
accordingly,  I  call  the  epistemic  version  of  the  theory ‘epistemic  kinds  realism’. 
Finally, in section 4.6, I conclude this chapter with a summary of the argument so far 
and prepare the ground for our next Ch.5.
4.2 Synthetic Naturalistic Reductionism Introduced
In  this  section,  we present  the  theoretical  commitments  of  synthetic  naturalist 
reductionism and explain how they are meant to rescue referential naturalism from 
the semantic problems exposed by ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’. We make explicit 
the  theoretical  commitments  of  the  approach and explicate  how these  theoretical 
commitments are supposed to perform the gambit to defuse the semantic problems of 
analytic naturalistic reductionism, as exposed by ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’, and 
rehabilitate referential naturalism.  This is our twofold task in this section. 
Let us now see the theoretical commitments of synthetic naturalistic reductionism 
and how these  are  meant  to  defuse ‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’.  Like  analytic 
naturalistic  reductionism,  synthetic  naturalistic  reductionism  is  a  referentialist 
approach.  It  starts  from  the  implicit  adoption  of  ‘the  referential  semantics 
assumption’  (P2),  namely,  accepts  that  justification  assertions  and  attributions 
purport to refer to a certain property of epistemic justification. Unlike fictionalists, 
though,  he  also  accepts  that  not  only  our  justification  assertions  and attributions 
purport  to  refer  to  such  an epistemic  justification  property but  that  this  property 
exists. 
The synthetic  reductionist  thinks  that  an epistemic  justification  property exists 
because  assumes  that  at  least  some  of  our  allegedly  justified  assertions  and 
attributions  are,  indeed,  justified.  This  is  the  familiar  from  section  2.2,  ‘the 
existential assertion’. But if there are at least some justified beliefs, he continues, 
then  there  must  be a  property of  epistemic  justification  in  virtue  of  which  these 
justified beliefs are justified. This is the also familiar from section 2.2,  ‘the realist  
ontological assertion’.
At  this  juncture,  however,  synthetic  and analytic  naturalistic  reductionism part 
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roads. The synthetic reductionist thinks that this property of epistemic justification 
that must somehow be ‘out there’, if at least some of our beliefs are to be justified, 
could not in principle be reduced by semantic analysis to a certain natural property. 
Unlike analytic naturalistic reductionism, the synthetic approach vehemently denies 
that  in  principle  we  can  reduce  by  semantic  analysis  the  property  of  epistemic 
justification.  This  is  his  particular  stance  because,  in  the  light  of  ‘the 
Moorean/Humean lesson’, he accepts the anti-reductionist verdict of Ch.3 and takes 
the property of epistemic justification to be irreducible by semantic analysis.  
In  short,  he  scraps  -what  in  Ch.2  we  dubbed-  ‘the  naturalistic  analysability 
assertion’: ‘The epistemic justification property (in virtue of which justified beliefs 
are justified) can, in principle, be reduced by semantic analysis to a certain natural 
property’.  Instead,  he  assumes  that  the  property  of  epistemic  justification  is,  in 
principle, irreducible by the traditional means of semantic analysis. Let us call the 
assumption that the property of epistemic justification is, in principle, irreducible by 
semantic analysis to a natural property, ‘the naturalistic unanalysability assertion’. 
The  synthetic  reductionist  discards  ‘the  naturalistic  analysability  assertion’  for 
‘the  naturalistic  unanalysability  assertion’  because,  crucially,  unlike  the  analytic 
naturalistic  reductionist,  he  does  not  adhere  to  ‘a  descriptive  conception  of 
reference’.  In  contrast,  the  analytic  naturalistic  reductionist  with  ‘the  naturalistic 
analysability assertion’ does adhere to a descriptive conception of reference. That is, 
he assumes that there is a directly descriptive natural property ‘out there’ reducing 
epistemic justification and this property can be discovered by semantic analysis102.
In turn,  the descriptive  conception of reference assumes -what D.Brink (1989: 
162)  has  called-  ‘the  semantic  test  of  property  identity’.  Namely,  that  we  can 
discover  property identities  (and,  hence,  accomplish reduction)  only by means of 
traditional  semantic  analysis.  In  other  words,  according  to  ‘the  semantic  test  of 
property identity’, reduction is a matter that lies in the hands of property identities 
discovered by semantic analysis.
The  synthetic  reductionist,  however,  does  not  agree  with  any  of  these  three 
102 The  use  of  ‘directly  descriptive’ needs  some  explication.  With  ‘a  directly  descriptive  natural 
property’ I mean a property that can be perceived simply by means of ordinary macroscopic eyesight 
e.g.  being  a  tree.  In  this  sense,  properties  perceived  through  microscopic  devices  are  ‘indirectly 
descriptive’. They are descriptive of the underlying microstructure of a certain natural property e.g. 
water is H2O.
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assumptions: ‘the naturalistic analysability assertion’, ‘the descriptive conception of 
reference’ and ‘the semantic test of property identity’. In the footsteps of Kripke and 
Putnam, he takes a dim view of these assumptions. On the one hand, he renounces 
‘the naturalistic analysability assertion’ for ‘the naturalistic unanalysability assertion’ 
and, on the other hand, abandons the descriptive conception of reference for a causal-
historical conception of reference. That is, he doesn’t think that directly descriptive 
features of the world regulate the use of normative sentences. 
Rather,  he thinks  that  features  of the world that  are  not  in  any sense directly 
descriptive causally regulate the use of such referential sentences. Subsequently, he 
exploits  the  causal-historical  conception  of  reference  in  order  to  show  that  ‘the 
semantic test for property identity’ is obsolete and then, based on this point, defuse 
‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ and rescue referential naturalism. Let me elaborate on 
their train of thought. 
First, very briefly, let us sketch how the two different conceptions of reference are 
meant to work. According to the traditional descriptivist conception of reference, we 
can  refer  to  natural  kinds  (and  proper  names),  let  us  say,  instances  of  gold  by 
identifying  at  least  some  of  its  main  directly  descriptive  characteristics  like  its 
yellowish colour, soft texture, shininess, density, malleability and ductility103. But for 
the  causal-historical  conception  of  reference,  identifying  directly  descriptive 
characteristics  of a  natural  kind is  utterly  inadequate  to  regulate  reference  to the 
natural kind in question. It is inadequate because these directly descriptive features 
do not  uniquely  identify instances  of gold.  In other words,  they don’t  reduce the 
property of being gold. 
Arguing by counterexample, causal-historical theorists press that there are cases 
where a  different  natural  kind bears  these directly  descriptive  features  but  is  not 
actually gold. As one might know from some good western film, ‘fool’s gold’ (or 
iron pyrite) also has these directly descriptive characteristics but is not actually gold. 
These  counterexamples  seem  to  show  that  no  matter  which  directly  descriptive 
characteristics of a natural kind we might identify these might prove deceptive and, 
hence, badly regulate reference to that certain natural kind. We might use ‘gold’ to 
103 There are different descriptive theories of reference in the theoretical marketplace (see G.Frege 
(1997), B.Russell (1956), J.Searle (1958)) but these differences are inconsequential to our discussion 
here and, therefore, are conveniently overstepped.
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refer  to  things  (e.g.  iron  pyrite)  associated  with  these  directly  descriptive 
characteristics but, nevertheless, these things do not really be instances of ‘gold’. As 
Shakespeare has said, ‘all that glitters is not gold’104.
In contrast,  for the causal-historical  theorist,  what -causally-  regulates referring 
sentences to gold is the property of being the element on the periodic table with 
atomic number 79. The rationale for this proposal is straightforward. The property of 
being the element with the atomic number 79 is what uniquely identifies and, hence, 
reduces instances of gold. In the light of this unique identification, we can say that 
sentences referring to the property of being ‘gold’ (e.g. My ear rings are made of 
gold) are actually referring to the property of ‘being the element with atomic number 
79’. The use of these referential sentences is causally regulated by the underlying 
essential property of gold. 
Now,  the  adoption  of  the  causal-historical  conception  of  reference  is  what  is 
meant  to  defuse ‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’  by rendering  obsolete  the hidden 
semantic  assumption that  lies  at  the heart  of  ‘the Moorean/Humean  lesson’:  ‘the 
semantic test of property identity’. ‘The semantic test of property identity’ assumes 
that only through a priori semantic analysis we can reduce a property to another. We 
can reduce a property to another  if and only if  we discover a certain  identifying 
property by semantic analysis. But as Kripke and Putnam taught us, this is a way too 
restrictive view of reduction because we can have a posteriori property identities as 
well. Property identities discovered by the empirical means of scientific inquiry (and 
not by traditional ‘armchair’ semantic analysis) that causally regulate the reference of 
the corresponding terms.
Take,  as another example,  the natural  kind of silver. According to the Kripke-
Putnam picture,  the property of ‘silver’  is reducible to the property of ‘being the 
element  on  the  periodic  table  with  atomic  number  47’.  This  is  an  a  posteriori 
property identity discovered through scientific inquiry and does not depend in any 
way to any analysis of the meaning of the notion of silver. No matter how hard we 
try,  this  is  not  something  discoverable  by  ‘armchair  philosophizing’.  It  is  not, 
because the property of being the element with atomic number 47 is not in any sense 
inherent in the meaning of the concept of silver and, hence, we can’t derive it by 
104  This appears somewhere in his The Merchant of Venice.
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meticulous semantic analysis. This is, after all, why we have a property identity that 
does not rest on synonymy unveiled by a priori analysis of meanings.
In a parallel  way,  the causal-historical  conception of reference is  then used to 
defuse the semantic problems of analytic naturalistic reductionism (as exposed by 
‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’).  In  the  light  of  a  causal-historical  conception  of 
reference,  synthetic  reductionists  claim that  as  the  property  of,  let  us  say,  being 
‘H20’ reduces and causally regulates the property of being ‘water’, there could be a 
certain  natural  kind  property  reducing  and  causally  regulating  the  property  of 
epistemic justification  (and other  normative  properties).  That  is,  there  could be a 
natural  kind  property  of  epistemic  justification  causally  regulating  the  use  of 
justification  assertions  and  attributions.  Call  this  claim  ‘the  causal-historical  
reference assertion’.
For it might be the case that normative properties, in spite of the inherent ‘open 
feel’ semantic intuitions sabotaging reductive semantic analyses, do have a posteriori 
property identities that have not yet been discovered. The parallel with natural kinds 
is sharply clear. For, surely, before Lavoisier’s discovery in the 1750s that water is 
H2O, if we were asked whether water is H20, an inherent semantic ‘open feel’ would 
indeed accompany the  reduction.  But  there  was after  all  an a  posteriori  property 
identity showing that the question is actually definitively closed and this explained 
away  the  ‘open  feel’  semantic  intuitions.  The  same  could  be  the  case  with  the 
property of epistemic justification (and other normative properties).
The inherent semantic ‘open fell’ intuitions could accompany reductive efforts by 
semantic analysis because there is no such directly descriptive natural property that 
can accomplish such a feat. These semantic intuitions could constitute an indication 
that epistemic justification is not reducible by a priori semantic analysis. But as in the 
case of water, these semantic intuitions will disappear if we discover an a posteriori 
property  identity  reducing  epistemic  justification.  Thus,  this  proposal,  evidently, 
seems to explain away the inherent semantic ‘open feel’ intuitions that accompany 
attempts to reduce the property of epistemic justification to a natural property (or to 
deduce a prescriptive ‘ought to believe’ from a referential ‘is’).  
This concise discussion yields a general overview of the synthetic reductionists’ 
theoretical commitments and how these are meant to defuse the semantic problems 
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of analytic naturalistic reductionism exposed by ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’. But 
before  moving  on  to  rehearse  in  more  succinct  and  explicit  terms  the  synthetic 
reductionist’s theoretical commitments, we should pause to make clear a last point. 
It is important to be stressed that synthetic reductionists only claim that we can’t 
reduce the property of epistemic justification by the traditional  means of a priori 
semantic analysis. These philosophers, though, do not suggest that the property of 
epistemic justification somehow  must be reducible by the sophisticated means of a 
posteriori  scientific  inquiry105.  Besides,  their  proposal  rests  on  the  mere  logical 
possibility  of  the  property  of  epistemic  justification  being  reduced  by  means  of 
scientific inquiry, not to any necessary reduction (in the by now familiar pattern of a 
posteriori property identities).
In any case, the synthetic naturalistic reductionist proposal does not hinge on any 
necessary reduction by a posteriori means of the epistemic justification property to a 
certain natural property.  It is meant to work even on the assumption that we will 
never reduce by empirical means the property of epistemic justification. For, their 
core insight is that the property of epistemic justification could be a natural kind and 
we  do  can  refer  to  it.  But  if  such  an  a  posteriori  reduction  will  be  somehow 
accomplished in the future, then synthetic reductionists will welcome this because it 
will  vindicate their theoretical project. It will show that they were right to propose 
that the property of epistemic justification could be reduced to a natural kind in an a 
posteriori pattern. 
This short digression for clarifying this last point finished, in more succinct and 
explicit terms these are the commitments of synthetic naturalistic reductionism:
• The  Referential  Semantics  Assumption:  ‘Justification  assertions  and 
attributions purport to refer to a certain property of epistemic justification’
• The Existential Assertion: ‘There are at least some justified beliefs’
• The Realist Ontological Assertion: ‘There must be an epistemic justification 
property in virtue of which justified beliefs are justified’
• The  Naturalistic  Unanalysability  Assertion:  ‘The  epistemic  justification 
105 Compare: ‘The moral realist may choose to agree that goodness is probably a physical property but 
deny that  it  has any physical  definition,  analytic  or  other’ R.Boyd (2007:173; my emphasis)  and 
‘Naturalistic identity claims should be construed on the model of other common identity claims, such 
as water=H2O... [m]oral properties can  be natural properties, though, even if they are not identical 
with natural properties’  D.Brink (1989: 157; my own emphasis).
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property (in virtue of which justified beliefs are justified) cannot,  in principle,  be 
reduced by semantic analysis to a certain directly descriptive natural property’
• The  Causal-Historical  Reference  Assertion:  ‘Justification  assertions  and 
attributions, in principle, purport to refer to a certain natural kind property (whatever 
this may be) causally regulating their use ’
We have now completed our twofold task for this section. That is,  on the one 
hand,  we  presented  the  theoretical  commitments  of  synthetic  naturalistic 
reductionism and, on the other hand, explained how they are meant to defuse the 
semantic  problems  of  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism,  as  exposed  by  ‘the 
Moorean/Humean  lesson’,  and  rehabilitate  a  sophisticated  form  of  referential 
naturalism.  Let  us  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  critical  examination  of  these 
proposals. The other part of critical examination follows in section 4.4. 
4.3 Synthetic Naturalistic Reductionism and Epistemic Twin Earth
In section 4.2, we introduced the theoretical commitments of synthetic naturalistic 
reductionism and explained how they exploit the causal-historical theory of reference 
with the intent to defuse the semantic problems (exposed ‘by the Moorean/Humean 
lesson’)  of  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism  and  articulate  a  viable  form  of 
sophisticated referential naturalism.
In this section, we present our critical examination of the proposal. We argue that 
the  deployment  of  sophisticated  dialectical  weaponry  by  synthetic  naturalistic 
reductionism with the intent to defuse ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ does not seem 
to make much progress. It does not seem to make much progress because it runs into 
an equally sophisticated version of ‘the open question argument’: ‘the epistemic twin 
earth argument’. As we shall explain, it appears to succumb to ‘the epistemic twin 
earth argument’. 
The ‘epistemic twin earth argument’ is inspired from the analogous ‘moral twin 
earth  argument’  of  M.Timmons  and  T.Horgan  (2007).  The  ‘moral  twin  earth 
argument’ has been propounded in a number of papers and has been specifically used 
against  so-called  synthetic  naturalistic  reductionism’s  application  to  moral 
properties106.  Here,  since  our  discussion  concerns  the  property  of  epistemic 
justification, I reinterpret the argument in epistemic terms. But we should bear in 
106  See M.Timmons and T.Horgan (2007) and M.Timmons (1999: ch.3).
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mind that there is no substantial dialectical difference between the initial moral and 
the current epistemic interpretation. I broadly follow Timmons’ and Horgan’s (2007) 
original argument. 
M.Timmons  and  T.Horgan  (2007),  following  H.Putnam’s  (1975:  215-271) 
renowned ‘twin earth thought experiment’ for causal-historical theories of reference 
(and semantic externalism), constructed an analogous thought experiment purported 
to launch a strengthened, non-classical ‘open question argument’ that could confront 
synthetic reductionism head-on. The idea was to build a modernized ‘open question 
argument’ that founders synthetic reductionism in the same way Moore’s classical 
‘open question argument’ founders analytic reductionism. 
In concise terms, this is ‘the epistemic twin earth argument’. Like in Timmons and 
Horgan’s moral version of the argument, consider two planets: ‘good old earth’ and 
‘epistemic  twin  earth’.  The  two  planets  are  alike  in  all  respects:  geography, 
surroundings  etc.  and,  significantly,  its  inhabitants,  respectively,  ‘earthlings’  and 
‘twin earthlings’ both speak English. They have the same conceptual repertoire (i.e. 
vocabulary)  and use  the  epistemic  predicates  ‘is  justified’,  ‘is  rational’,  ‘is  well-
grounded’ etc. 
The  only difference is that in ‘good old earth’ epistemic predicates are causally 
regulated,  as a matter  of some a posteriori  property identity,  by some coherentist 
property (e.g.  Quinean holistic  coherentism) while  in ‘epistemic twin earth’,  as  a 
matter  of  some  a  posteriori  property  identity,  epistemic  predicates  are  causally 
regulated by some foundationalist property (e.g. Chisholmian self-presentation). The 
question now is how we should understand this sole difference between ‘good old 
earth’ and ‘epistemic twin earth’. 
As Timmons and Horgan (2007) suggest, there are two hermeneutic options: 
• We could say that ‘earthlings’ and ‘twin earthlings’  differ in meaning and 
reference, since epistemic predicates are causally regulated by different natural prop-
erties in each case: a coherentist for ‘earthlings’ and a foundationalist for ‘twin earth-
lings’. 
• We could say that, despite the causal regulation by different natural proper-
ties, their disagreement is not one of meaning and reference but rather one of genu-
ine disagreement in epistemological theory and belief.
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The first hermeneutic option seems to be the case in Putnam’s (1975: 223-227) 
original ‘Twin earth argument’.  In Putnam’s argument,  the term ‘water’ in planet 
earth is causally regulated by H20, while in planet twin earth ‘twin-water’ is causally 
regulated by a property, alas, unbeknown to us earthlings, the XYZ. In such a case, 
Putnam (1975) argued, ‘earthlings’ and ‘twin earthlings’ seem to mean and refer dif-
ferently with the term ‘water’  and ‘twin-water’:  H20 in planet earth and XYZ in 
planet twin earth. 
Very briefly (and rather unfairly to the richness and complexity of Putnam’s dis-
cussion), this is the case because, as Putnam cogently argued, ‘the twin earth thought 
experiment’ shows that psychological states are not sufficient on their own to de-
termine meaning, though, they are probably necessary for meaning. They are not suf-
ficient on their own to determine meaning because, as the thought experiment shows, 
intuitively, people with the same psychological states can have different meanings. 
Earthlings with ‘water’ mean H20 and Twin earthlings with ‘twin-water’ mean XYZ.
Earthlings  and  Twin  earthlings  have  different  meanings  because  the  external 
world,  importantly,  does contribute  to the meaning of our terms and expressions. 
That is, meaning is at least partially determined by the external world. It is determ-
ined by social conventions constantly informed by the dissemination of scientific ad-
vances and discoveries. Therefore, no one can reasonably deny that at least partially, 
as philosophers of mind say, ‘mental content is broad’. In Putnam’s (1975:227) fam-
ous  colloquial  phrase,  ‘Cut  the  pie  any  anyway  you  like,  meanings  ain’t  in  the 
head!’; or, at least, not entirely in the head ( as that would mean sliding to a form of 
Berkeleyan idealism!). 
In  contrast,  like  Timmons  and  Horgan  (2007)  in  their  ‘moral  twin  earth 
argument’, I opt out for the second hermeneutic option. And this is the heart of the  
matter. I contend that, unlike Putnam’s original ‘twin earth thought experiment’, in 
the  ‘epistemic  twin  earth  thought  experiment’  we  seem to  have  rather  different 
hermeneutic intuitions. Intuitively, we don’t seem to think that there is difference in 
meaning  and  reference  as  in  Putnam’s  original  scenario,  but  rather  genuine 
disagreement in epistemological theory and belief. 
Genuine  disagreement  in  epistemological  theory  and  belief  that  appears 
irresolvable, even in the logically possible scenario that we did have an a posteriori 
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property identity that reduces the property of epistemic justification.  For, it appears 
that  even  if  we  had  a  posteriori  property  identities  for  epistemic  properties, 
intuitively, we would still genuinely disagree about these properties. In contrast with 
natural  kind terms, where a posteriori  property identities seem to resolve genuine 
disagreement and definitively close the question, in the case of epistemic (and other 
normative) properties potential discovery of a posteriori property identities does not 
seem to promise the same closure results. It does not seem to promise resolution of 
genuine disagreement and definitive closure of the question. 
So, while the question: ‘Is the natural kind of water reducible to H2O?’  in the 
light  of an a posteriori  property identity intuitively appears closed,  the analogous 
question:  ‘Is  epistemic justification reducible  to a certain  natural  kind property?’, 
even in the light of a presumed a posteriori identity,  would  still intuitively appear 
indeterminately  open.  Like  Timmons’  and  Horgan’s  (2007)  original  argument, 
therefore, I conclude that sophisticated synthetic reductionism does not seem to make 
much progress. Unfortunately, despite its subtlety and sophistication, it still founders 
on  revived  inherent  semantic  ‘open  feel’  intuitions.  It  still  runs  into  another 
devastating  ‘open  question  argument’.  Call  this  lesson ‘the  epistemic  twin  earth 
lesson’.
However, as in the case of Moore’s classic ‘open question argument’ we should 
be careful about the exact logical import of ‘the epistemic twin earth argument’. It 
should not be mistaken for something that it is not and, surely, it is not a conclusive 
rebuttal of synthetic naturalistic reductionism. Very briefly, both arguments, Moore’s 
classical ‘open question argument’ and ‘the epistemic twin earth argument’ seem to 
fall  prey  to  W.Frankena’s  (1939)  famous  ‘begging-the–question  objection’107.  As 
have seen in section 2.3, Moore’s argument presupposes that we can’t reach analytic 
naturalistic definitions and, since this is what is really at stake, it is enough to ‘beg 
the question’. 
For, despite our unsuccessful attempts at least since Plato, we can’t inductively 
preclude  that  we won’t  find one in  the future.  Timmons and Horgan’s argument 
analogously  presupposes  that  even  if  we  reach  a  posteriori  identities  causally 
regulating epistemic terms the semantic ‘open feel’ intuitions will remain and this, 
107  See A.Miller (2005: 167-8) for some discussion.
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again, prejudges what is really at stake. For, after all, the semantic ‘open feel’ might 
vanish in thin air  when we finally discover the a posteriori  property identities of 
epistemic  terms.  Given  then  that  Moore-style  ‘open  question  arguments’  are 
committed to  such inductive prejudgements  they are  doomed to  beg the question 
against  referential  naturalism (analytic  or synthetic)  and, hence,  they are far from 
being conclusive.
But, as in the case of Moore’s classical ‘open question argument’, many people 
are inclined to think that the argument  strikes something deep that should not be 
missed simply in virtue of its  inconclusiveness.  Besides, no one would deny that 
many inconclusive  arguments  do create  a  strong presumption  for  their  case.  The 
argument seems to strike something deep because it captures the entrenched intuition 
that,  no matter  what happens,  genuine disagreement  about epistemological  theory 
and belief  is  irresolvable.  Therefore,  many philosophers are  willing to accept  the 
argument  as  enthymatic.  That  is,  as  an inference  to  the  best  explanation for  the 
existence  and  persistence  of  these  inherent  ‘open  feel’  semantic  intuitions.  The 
inherent  ‘open  feel’  semantic  intuitions  persistently  arise  because  there  is  no  a 
posteriori property identity reducing epistemic justification.
 With  ‘the  epistemic  twin  earth  lesson  in  hand’,  in  the  next  section  4.4,  we 
introduce Sayre-McCord’s (1997) ‘epistemic  kinds realism’  that  aspires to  accept 
‘the epistemic twin earth lesson’ but still resist its antirealist conclusion. Again, it 
does not fare very well. 
4.4 Epistemic Kinds Realism Introduced
G.Sayre-McCord’s  (1997a)  interesting  argument  for  ‘normative  kinds  realism’ 
comes as a response to Timmons’ and Horgans’ (2007) ‘moral twin earth argument’. 
As we have seen, ‘the moral twin earth argument’ amounts to a sophisticated ‘open 
question  argument’  devastating  synthetic  naturalistic  reductionism.  Yet,  Sayre-
McCord’s intention is to show that there is still  open logical space for a form of 
moral realism.  It  is to show that while Timmons’ and Horgans’ (2007) argument 
against synthetic naturalistic reductionism correctly traces something important, they 
nevertheless hasten to draw the wrong conclusion. 
That is, by the fact that we seem to have ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions about a 
possible reduction of moral properties to natural kinds, we should not hasten to lead 
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to the hands of moral antirealism/expressivism (as Timmons and Horgan urge). We 
can still be moral realists and accept ‘the epistemic twin earth lesson’, namely, that 
normative  properties  are  not  reducible  to  natural  kinds.  Now,  as  in  the  case  of 
synthetic reductionists, Sayre-McCord’s argument is in moral terms and, therefore, 
henceforth I freely reinterpret it in epistemic terms.
Sayre-McCord  (1997a)  argues  that  we  can  accept  ‘the  epistemic  twin  earth 
lesson’, namely,  that in all evidence there are no natural kinds reducing epistemic 
properties and still resist Timmons’ and Horgan’s (2007) conclusion that there are no 
epistemic properties. We can achieve this much, Sayre-McCord (1997) contends, by 
drawing  a  subtle  and  delicate  distinction  between  ‘natural  kinds  terms’  and 
‘epistemic kinds terms’.  Crucially,  epistemic kinds terms are supposed to operate 
‘much like’ natural kinds terms but not exactly like them (and this is supposed to 
open the  new logical  space).  Let  me  explain  the  difference  between natural  and 
epistemic  kinds  terms  and how this  is  supposed  to  open  new logical  space  that 
absorbs ‘the epistemic twin earth lesson’ and still rescues epistemological realism.
As  we  have  seen  in  section  4.2,  according  to  ‘causal-historical  theories  of 
reference’ natural kinds terms (like water, gold, silver etc.), in the light of our best 
scientific theory,  are causally regulated by certain natural  properties e.g. Water is 
H20. These natural properties a posteriori reduce and, therefore, uniquely identify the 
respective natural kinds. Since we have reduction and unique identification of the 
natural  kinds  by  certain  natural  properties,  we  can  legitimately  talk  of  causal 
regulation of the use of the natural kind terms by the respective natural properties. 
That is, we can talk of a certain causal-historical link between the correct use of the 
natural kind terms and the natural property reducing the term in question. 
Now, importantly, Sayre-McCord argues that the case with epistemic kinds terms 
(justification,  rationality  etc.)  is  just  slightly  different  from  natural  kinds  terms; 
though,  this  slight  difference  makes  an  (epistemic)  world  of  difference.  The 
difference is that, unlike natural kind terms, epistemic kind terms are not supposed to 
be causally regulated by certain natural kind properties. This is what Timmons and 
Horgan  (2007),  Sayre-McCord  (1997a)  concedes,  correctly  traced  with  their 
‘epistemic twin earth argument’. 
For, if epistemic kinds terms were to be causally regulated by a certain natural 
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kind  property  -according  to  our  best  scientific  theory-  as  synthetic  reductionists 
envisaged, then in the ‘epistemic twin earth argument’ we wouldn’t have ‘open feel’ 
semantic  intuitions.  We  wouldn’t  feel  that  no  matter  which  natural  property  a 
posteriori reduces an epistemic kind term, there would still be irresolvable normative 
disagreement about normative theory and belief. But in fact, as we have canvassed in 
section 4.3, we do have such ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions. 
Unlike natural  kinds terms, epistemic kinds are meant to be causally regulated 
only by instances of the kind, not by the kind itself. We then proceed to observe and 
track  the similarities  of the instances  of  the relevant  epistemic  kinds and form a 
theory of what they could mean. Afterwards, our resultant moral theory ‘fixes the 
reference’ of the epistemic kinds in the same way our scientific theory ‘fixes the 
reference’ of natural kinds (with Kripkean ‘rigid designators’). Once the reference of 
epistemic kinds is fixed, this gradually becomes part of linguistic conventions and 
epistemic kinds terms come to mean what the fixation of reference takes them to 
mean.
With  the  distinction  between  ‘natural/epistemic  kinds  terms’  at  hand,  Sayre-
McCord then argues that the discovery of the true nature of epistemic kinds is an 
unfolding ‘process’ that takes time, reflection and responsiveness to new information 
about such epistemic kinds. This new information, though, could come only from the 
maturation of normative epistemological theory, not scientific inquiry. It could come 
from  the  process  of  development,  maturation  and  fruition  of  an  adequate 
epistemological  theory  through  due  argument,  reflection  and  new  information. 
Scientific advances do not have a say in this process, at least not in any direct and 
important way. 
Worthy of special notice is also that Sayre-McCord’s (1997a: 271) proposal is 
supposed to remain ontologically neutral. That is, it remains neutral on what these 
epistemic  kind  properties  are  from  an  ontological  point  of  view  (natural  or 
nonnatural)). As far as his proposal is concerned, they might turn out to be either 
natural or nonnatural and his proposal remains open to both interpretations. This is a 
crucial  assumption  and  we will  back  to  this  in  our  criticism of  Sayre-McCord’s 
argument. 
But here is a nice quote that captures much of the essence of Sayre-McCord’s 
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(1997a:269-270) proposal in his own words:
‘Discovering the referents of our [epistemic] terms is a process, I’ll suggest, 
of  discovering  what  normatively  significant  kinds  –and  not  causal-
explanatorily  significant  kinds-  regulate  our  [epistemic]  beliefs.  The 
regulation involved must be, I’ll nonetheless assume, a causal regulation, 
so the kinds in question will end up being causally relevant at least to the 
explanation  of  our  use  of  the  terms.  Yet  when  an  [epistemic]  kind  is 
appropriately implicated in the explanation of our use of some term it will 
not be because we causally interact with the kind itself. Rather, it will be 
because (i) our use is causally responsive to what are, in fact, instances of 
the kind and (ii) the use to which the term is put is one of referring to 
whatever normatively significant kind it is that they are instances of… Of 
course just what might count as appropriate causal regulation is itself a 
complicated and controversial matter. I assume that a crucial part of the 
story will highlight features of the use of the term in question that make its 
use responsive to new information about the kind in question’.
According  to  Sayre-McCord,  once  the  distinction  between  the  ‘natural  kinds 
semantics’ of synthetic reductionism and the ‘epistemic kinds semantics’ is crisply 
drawn, we can harvest  important  theoretical  fruits.  On the one hand, new logical 
space is cleared for a form of epistemological realism that defuses ‘the epistemic 
twin earth lesson’ and, on the other hand, certain important explanatory advantages 
are secured. Let me explain how epistemic kinds semantics accomplishes this much. 
First, ‘epistemic kinds semantics’ accept ‘the epistemic twin earth lesson’ because 
these semantics are not causally regulated by a natural kind (according to our best 
scientific picture of the world). Rather, they are causally regulated by instances of 
epistemic kinds that, subsequently, our epistemological theory exploits in order to fix 
the  reference  of  epistemic  kinds  terms.  The  ‘epistemic  twin  earth  argument’ 
neglected this available logical space because identified causal regulation with causal 
regulation by a natural kind and then hastened to pronounce their antirealist verdict: 
there are no epistemic properties.
But as Sayre-McCord points out, we need not take this step. We can settle for 
causal  regulation  by  instances  of  the  kind.  Thus,  presumably,  for  Sayre-McCord 
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‘open feel’ semantic intuitions exist because our best epistemological theory has not 
yet  discovered the nature of epistemic kinds. Therefore,  ‘the epistemic twin earth 
lesson’ applies to the ‘natural kinds semantics’ of synthetic reductionism but not to 
‘epistemic kinds semantics’. 
Second,  ‘the  [epistemic]  kinds  approach  also  helps  to  make  sense  of  why no 
robust analytical definitions are available’ (1997a: 269). That is, it makes sense of 
why ‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’  worked so efficiently.  The  ‘[epistemic]  kinds 
approach’ makes sense of why ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ worked so efficiently 
‘because it treats proposed ‘definitions’ of epistemic terms as discoveries not settled 
by  current  use,  prevailing  linguistic  conventions,  or  declarative  stipulation…’ 
(1997a:269).  The  true  nature  of  an  epistemic  kind  is  quite  different  of  what  we 
currently  think  it  is  and  discovering  this  nature  is  ‘a  process’;  not  something 
discovered with the easiness and speed of the blink of an eye. 
Third,  with  the  ‘epistemic  kinds  semantics’  we  can  still  vindicate  our  pre-
theoretical realist intuitions. We can make sense of talking, on the one hand, about 
the same epistemic properties when we use epistemic terms and, on the other hand, 
about facts of the matter that can resolve epistemic disputes. Unlike ‘the epistemic 
twin  earth  argument’,  we  can  opt  for  the  first  hermeneutic  option  and  interpret 
normative  disagreement  as  disagreement  about  meaning  and  reference  (as  in 
Putnam’s original scenario), not as irresolvable disagreement about normative theory 
and belief. 
This vindicates the realist intuition that when we disagree about epistemic matters 
we disagree about  something;  we are  not just  talking past  each other  (this  is  the 
familiar ‘realist ontological assertion’). There is, presumably, a fact of the matter that 
can settle the dispute. These ‘facts of the matter’ we purport to refer to when we use 
epistemic terms are determined by ‘the epistemic kinds’ (whatever these may be).
To illustrate  this  last  point,  Sayre-McCord (1997a:  285)  gives  the example  of 
people having different (deontological and consequentialist) conceptions of justice. 
Let me illustrate the same point by giving an analogous example of people having 
different  conceptions  of  epistemic  justification.   Some  people  might  accept  a 
Quinean theory of justification and count as justified only the beliefs that conform to 
Quine’s  holistic  coherentism,  while  others  may  accept  a  Chisholmian  theory  of 
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justification  and count  as  justified  only  the  beliefs  that  are  either  self-presenting 
themselves or based on self-presenting beliefs. Yet, in this case we don’t see people 
as talking past  each other,  but ‘as holding competing views about [justification]’. 
That is, holding competing views about what justification is. And, surely, when we 
talk about justification we imply both that the property of justification exists and has 
a certain determinate nature.
This concludes our presentation of ‘epistemic kinds realism’. Let us now turn to 
the  critical  appraisal  of  this  attempt  to  rescue  epistemological  realism from ‘the 
epistemic twin earth lesson’.
4.5 Epistemic Kinds Realism Criticized
A first quick (yet, too quick) complaint is that Sayre-McCord’s argument might 
break down on the ‘much like’ analogy with natural kind terms. It might break down 
on exactly the point of the alleged causal regulation of epistemic kinds terms by 
instances of the kind, but not by the kind itself. For, we can clearly understand how 
causal regulation by kinds fixes the meaning and reference of natural kind terms, but 
is not so clear how causal regulation by instances can do the same for epistemic 
kinds terms. 
‘H20’  causally  regulates  the  use  of  ‘water’  because  it  reduces  and,  therefore, 
uniquely identifies water. But we don’t have property identities that reduce, uniquely 
identify and, hence, can causally regulate the use of epistemic kind terms. That was 
the  problem with  synthetic  reductionism in  the  first  place.  We  don’t  have  such 
property identities at our disposal and ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions indicate that the 
prospect of discovering any is unpromising.  If this is correct,  then epistemic kind 
terms can only be causally regulated by some sort of natural kind properties (given 
that  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism  is  not  an  option).  But  this  is  the  initial 
synthetic reductionist approach and we have seen that it runs into ‘an open question 
argument’. Thus, the argument goes, epistemic kinds semantics do not fair any better 
than synthetic reductionism’s natural kinds semantics. 
However, this argument entirely misses the point of Sayre-McCord’s theory. For 
the  insight  of  Sayre-McCord was to  stress  that  we shouldn’t  -like  Timmons  and 
Horgan- assume that the only sort of causal regulation is causal regulation by a kind. 
We can also have causal regulation by instances of the kind and this is good enough 
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for a viable form of epistemological realism. 
For  although  we  might  not  yet  know  what  reduces  the  epistemic  kind  of 
‘justification’ and, therefore, can’t claim that ‘justification’ is causally regulated by a 
certain natural kind property, we can still speak of ‘justification’ as being causally 
regulated by instances of this kind property;  or, more accurately,  at least what we 
currently  think  are  instances  of  this  kind  property.  We  can  still  be  ‘causally 
responsive’ to instances of what we take to be, let us say, justified beliefs, theories, 
explanations etc. even if we don’t know which property reduces ‘justification’. 
We  can  then  systematize  the  similarities  of  what  we  take  to  be  instances  of 
‘justification’ and come to form a speculative theory of what ‘justification’ could be. 
This process could take place time and time again as our speculative theories might 
collapse in the face of counterexamples, recalcitrant intuitions etc. 
But there is no reason to be overly pessimistic about the possibility that one day 
this constant formulation and trial of more and more refined theories won’t arrive at 
the true nature of what justification is. And once epistemological theory settles on 
what  ‘justification’  really  is  (or  any  other  epistemic  kind),  we can  then  ‘fix  the 
reference’  of  our  epistemic  term  and,  gradually,  this  will  become  part  of  the 
established  linguistic  convention.  Yet,  it  takes  epistemological  theorizing  and not 
scientific inquiry for this task and epistemological theorising needs time and effort. 
Think, for example,  how we gradually came to realize epistemic facts like the 
truth-conducivity of inductive experimentation and meticulous observation of natural 
phenomena. Nowadays, this sounds a commonplace truism to our modern ears but 
actually it was the result of a slowly unfolding process that gave rise to the scientific 
method  sometime  around  16th-17th century.  In  pre-scientific  communities,  the 
formulation from scratch of animistic  explanations (and other ‘just so stories’) of 
natural phenomena was (and in some places still is, I am afraid) a common epistemic 
practice.  The  realization  of  such  epistemic  facts  was  exactly  a  socio-historical 
process, not something that suddenly dawned on us. That is, it was a process that 
took argument, reflection, controversy etc.
 In conclusion, this preliminary objection does not seem to make much progress 
against  epistemic  kinds  realism as  it  exactly  misses  its  key  insight,  namely,  the 
distinction between causal regulation by kinds and causal regulation by instances of 
98
kinds.
A second more promising objection to Sayre-McCord’s theory is the following. 
Given the ontological neutrality of Sayre-McCord’s theory, it faces a dilemma: either 
epistemic kinds are natural properties or nonnatural properties. Let us take the first 
horn of the dilemma. If epistemic kinds are natural properties, then we should be able 
to discover them either by semantic analysis or by a posteriori scientific methods, as 
what exists in nature can in principle be discovered. 
What  exists  in  nature  has  independent  causal  powers  and takes  part  in  causal 
interactions  and,  sooner or later,  we can track and identify  such things.  Thus,  in 
principle, we should be able to discover the nature of epistemic kinds, even if this 
discovery is a process that will take time and effort. To suggest otherwise, namely, 
that  there  can  be  natural  properties  that,  in  principle,  are  not  discoverable  is  to 
mystify nature and I don’t think that Sayre-McCord would be happy to embrace this. 
But  this  first  horn  runs  straight  into  our  still  powerful  ‘open  feel’  semantic 
intuitions about a potential discovery -by our matured best epistemological theory 
this time- of the nature of epistemic kinds. We can thus build on these intuitions and 
level  another  ‘open  question  argument’  in  the  form of  an  ‘epistemic  twin  earth 
argument’.  
Once  again  we  have  ‘earth’  and  ‘twin  earth’.  As  usual,  the  two  planets  are 
identical in all imaginable respects (surroundings, geography, language etc.). There 
is only one difference. The use of ‘earthlings’’ notion of ‘justification’ is causally 
regulated by the coherentist property discovered by Quine. Quine has won the hearts 
of  earthlings  and  they  came  to  realize  that  some  form  of  holistic  coherentism 
captures  the true nature  of  justification.  They proceeded to  ‘fix  the  reference  ‘of 
justification according to Quine’s coherentist dictates and by now with justification 
they mean what Quine taught them to mean. 
But  in contrast,  the use of the notion of justification in twin earth  is  causally 
regulated  by  a  property  discovered  by  a  twin  earthling  foundationalist  named 
Chisholm.  The  twin  earthling  foundationalist  has  again  won  the  hearts  of  twin 
earthlings and they came to realize that some form of ‘self-presentation’ captures the 
true nature of justification. They proceeded to ‘fix the reference’ of justification and 
by now with justification they mean what Chisholm taught them to mean. 
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The  question  now  is  how to  understand  the  normative  disagreement  between 
earthlings  and  twin  earthlings  on  ‘what  justification  is’.  There  are  again  two 
hermeneutic options:
• We could say that ‘earthlings’ and ‘twin earthlings’  differ in meaning and 
reference, since justification is causally regulated by a different natural property in 
each case: a Quinean coherentist for ‘earthlings’ and a Chisholmian foundationalist 
for ‘twin earthlings’. 
• We could say that, despite the causal regulation by different natural proper-
ties, their disagreement is not one of meaning and reference but rather one of genu-
ine disagreement in epistemological theory and belief.
Now it  seems,  again,  that  we should  side  with  (b).  Disagreement  about  what 
justification is seems to be genuine disagreement in epistemological theory and belief 
because,  intuitively,  we  feel  that  no  matter  with  which  property  our  best 
epistemological  theory  identifies  justification  we will  still be  doubtful  about  this 
reduction. And we will feel doubtful because of the inherent ‘open feel’ semantic 
intuitions concomitant to such reductive efforts. Thus, the first horn of the dilemma 
leads to a dead end for epistemic kinds realism 108. 
Let us now follow the second horn of the dilemma and take epistemic kinds to be 
nonnatural  properties.  If epistemic kinds are nonnatural  properties,  then epistemic 
kinds are irreducible to more basic naturalistic terms and our pursuit of analysing 
their  nature through a process of trial-and-error will  never discover the nature of 
epistemic kinds. This nonnaturalist reading is in agreement with what ‘the epistemic 
twin earth lesson’ suggests.
 But although Sayre-McCord’s theory embraces the conclusion of ‘the epistemic 
twin  earth  lesson’,  if  it  is  given  a  nonnaturalist  reading,  it  then  meets  serious 
epistemological  and  ontological  problems  we  will  discuss  in  the  next  Ch.5.  I 
postpone discussion of these problems until the next chapter but, as we will see in the 
Ch.5,  these  problems  are  important  and  make  nonnaturalist  theories  seem 
implausible. Without any third ontological reading option, epistemic kinds realism 
seems to have been cornered as neither a naturalistic nor a nonnaturalist reading of 
this theory can really help it.
108   This is, broadly, how Gibbard (2003: 159-168) argues against Sayre-McCord, though, without the 
conceptual apparatus of a ‘twin earth’ thought experiment.
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Sayre-McCord might still have a bifurcated rejoinder, though. First, against ‘the 
epistemic twin earth argument’, he might respond that it works against his proposal 
only if we assume that the discovery of the true nature of epistemic kinds is possible 
and  that  such  a  discovery  will  entail  the  evaporation  of  ‘open  feel’  semantic 
intuitions and, subsequently, the resolution of entrenched normative disagreement109. 
But this is an assumption that nowhere in the text Sayre-McCord appears to concede 
and, moreover, at one point seems to explicitly hint that he is not conceding it. For as 
he says (1997a: 288): ‘It is not a forgone conclusion that our [epistemic] terms will 
find a reflection, let alone a vindication, in the best normative theory’. 
This is somewhat brief and cryptic, but he seems to be saying that is not quite 
clear whether we will ever discover the true nature of epistemic kinds, and even if we 
do discover it, is also not clear whether this will be vindicated as such. And it might 
not  be  vindicated  as  the  true  nature  of  epistemic  kinds  because  the  ‘open  feel’ 
semantic intuitions of agents might still resist its acceptance and, hence, resolution of 
normative disagreement might not be achieved.
Second,  Sayre-McCord  might  point  out  that  our  argument,  if  correct,  seems 
unable to explain our pre-theoretical realist intuitions -as his theory does- and that 
this is another defect of taking hermeneutic option (b) above. Perhaps, he might even 
make  the  by  far  stronger  claim  that  any  theory  that  cannot  explain  these  pre-
theoretical  realist  intuitions  does not really take off the ground in the first  place, 
because  these  intuitions  are  an  a  priori  constraint  on  any  possible  theoretical 
explanation of normative discourse. 
Sayre-McCord’s  (imagined)  bifurcated  rejoinder  goes  deep.  My brief  counter-
response  is  this.  On  the  first  prong,  given  that  Sayre-McCord does  not  concede 
neither the assumption that the true nature of epistemic kinds is discoverable nor that 
such a discovery will bring evaporation of the ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions and 
convergence, ‘the epistemic twin earth argument’ is, indeed, rendered toothless. It is 
rendered toothless because he accepts that there are epistemic kinds and we might 
never discover their nature and, a fortiori, even if we discover their nature we might 
never come to vindicate it as such.
If  we grant  to  Sayre-McCord this  assumption,  ultimately,  the  discussion  boils 
109  This style of response to ‘the open question argument’ has been explored by M.Smith (1994). 
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down to a stalemate of conflicting intuitions. Sayre-McCord has realist intuitions and 
goes for hermeneutic option (a). That is, he thinks that normative disagreement is one 
of meaning and reference, even though normative properties are not natural kinds 
and  science  is  not  of  much  help  on  normative  issues.  We  disagree  about  what 
something is; we don’t just talk past each other. 
In contrast, I have antirealist intuitions and go for hermeneutic option (b). That is, 
I think that normative disagreement is not one of meaning and reference but rather 
one  of  genuine disagreement  in  epistemological  theory and belief.  We genuinely 
disagree  about  epistemic  kinds  because  there  are  no  such  things  with  a  certain 
determinate nature; (though, I wouldn’t say that disagreeing agents talk past each 
other just because there are no such epistemic kinds).
However, I don’t think that we should be so charitable to grant this assumption to 
Sayre-McCord. Reasonably, if epistemic kinds are natural properties we should be 
able  to  discover  them  either  by  semantic  analysis  or  by  a  posteriori  scientific 
methods, as what exists in nature can in principle be discovered. For, to suggest that 
something can be natural and, thereby, exist in nature and still, in principle, not be 
discoverable by scientific inquiry is to mystify nature in an anachronistic manner.
 We should be able to discover the nature of epistemic kinds, even if their initial 
discovery does not lead to immediate convergence. For it is true enough that ‘open 
feel’  semantic intuitions obstructing convergence and agreement may persist even 
when  we  do  discover  the  truth  about  some  question.  Think  for  example  of 
Copernicus’  proposal  of  heliocentricism.  It  took  some  time  for  people  to  be 
convinced that geocentricism is mistaken. Equally, disagreement might persist even 
when we discover (if ever) the true nature of epistemic kinds.
But,  reasonably,  we  expect  rational  agents  to  come  bit-by-bit,  step  by  step 
(through sober reflection, argument, full information etc.) to recognise the truth of 
the  matter  at  some  point  as  it  happened  with  the  historical  example  of 
heliocentricism. If we have discovered the truth about a certain question, then we 
should expect rational agents at some point to acknowledge this truth. And this is 
mere common sense.  
Think, more generally, how science evolves through Kuhnian ‘paradigm shifts’110. 
110  I allude to T.Kuhn (1996).
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At  the  beginning  there  is  strong  resistance  to  the  revolutionary  theory,  even 
vehement outright rejection. But gradually as passions subside and wisdom returns 
the better scientific theory seems to take the lead. And this happens because we are 
rather rational beings (though not  all that rational). We can understand if a theory 
does better than another in terms of explanatory power, theoretical virtues etc. and 
finally  reason things out.  Of course,  this  might  take time,  from months  to  years, 
decades even centuries in some occasions. Such incidents abound in the history of 
science.
Here is an example from the history of medicine. The ‘Pap test’ is an easy, low-
cost and reliable method of detection and prevention of cervical  cancer and other 
cytologic diseases of the female reproductive system. Dr G.Papanicolaou discovered 
it  in the early 1920’s.  Yet  although the adduced evidence was clear,  it  took two 
decades (and many more female lives) until the incredulous physician’s community 
accept  it.  The  same  could  happen  with  a  potential  discovery  of  the  nature  of 
epistemic kinds. We could discover their true nature and disagreement still persists 
for some time.  But the point is that,  if  we have discovered what epistemic kinds 
really are,  it  is  reasonable to expect  that  the evaporation of ‘open feel’  semantic 
intuitions and convergence sooner or later will eventually come.
The  second  prong  goes  again  deep.  It  is  true  that  everyday  life  normative 
discourse seems to exemplify these realist intuitions and, therefore, a theory should 
better adequately accommodate these intuitions. I have conceded this much when in 
section 1.4 said that the great promise of expressivism is to account for the realist 
pretensions  normative  language  in  such  an  antirealist  framework.  The  problem, 
however, is that, as we have seen (Chs. 2-4), striving to accommodate these realist 
intuitions in a realist framework runs us into very serious difficulties. In the light of 
these  difficulties  then,  it  is  perhaps  (just  perhaps)  worthwhile  to  endeavour  to 
accommodate these realist intuitions in an antirealist framework.
Thus, we shouldn’t blankly reject even the mere possibility of such an exploration 
from the very start. We should take it as a working hypothesis that stands in need of 
conceptual  exploration.  Whether  such  an  exploration  is  worthwhile  or  not,  it  is 
something that can only be evaluated in retrospect at the end of the road, after we 
have gone all the way down in exploration of such a theoretical explanation. It is not 
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something that should (or can) be decided from the outset. 
Besides, Plato himself introduced his nonnaturalist/realist ‘theory of forms’ in the 
Phaedo as a mere working hypothesis to be judged from the theoretical fruit it can 
produce, not as the ultimate truth of the matter. If realists can do this then antirealist 
should be allowed to  do the same.  And for one thing,  we should not  forget that 
philosophy is praised for its open-mindedness and dialectical tolerance. 
In  conclusion,  these considerations  entitle  us  to  think that  the epistemic  kinds 
approach  does  not  really  yield  the  promised  land  of  a  plausible  form  of 
epistemological  realism.  In  the  next  section  4.6,  I  wrap  up  the  argument  of  the 
current chapter and prepare the ground for the next chapter 5.
4.6 Conclusion and Summary of the Argument
In  this  chapter,  we  raided  two  sophisticated  species  of  referential  naturalism 
taking  advantage  of  causal-historical  theories  of  reference  in  order  to  defuse the 
semantic  problems  of  old  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism,  as  exposed  by  ‘the 
Moorean/Humean lesson’, and rescue referential naturalism. We found that, in spite 
of the deployment of sophisticated dialectical weaponry and subtle dialectical twists, 
the synthetic naturalist reductionism and epistemic kinds realism are again subjected 
to criticism.
In section 4.2, we concisely presented the theoretical commitments of synthetic 
naturalistic reductionism and how they are meant to defuse ‘the Moorean/Humean 
lesson’ and rescue referential naturalism. We explained how by taking advantage of 
causal-historical  theories  of  reference,  synthetic  naturalistic  reductionists  render 
obsolete  the  semantic  assumption  that  lies  hidden  in  the  very  heart  of  ‘the 
Moorean/Humean lesson’, ‘the semantic test of property identity’, and open logical 
space for a sophisticated form of referential naturalism. 
In section 4.3, we presented our criticism for synthetic naturalistic reductionism. 
We argued that it runs into a sophisticated ‘open question argument’, ‘the epistemic 
twin earth’, and succumbs immediately to revived ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions. In 
sections 4.4-4.5, we introduced and examined a neglected alternative that endeavours 
to rescue epistemological realism from the teeth of the ‘epistemic twin earth lesson’: 
epistemic kinds realism. We found that epistemic kinds realism faces a dilemma: 
either  epistemic  kinds  are  natural  properties  or  nonnatural.  If  they  are  natural 
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properties,  they  run  again  into  ‘the  epistemic  twin  earth  lesson’.  If  they  are 
nonnatural properties, they run into serious epistemological and ontological problems 
we promised to present in the next chapter 5. 
The discussion of synthetic naturalistic reductionism and epistemic kinds realism 
signals the end of the discussion of referential naturalism and yields its long awaited 
conclusion. In all evidence, justification assertions and attributions do not purport to 
refer  to  a  certain  natural  property  of  epistemic  justification.  This  is  the  familiar 
‘naturalism-denial  assertion’  (P3)  of  ‘the  epistemic  justification  puzzle’  and  the 
discussion  of  Chs.2-4  seems  to  buttress  its  plausibility.  Referential  naturalism 
(sophisticated or traditional) does not seem to be particularly plausible.
With this aporetic conclusion at hand, a figure like Socrates would probably drop 
the exploration of the question ‘What is epistemic justification?’ here and, perhaps, 
suggest in his familiar ironic tone that, strangely, although we seem to have justified 
beliefs  we don’t  know what epistemic justification is111.  But I hope that Socrates 
would excuse the temerity  and,  perhaps,  recklessness of  my inexperienced youth 
because I will try to explore some more theoretical approaches to the puzzle. I hope 
that he would excuse me on the grounds that philosophy is foremost a challenge in 
conceptual  exploration  and  Socrates  valued  conceptual  exploration  more  than 
anything else; or at least this is the picture Plato inherited to us.
With Socrates’ eulogies assumed then, in the next chapter our little odyssey of 
conceptual exploration continues. We examine another venerable theoretical camp 
that traces its roots to Plato, Socrates’ own great disciple: nonnaturalism. That is, the 
possibility that the property of epistemic justification is some sort of nonnatural, sui 
generis property. A property that is not reducible to other natural properties and in 
this sense is primitive, not derivative. The camp of nonnaturalism is also meant to be 
raided.  In  the  end,  ‘the  nonnaturalism-denial  assertion’  (P4)  of  ‘the  epistemic 
justification puzzle’ will also appear in favourable light. 
That is, it will appear plausible that justification assertions and attributions do not 
purport to refer to a certain nonnatural property of epistemic justification. On how 
this is supposed to be accomplished, we should turn to the next page. We now set sail 
111 As he does, for example, in Plato’s (2001) Lysis (223b): ‘…we have made ourselves ridiculous…
[f]or these others will go away and tell how we believe we are friends of one another… but what a 
friend is, we have not yet succeeded in discovering’. 
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for the lands of nonnaturalism and in the next chapter we present and examine the 
plausibility  of  two  forms  of  the  nonnaturalist  camp:  ‘naïve’  nonnaturalism  and 
J.McDowell’s (1994) more sophisticated quietist version of nonnaturalism.
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 Chapter 5 The Problems of Nonnaturalism
5.1 Introduction
In  Chs.  2,  3  &  4  we  criticized  referential  naturalism  (analytic  naturalistic 
reductionism, synthetic naturalistic reductionism and -if given a naturalistic reading- 
epistemic kinds realism). We found that such approaches, on the one hand, run into 
devastating  ‘open question  arguments’  (classical  or  sophisticated).  We concluded 
that  referential  naturalism  is  not  very  plausible.  In  terms  of  ‘the  epistemic 
justification  puzzle’,  this  is  translated  as  ‘the  naturalism-denial  assertion’  (P3)  is 
plausible, namely, justification assertions and attributions do not purport to refer to a 
certain natural property.
Still, this is not sufficient to undermine the idea that some form of epistemological 
realism is plausible. It is not sufficient to undermine the idea that there is a property 
of epistemic justification we purport to refer to when we make justification assertions 
and attributions. For it might be the case that the property of epistemic justification is 
a sui generis property, a property irreducible to naturalistic properties (analytically or 
synthetically).  Besides,  if  we  do  not  respect  Sayre-McCord’s  (1997a)  professed 
ontological neutrality about his normative kinds and feel free to ascribe to him the 
view that normative kinds are nonnatural properties, then we quickly arrive to such a 
nonnaturalist realist position. 
In this chapter 5, we examine this alternative realist tradition that its traces go 
back  to  Plato’s  (middle  period)  ‘theory  of  forms’:  nonnaturalism.  Nonnaturalists 
concur that referential naturalism (of any sort) is not very plausible. They embrace 
our conclusion that ‘the naturalism-denial assertion’ (P3) is plausible, namely, that 
justification assertions and attributions do not purport to refer to a certain natural 
property of epistemic justification. Instead, nonnaturalists propose that justification 
assertions  and  attributions  purport  to  refer  to  a  certain  sui  generis  property.  A 
property that is nonnatural and therefore primitive. That is, a property that cannot be 
reduced (analytically or synthetically) to other more basic natural properties in terms 
of necessary and sufficient conditions.
A recent notable exponent of such a nonnaturalist approach to epistemic discourse 
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has been T.Williamson (2000). Williamson (2000), who takes ‘the knowledge first 
view’,  has argued that knowing is an irreducible,  sui generis - in his own terms- 
‘mental  state’.  In our terms,  this  means  that knowing is a property irreducible  to 
more basic properties like the traditional true justified belief analysis112.
 As  far  as  I  know,  though,  there  is  no  straightforward  example  of  an 
epistemologist both taking ‘the epistemic justification first view’ and claiming that 
epistemic justification is a sui generis, nonnatural property. In what follows, I assume 
that there is such an epistemologist in order to examine the plausibility of this open 
logical  space.  Of course,  the  criticism of  this  open logical  space  carries  over  to 
Williamson’s nonnaturalism about knowledge (and other sorts of nonnaturalism e.g. 
moral, aesthetic, semantic, modal, mathematical etc.).
As I explain in section 5.2, the motivation for a nonnaturalist approach to ‘the 
epistemic justification puzzle’ is twofold. On the one hand, a nonnaturalist approach 
can easily defuse the semantic problems of referential naturalism exposed by ‘open 
question arguments’. It can defuse these semantic problems because it accepts the 
lessons of the ‘open question arguments’:  ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ and ‘the 
epistemic  twin earth  lesson’.  That  is,  it  concurs  that  the inexistence  of  a  natural 
property  (of  any  kind)  of  epistemic  justification  best  explains  the  reality  of  our 
inherent ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions. 
On the other hand, it can easily explain our pre-theoretical realist intuitions about 
epistemic  discourse.  This  much  is  achieved  with  the  postulation  of  ‘the  realist 
ontological assertion’: there must be a property of epistemic justification in virtue of 
which  justified  beliefs  are  justified.  The  postulation  of  ‘the  realist  ontological 
assertion’  allows  us  to  explain  a  bunch  of  pre-theoretical  realist  intuitions 
surrounding epistemic discourse. Such realist intuitions are the justification similarity 
relation, epistemic objectivity and truth, the existence of mind-independent epistemic 
norms, the possibility of factual epistemic (dis)agreement etc.
But unfortunately, as I explain in section 5.3, although at first sight nonnaturalism 
seems particularly auspicious, it eventually turns out to be a theoretical giant with 
112  Someone might question here why talk of knowing as irreducible to a mental state is equivalent to 
talk of knowing as irreducible to a property. I think that they are equivalent because if we think that 
knowing is irreducible to more basic mental states (like true justified belief), then we are committed to 
think that  the property of knowing is also irreducible to more basic properties (like true justified 
belief).
108
feet of clay. That is, it seems to have certain problems that seriously undermine the 
plausibility of the theory. These problems are of an epistemological and ontological 
ilk. Here is a quick glimpse of what these epistemological and ontological problems 
are about.
 First, there is the ‘epistemic access problem’, namely, how we could ever track 
the existence of such a nonnatural property. Second, there is the ‘queerness problem’, 
namely, what such a ‘queer’ sui generis property could ever be. Third, as I explain in 
section  5.4,  nonnaturalism  has  problems  explaining  -what  I  call-  the  ‘epistemic 
supervenience  desideratum’,  namely,  a  desideratum  asking  how  a  nonnatural 
property  of  epistemic  justification  could  ever  necessarily  supervene  on  a  certain 
natural property. 
These  thorny  epistemological  and  ontological  problems  seem  to  prompt  the 
conclusion that there is no nonnatural property of epistemic justification. But while 
such a simple and ‘naïve’ version of nonnaturalism easily succumbs,  J.McDowell 
(1994, 1998) has defended a subtle neoAristotelian, quietist version of nonnaturalism 
that aspires to rescue a form of nonnaturalism. In sections 5.5 I introduce and in 
section 5.6 examine McDowell’s ‘naturalism of second nature’ that aspires to make a 
more modest version of nonnaturalism naturalistically respectable and find this too 
wanting,  as  it  fails  to  stifle  the  epistemological  and  ontological  worries  for 
nonnaturalism. 
Thus, in the end of the examination, I arrive at the conclusion that nonnaturalism 
does not seem a very plausible answer to the Socratic question ‘What is epistemic 
justification?’. In terms of ‘the epistemic justification puzzle’, this is translated as 
‘the nonnaturalism-denial assertion’ (P4) is plausible, namely, justification assertions 
and attributions do not purport to refer to a certain nonnatural property of epistemic 
justification.
Overall,  this is the plan for this sketched critique. First,  in section 5.2, I make 
explicit the theoretical commitments of ‘naïve’ nonnaturalism and explain how these 
commitments  are  supposed  to  address  ‘the  epistemic  justification  puzzle’  in  an 
elegant fashion. That is, in a manner that does not run into the semantic problems of 
the  referential  naturalistic  approaches  (highlighted  in  Chs.2-4)  and,  in  addition, 
explains our pre-theoretical realist intuitions about epistemic discourse. 
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In sections 5.3-5.4 I criticize the ‘naïve’ nonnaturalist approach, namely, explain 
its epistemological and ontological discontents. First, in section 5.3, I explain how 
‘the  epistemic  access  problem’  and  ‘queerness  problem’  impugn  nonnaturalist 
approaches. That is, I explain why it is difficult to understand, first, how we could 
ever  come  to  track  such  a  nonnatural  property  and,  second,  how  could  such  a 
property ever exist. 
Second, in section 5.4, I explain how nonnaturalism seems unable to explain ‘the 
epistemic  supervenience  desideratum’.  I  initially  introduce  what  is  the  epistemic 
supervenience desideratum and then explain why it is difficult to understand how any 
nonnatural  normative  property  -not  just  epistemic  justification-  could  ever 
necessarily  supervene  on a  natural  property.  In  section  5.5,  I  go on to  introduce 
McDowell’s sophisticated ‘naturalism of second nature’ and in section 5.6 criticize 
and reject his proposal. Finally, in section 5.7 I preview the argument of the chapter 
and prepare the ground for the next chapter 6.
5.2 ‘Naïve’ Nonnaturalism Introduced 
As it  is  accustomed,  let  us first  make explicit  the theoretical  commitments  of 
nonnaturalism  and  how  these  are  meant  to  defuse  the  semantic  problems  of 
referential  naturalism, capture our pre-theoretical  realist  intuitions about epistemic 
discourse and, hence, resolve ‘the epistemic justification puzzle’ in elegant fashion. 
Like  the  camp  of  referential  naturalism,  the  nonnaturalist  camp  starts  from  ‘the 
referential  semantics  assumption’ (P2).  It  assumes  that  epistemic  justification 
assertions  and  attributions  purport  to  refer  to  a  certain  property  of  epistemic 
justification. 
Like  referential  naturalists  again, nonnaturalists  also  accept  that  not  only  our 
justification  assertions  and  attributions  purport  to  refer  to  such  an  epistemic 
justification property but that this property exists. The nonnaturalist thinks that an 
epistemic justification property exists because he assumes that at least some of our 
allegedly  justified  assertions  and  attributions  are,  indeed,  justified.  This  is  ‘the 
existential assertion’. But if there are at least some justified beliefs, he adds, then 
there must be a property of epistemic justification in virtue of which these justified 
beliefs are justified. This is ‘the realist ontological assertion’. 
Up to this  point,  referential  naturalistic approaches and nonnaturalism go hand 
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with hand. They are in agreement that some form of epistemological realism should 
be true. But this ‘realism fellowship’ does not last because referential naturalists and 
nonnaturalists  dissent  about  the  exact  form of  this  epistemological  realism.  They 
disagree  about  the  exact  ontological  character  of  the  property  of  epistemic 
justification.
Nonnaturalism  first  parts  roads  with  analytic  naturalistic  reductionism.  The 
nonnaturalist accepts the anti-reductionist corollary of Ch.3, namely, that we cannot 
reduce  epistemic  justification  by  semantic  analysis  and,  therefore,  rejects  ‘the 
naturalistic  analysability  assertion’.  The  nonnaturalist  thinks  that  this  property  of 
epistemic  justification  that  must  somehow be ‘out there’,  if  at  least  some of our 
beliefs are to be justified, could not in principle be reduced by semantic analysis to a 
certain natural property. This is the familiar ‘naturalistic unanalysability assertion’. 
The  nonnaturalist  also  parts  roads  with  the  synthetic  naturalistic  reductionist 
because  he  rejects  ‘the  causal-historical  reference  assertion’.  He  denies  that  our 
justification  assertions  and  attributions  purport  to  refer  to  a  certain  natural  kind 
property causally regulating their use. He is convinced that, in general, referentially 
naturalistic  approaches  cannot  reduce  epistemic  justification  (analytically  or 
synthetically) and would therefore gladly embrace ‘the epistemic twin earth lesson’. 
This follows from the more general methodological stance of nonnaturalists. 
Nonnaturalists  usually  adopt  a  traditional  stance  towards  philosophical 
methodology and take philosophy to be a clearly distinct and autonomous field of 
inquiry from science. For nonnaturalists, philosophy is one thing, science is another 
and empirical inquiry cannot really provide answers to philosophical puzzles. This is 
what lurks in the background of their scepticism for referential naturalism and boosts 
their conviction of the naturalistic irreducibility (analytic or synthetic) of normative 
properties.  Call  this  irreducibility  claim  ‘the  naturalistic  irreducibility  assertion’. 
Since referential naturalists can’t reduce the property of epistemic justification, they 
also cannot account for our pre-theoretical realist intuitions and adequately address 
‘the epistemic justification puzzle’. 
Rather, the nonnaturalist thinks that the property of epistemic justification should 
be taken to be nonnatural. He thinks that since there must be a property of epistemic 
justification in virtue of which justified beliefs are justified and this property cannot 
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be reduced (analytically or synthetically) to naturalistic terms, then there is no other 
way out of the puzzle than nonnaturalism. The property of epistemic justification 
should  be  considered  in  principle  to  be  a  sui  generis,  naturalistically  irreducible 
property. This would nicely account for ‘the realist ontological assertion’, namely, 
that there must be a property of epistemic justification in virtue of which justified 
beliefs are justified and, as a result, accommodate a bunch of other pre-theoretical 
realist intuitions surrounding epistemic discourse. Call this claim ‘the nonnaturalist  
postulate assertion’. 
In  more  succinct  and  explicit  terms,  these are  the theoretical  commitments  of 
nonnaturalism:
• The  Referential  Semantics  Assumption:  ‘Justification  assertions  and 
attributions purport to refer to a certain property of epistemic justification’
• The Existential Assertion: ‘There are at least some justified beliefs’
• The Realist Ontological Assertion: ‘There must be an epistemic justification 
property in virtue of which justified beliefs are justified’
• The Naturalistic Irreducibility Assertion: ‘The epistemic justification property 
cannot,  in principle,  be reduced (analytically or synthetically)  to a certain  natural 
property’
• The Nonnaturalist Postulate Assertion: ‘The epistemic justification property 
must,  in  principle,  be  an  irreducible  (analytically  and  synthetically)  nonnatural 
property’
Let  us  now  elaborate  in  more  detail  how  these  theoretical  commitments  are 
utilised by nonnaturalism. As we already mentioned in section 5.1, the motivation for 
nonnaturalism is twofold. First, these theoretical commitments defuse the semantic 
problems of referential  naturalism exposed by ‘open question arguments’.  As we 
have seen in Chs.  2-4,  referential  naturalistic  approaches run into ‘open question 
arguments’ exposing their semantic problems and thwarting their reductive efforts. 
Analytic  naturalistic  reductionism  runs  into  a  classic  Moorean  ‘open  question 
argument’  and synthetic  naturalistic  reductionism and epistemic  kinds  realism (if 
given  a  naturalistic  reading)  run  into  the  sophisticated  ‘epistemic  twin  earth 
argument’. 
Nonnaturalism easily defuses these ‘open question arguments’ because endorses 
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‘the naturalistic irreducibility assertion’. It accepts that  justification assertions and 
attributions  do  not  purport  to  refer  to  a  certain  natural  property  of  epistemic 
justification.  That  is,  it  concurs  that  the  inherent  ‘open  feel’  semantic  intuitions 
indicate  that  there  is  no  natural  property  reducing  (analytically  or  synthetically) 
epistemic justification and, hence, accepts their anti-reductionist verdict.
Second,  these  theoretical  commitments  vindicate  our  pre-theoretical  realist 
intuitions about epistemic discourse. Such pre-theoretical realist intuitions concern 
the justification similarity relation, epistemic objectivity and truth, the existence of 
mind-independent epistemic norms, the possibility of convergence and agreement in 
the  pursuit  of  an  inquiry  by  rational  epistemic  agents  etc.  They  vindicate  such 
intuitions  because  ‘the  realist  ontological  assertion’  entitles  us  to  do  so.  Let  me 
explain how this much is achieved. 
Pre-theoretical realist intuitions appear to be somehow ingrained in the syntactic 
(and  semantic)  structure  of  our  everyday  language  (and  thought).  For  everyday 
epistemic discourse seem to be intentional: it seems to be about epistemic properties 
(justification, rationality etc.). That is, justification attributions, rationality assertions 
like ‘S justifiably believes that p’, ‘p is rational’ etc. seem to purport to refer to the 
respective epistemic properties. This intentionality of epistemic discourse seems to 
imply that there are mind-independent, objective facts about matters epistemic that if 
discovered, ideally, could elicit agreement among rational disputants. 
These pre-theoretical realist intuitions are actually what drive the emergence of 
‘the  referential  semantics  assumption’,  ‘the  existential  assertion’  and  ‘the  realist 
ontological  assertion’  in  the  first  place.  These  three  theoretical  commitments  are 
supposed to be driven in the first  place from our pre-theoretical  realist  intuitions 
about epistemic discourse. For in everyday life epistemic discourse when we talk 
about the justification of an individual belief or the justification of a whole bunch of 
interconnected beliefs called a theory, we seem to be talking about a certain property 
that  this  individual  belief  or  theory  instantiates.  This  is  what  ‘the  referential 
semantics assumption’ captures. 
We also presume that at least some of our beliefs and theories are indeed justified. 
Almost everyone concedes that we do have at least some justified beliefs, no matter 
whether  these  beliefs  are  ultimately  true.  This  is  what  ‘the  existential  assertion’ 
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captures. And, presumably,  there is a certain property of epistemic justification in 
virtue of which justified beliefs are justified. There is a common property shared by 
these beliefs that entitles us to call them by the same name: ‘justified’. This is what 
‘the realist ontological assertion’ captures.
The realist ontological assertion then allows us to vindicate a bunch of other pre-
theoretical  realist  intuitions.  First,  it  easily  explains  the  justification  similarity 
relation. For, trivially, if there is a nonnatural property of epistemic justification then 
all  justified  beliefs  are  justified  in  virtue  of  the nonnatural  property of epistemic 
justification. Second, it explains the intuitions concerning epistemic objectivity and 
truth. If there is a nonnatural property of epistemic justification, then it is a matter of 
epistemic  fact  whether  a  belief  is  justified  or not.  There is  a truth  of the matter 
whether  a  belief  is  justified  or  not.  If  it  instantiates  the  epistemic  justification 
property then is justified. If not, then it is not justified. 
Third,  it  vindicates  the  intuition  that  there  is  an  objective  fact  about  matters 
epistemic that if discovered, ideally, could elicit convergence and agreement among 
rational  disputants.  For  given the truism that  one ought  to  believe  what  is  (best) 
epistemically justified and that we can identify instances of epistemic justification, 
then ideally we can aspire to convergence between rational disputants. 
Finally,  it  vindicates  the intuition concerning the existence of objective,  mind-
independent epistemic norms. For, it is often considered that epistemic justification is 
regulated and, hence, it is inter-definable by objective, mind-independent epistemic 
norms113.  A belief  is  justified  if  and  only  if  is  licensed  by the  correct  epistemic 
norms.  That is, the epistemic norms that are indeed the correct ones no matter which 
norms we think are the correct ones. But if epistemic justification is inter-definable 
with the correct epistemic norms and epistemic justification is a nonnatural property, 
then these epistemic norms should also be considered to be nonnatural.
This much being said about the twofold motivation behind nonnaturalism, it is of 
critical  importance to fully understand why nonnaturalists  in various ways do not 
hesitate to resort to invocation of such a sui generis property and risk the danger of 
being criticized for unwarranted spookiness and mystery. Nonnaturalists are not, of 
course, philosophically naïve or something of the sort. Far from it, they are often 
113  See J.Pollock (1985:125) and T.Williamson (2000: 242). 
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very thoughtful and competent philosophers fully aware of this kind of criticism and 
yet still opt for this kind of theoretical explanation. 
Like  their  forefather  Plato  (and  for  some  readings  Aristotle),  contemporary 
nonnaturalists  opt  for  this  kind  of  theoretical  explanation  because  they  are  not 
prepared to give up these theoretical commitments emerging from our pre-theoretical 
realist intuitions. The reason they are not really prepared to give up these theoretical 
commitments emerging from our pre-theoretical realist intuitions (or at least question 
them) is their more general stance on philosophical methodology.
 Their  methodological  take on how to do philosophy is firmly traditional  and, 
thus, conservative. They start from the pre-theoretical realist intuitions ingrained in 
everyday life thought and talk and aspire -whatever the theoretical price we have to 
pay-  to  vindicate  these  intuitions.  That  is,  to  accommodate  these  intuitions  in  a 
certain realist theoretical framework. In Aristotelian terms, they strive to ‘save the 
(normative) phenomena’ at any cost. 
In the light of this philosophical methodology, they opt for nonnaturalism because 
they think is the only way,  on the one hand, to defuse the semantic problems of 
referential naturalism exposed by ‘open question arguments’ and, on the other hand, 
explain and vindicate our pre-theoretical realist intuitions about epistemic discourse. 
In short, they think that pre-theoretical realist intuitions must be explained no matter 
how  high  is  the  (epistemological  and  ontological)  price  we  have  to  pay  and 
nonnaturalism is the only obvious way to do so.
Arguably, this is what their great forbearer himself, Plato, had in mind when he 
introduced his nonnaturalist ‘theory of forms’. Here is Plato in the Phaedo (100c-d), 
for the first time in the history of Western philosophy introducing (as a working 
hypothesis) the idea of nonnaturalism:
‘Now I do not yet understand…nor can I perceive those other ingenious 
causes. If anyone tells me that what makes a thing beautiful is its lovely 
colour, or its shape or anything else of the sort, I let all that go, for all 
those  things  confuse  me,  and  I  hold  simply  and  plainly  and  perhaps 
foolishly to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful but the presence or 
communion (call it which you please) of absolute beauty, however it may 
have been gained;’.
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As I read the text (and Plato in general), Plato here exhibits the usual realist policy 
of ‘vindicating pre-theoretical realist intuitions whatever the price’. He admits that he 
doesn’t understand how the property of beauty could be reduced to a certain natural 
property of ‘lovely colour or shape or anything else of the sort’ ‘for these things 
confuse me’. They confuse him because they run into counterexamples, as there are 
things with lovely colour that  are not beautiful  or beautiful  things without lovely 
colour etc.114. But he holds ‘simply and plainly and perhaps foolishly to this’ that if 
we are to vindicate  our pre-theoretical  realist  intuitions  about aesthetic  discourse, 
then beautiful  things  must  be beautiful  in  virtue of  the property of beauty itself, 
‘however it may have been gained’. That is, no matter how this property ‘causes’ 
beautiful things to be beautiful, we need to postulate such ‘absolute’ beauty if we are 
to make sense of our realist intuitions. 
This brief discussion draws an outline of ‘naïve’ nonnaturalism’s commitments 
and theoretical  aspirations.  It  is  concise and somewhat  simplifying  but  I  think is 
sufficient  for  present  purposes.  In  the  next  sections  we  turn  to  the  critical 
examination  of  ‘naïve’  nonnaturalism.  As  usual,  our  critical  examination  of 
nonnaturalism will have a raiding character. It will be short and direct and will unveil 
the theoretical giant’s feet of clay. The first dose comes in the next section 5.3 and 
highlights the epistemological and ontological problems of nonnaturalism.
5.3 The Epistemological and Ontological Problems of ‘Naïve’ Nonnaturalism
Like  the  theoretical  approach  of  nonnaturalism  itself,  its  epistemological  and 
ontological problems are hardly a contemporary discovery. Nonnaturalism has a long 
history of facing such thorny problems and these have consistently been considered 
the primary reason for rejecting nonnaturalist  theories  (or,  at  least,  viewing them 
with due perplexity in spite of the other attractions they bear). In Plato’s own time, 
Aristotle  (2003a,  2003b,  2006)  forcefully  pressed these  problems  and in  modern 
times  philosophers  from  I.Kant  (2003),  to  A.J.Ayer  (1946),  J.Mackie  (1977), 
D.M.Armstrong (1980), S.Shoemaker (2004) and beyond did the same.
These historically consistent critical reactions to nonnaturalism are not accidental 
114  Actually, one of Plato’s central arguments for the introduction of ‘the theory of forms’ is broadly 
similar to Moore’s ‘open question argument’ for the introduction of goodness as a nonnatural property. 
For this see my ‘Plato, Moore and Ethical Nonnaturalism’ (2009). For the introduction of the theory of 
forms see also R.Dancy (2004).
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because  the  ontological  and  epistemological  commitments  of  nonnaturalism  are, 
indeed, far from easy to accommodate. Nonnaturalists, as we mentioned in section 
5.2,  are  aware of this  issue and employ a number  of  different  strategies  in  their 
endeavour  to extenuate  their  theories  from these charges.  Some follow Plato and 
think that we need to vindicate our pre-theoretical realist intuitions no matter the cost 
and nonnaturalism is the only obvious way to do so. As a result they downplay or 
even simply ignore these problems or bite the bullet and claim that we are forced to 
countenance these problems (and the resultant mystery), if we are to make sense of 
the nature of normative reality115. Others again try to meet the discontents head-on in 
a way that aspires to dispel the clouds of mystery116. 
But let us now sketch what are these infamous ontological and epistemological 
problems  of  nonnaturalism.  Let  us  start  with  the  epistemological  problem:  ‘the 
epistemic access problem’. As the label implies, the problem is that it is not clear 
how we could ever come to track the existence of nonnatural properties. That is, how 
we could ever come to identify instances of nonnatural properties. For the ordinary 
way  of  coming  to  know  the  existence  of  property  instances  is  through  causal 
interaction of our perceptual mechanisms with the respective instances. We can taste 
honey and drink water, touch trees, see a bird, smell a rose, hear a concert etc. 
These  are  all  instances  of  natural  properties  we  come  to  detect  and  identify 
through  the  causal  interaction  of  our  perceptual  mechanisms  with  the  particular 
instances. And we can causally interact with these natural properties because they 
have independent causal powers. That is, they have difference-making powers and 
they can bring about effects. Water can dissolve salt for example, it can get you wet, 
conduct electricity,  clean your stained shirt etc. and these can be perceived by the 
mechanisms of our five senses: taste, smell, vision, touch and hearing. 
In  contrast,  this  does  not  seem  to  be  the  case  with  nonnatural  properties. 
Nonnatural properties do not seem to have independent causal powers and therefore 
are not in any obvious way tracked by our perceptual mechanisms. We don’t seem to 
115   Arguably, this was Moore’s (2000) dialectical strategy.
116  R.Shafer-Landau (2003) and R.Wedgwood (2007) are two recent normative nonnaturalists that 
have heroically tried to meet head-on the epistemological and ontological problems of nonnaturalism. 
Unfortunately, I don’t have the space and time to go through their sophisticated views here, although I 
have  done  some  work  on  Shafer-Landau’s  approach.  See  my  ‘Causal  Exclusion  and  R.Shafer-
Landau’s  Nonnaturalism’ (ms).  For  a  critique  of  Shafer-Landau’s  attempt  to  explain  normative 
supervenience see M.Ridge (2007c).
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causally  interact  with  a  nonnatural  property  of  justification,  goodness  or  other 
normative  properties  often  taken  to  be  nonnatural.  To  paraphrase  what  Moore 
(2000:175) once said about goodness, justification (and other epistemic properties) 
are not properties that we can take up in our hands and meticulously examine. We 
can’t  examine  them  even  with  the  most  advanced  scientific  instruments  and 
devices117. Thus, since nonnatural properties do not seem to have any independent 
causal powers, it is not clear how we could ever track them down and come to know 
their existence. 
Plato himself, as we have seen in the Phaedo quote above, talked about nonnatural 
properties as abstract properties (i.e. ‘forms’) with the causal power to individuate 
property instances, no matter how this causal relation of individuation could have 
been established.  Aristotle  and other  modern  philosophers,  though, gave and still 
give Plato a hard time for this causal individuation claim118. For, it is not clear how a 
nonnatural  property  could  ever  have  independent  causal  efficacy.  That  was  the 
problem in the first place. Nonnatural properties do not seem to have independent 
causal powers and, hence, we don’t really know how we could ever come to know 
the existence of such properties119.
Here is a nice quote from Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1079b10-1080a5)) castigating 
Plato’s causal individuation claim:
‘Above all  we might  examine  the  question  what  on earth  the  forms 
contribute to sensible things... for they are not the cause of any motion or 
change in them. Moreover... [t]o say that the forms are paradigms, and that 
other  things  participate  in  them,  is  to  use  empty  phrases  and  poetical 
metaphors;  for  what  is  it  that  fashions  things  on  the  models  of  the 
forms? ... Further, it would seem impossible that the essence and the thing 
of which is the essence exist in separation; hence how can the forms, if 
they are the essences of things, exist in separation from them? It is stated 
in  the  Phaedo that  the  forms  are  the  causes  both  of  existence  and  of 
generation.  Yet,  assuming  that  the  forms  exist,  still  the  things  which 
117  Compare Moore (2000 : 175) : ‘It is immediately obvious that when we see a thing to be good, its 
goodness is not a property which we can take up in our hands, or separate from it even by the most 
delicate scientific instruments, and transfer to something else.’
118  See S.Shoemaker (2004) and  D.M.Armstrong (1980: 66-68)
119  This criticism also applies to epistemic kinds realism, if given a nonnaturalist reading.
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participate in them are not generated unless ‘there is something to impart  
motion’; (my emphasis)120.
Aristotle’s point is that to talk of a nonnatural property Fness in virtue of which F 
things are F is an ‘empty phrase and poetical metaphor’ because it seems impossible 
that the Fness property could be distinct from F instances. And it is impossible to be 
distinct because, if they are distinct, then we have to assume that ‘there is something 
to  impart  motion’.  That  is,  -in  modern  terms-  something  establishing  the  causal 
individuation  relation  between  the  nonnatural  property  Fness  and  F  property 
instances. For the ‘in virtue of’ that stands between Fness and F property instances 
seems to be causal. But it seems, Aristotle points out, that ‘forms’ do not have any 
independent  causal  powers,  as  they  don’t  seem  to  cause  anything  in  nature. 
Therefore,  it  appears  implausible  that  the  nonnatural  Fness  property  causally 
individuates F instances of natural properties. 
The traditional response of the nonnaturalist to ‘the epistemic access problem’ has 
been to appeal to an ‘intuitionistic epistemology’. That is, to propose that such sui 
generis properties are somehow tracked and identified in a direct and non-inferential 
way by a  cognitive  faculty  of  intuition121.  This  faculty  of  intuition  can somehow 
directly and non-inferentially reveal to us, ‘clearly and distinctly’, instances of such 
properties as if it is a cognitive ‘sixth sense’ of some sort. It is supposed to somehow 
function like a cognitive mechanism finely tuned to detect and identify instances of 
nonnatural properties. Once the faculty of intuition tracks a nonnatural property, then 
the agent can somehow ‘see’ the instance of the property. He can ‘perceive’ that a 
certain action is good, a belief is justified, a statue is beautiful, a taxation programme 
is just etc.
But let us narrow down our attention to the object of our discussion: epistemic 
justification.  The  idea  is  that  when  an  agent  scrutinizes  a  certain  belief,  theory, 
explanation etc. the faculty of intuition will reveal to him whether the belief, theory 
etc.  is  justified  or  unjustified.  It  will  reveal  to  him  the  nonnatural  property  of 
justification  (or  unjustifiedness).  This  ‘revelation’  will  come  in  the  form  of  an 
120  Translation by H.Tredennick and G.C.Armstong (2006) with some own modifications in order to 
make it more approximate to modern philosophical parlance.
121  Philosophers usually considered intuitionists are (middle) Plato, H.Sidgwigk (1967), G.E.Moore 
(2000). Contemporary philosophers usually considered intuitionists include J.McDowell (1994, 1998) 
and R.Audi (2007). For the history of the development of intuitionism see T.Baldwin (2006). For a 
brief introduction to ethical intuitionism see P.Stratton-Lake’s (2006).
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intuition. The agent will intuit or ‘see’ whether the belief is justified or not. Of such 
intuitionistic sort were Moore’s (2000) moral epistemology and also the classical and 
non-classical  foundationalist  theories  of Chisholm (1966) and Bonjour (1998) we 
encountered in Ch.3. They were appealing to the idea of a cognitive mechanism of 
‘intellectual seeing’, ‘self-presentation’ or ‘rational intuition’ that can identify which 
beliefs are justified and which are not. 
Yet  the  appeal  to  intuitionistic  epistemology  does  not  seem  to  resolve  ‘the 
epistemic access problem’. Rather, it only seems to push it one step back122. For it 
still remains unclear how the faculty of intuition tracks and identifies instances of the 
nonnatural property of epistemic justification. It remains unclear because nonnatural 
properties do not seem to have independent causal powers and, therefore, remains 
enigmatic how any cognitive mechanism could track and identify such properties. 
For to identify instances of properties we need to causally interact with the relevant 
properties and, since nonnatural properties do not have independent causal powers, it 
is not evident how we could ever do so.
 The whole idea of a faculty of intuition seems to rely on a vague ocular metaphor 
of ‘seeing’ which beliefs are justified and which are not123. But the metaphor needs to 
be cashed out in more exact and explicit  terms, if intuitionistic epistemology will 
dodge the charge  of  being unduly mysterious.  For  my part,  I  don’t  see  how the 
metaphor could be cashed out in such terms because the metaphorical element seems 
to be part and parcel of intuitionistic epistemology. If we try to cash out the metaphor 
in literal terms, then intuitionism seems to collapse. It collapses because, as I said, it 
remains  enigmatic  -  if  this  property does  not  appear  to  have  independent  causal 
powers- how we ‘see’ the nonnatural property.
It seems then that Kant (2003) was right to say that:
‘if  we  understand  by  it  [nonnatural  property]  an  object of  a  non-
sensible  intuition,  we  thereby  presuppose  a  special  mode  of  intuition, 
namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which 
we  cannot  even  comprehend  the  possibility  (B307/p.268)…For  the 
122 Compare P.Stratton-Lake (2006:6): ‘  An important factor in the decline of intuitionism was its 
commitment  to  metaphysical  and  epistemological  views  that  were  regarded  as  both  deeply 
implausible and unnecessary’.
123  See R.Rorty (1979) for how ocular  metaphors -largely due to Plato- have dominated western 
philosophy.
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intelligible  would  require  a  quite  peculiar  intuition  which  we  do  not 
possess,  and  in  the  absence  of  this  would  be  for  us nothing  at  all 
(B336/A280/p.288)… for we are acquainted  with no kind of intuition but 
our  own sensible  kind  and no kind of  concepts  but  the  categories  and 
neither  of  these  is  appropriate  to  a  non-sensible  object  (A287/p.292)’; 
(Kant’s own emphasis)124. 
Kant’s point is that  for the tracking of nonnatural  properties we would need a 
cognitive  mechanism that  goes beyond the boundaries of a  naturalistic  picture  of 
psychology.  That  is,  we would need a  special  kind  of  cognitive  mechanism that 
somewhat  mysteriously  tracks  the  existence  of  nonnatural  properties;  in  Kant’s 
philosophical idiom ‘noumena’. But as Kant underlines, for us this would be nothing 
at all, because all we have as human beings is ‘sensible intuition’ and ‘no kind of 
concepts  but  the  categories’.  That  is,  perceptual  mechanisms  and  conceptual 
repertoire, namely, a language. 
The  epistemological  problem  interlocks  with  the  ontological  problem:  ‘the 
queerness problem’.  The queerness problem owes its name to J.Mackie (1977:38) 
who claimed that it is not clear what such nonnatural properties could ever be if they 
existed. If such properties existed they wouldn’t resemble in any way the mundane 
natural  properties  that  impinge  on  our  senses  in  our  everyday  life125.  Natural 
properties are of the usual ilk.  They have independent causal powers and we can 
easily detect them. Natural properties are difference-making properties and as such 
they bring causal effects about. 
But nonnatural properties do not appear to be like that. They are not like natural 
properties  in  any  obvious  way.  If  nonnatural  properties  had  independent  causal 
powers we would be able to track them down and identify their instances. But it is 
exactly because they don’t appear to be natural and thereby have any such powers 
that were postulated as nonnatural in the first place. Since we can’t detect causally 
impotent properties, it is not clear what these nonnatural properties are or even could 
be. 
124  Translated by N.K. Smith. Compare Mackie (1977:38): ‘ …if we were aware of them, it would 
have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary 
ways of knowing everything else’.
125  Compare Mackie (1977:38): ‘…they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange 
sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.’
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Moreover, it is not only difficult to understand what such nonnatural properties 
are or even could be but is equally difficult to understand where we should  place 
these properties if they exist. Obviously, the natural world won’t do because things 
that exist within the natural realm have independent causal powers and in virtue of 
these  powers,  sooner  or  later,  come  to  our  attention.  We  come  to  know  their 
instantiation when we perceive relevant instances. 
But  nonnatural  properties  are  not  supposed  to  be  of  such  kind.  They are  not 
supposed to appear within the realm of nature. Otherwise, we would expect them to 
have independent causal powers that it seems they do not. They do not seem to be 
embedded in causal relations in any obvious way. Thus, talk of nonnatural properties 
is shrouded with a ring of enigma and mystery that makes naturalistically minded 
philosophers to shake their heads in disbelief and perplexity.
This much concludes the brief  presentation of the interlocking epistemological 
and ontological discontents of nonnaturalism. In the next section 5.4 we present the 
second  part  of  our  criticism  of  nonnaturalism.  We  examine  whether  the  ‘naïve’ 
nonnaturalist can explain epistemic supervenience. 
5.4 ‘Naïve’ Nonnaturalism and Epistemic Supervenience
In  this  section,  we  present  the  second  part  of  our  criticism  of  ‘naïve’ 
nonnaturalism.  We  argue  that  nonnaturalism  has  problems  in  explaining  ‘the 
epistemic  supervenience  desideratum’.  First,  we  introduce  ‘the  epistemic 
supervenience desideratum’ and elaborate a bit on why it is a constraint on epistemic 
discourse that any adequate theory of epistemic justification must accommodate. We 
explicate  why it  has  this  binding  character  on  any adequate  theory  of  epistemic 
justification. Second, we argue that ‘naïve’ nonnaturalism does not seem capable of 
adequately explaining ‘the epistemic supervenience desideratum’. Let us start with 
the introduction and elaboration of ‘the epistemic supervenience desideratum’.
The ‘epistemic supervenience desideratum’ is sometimes introduced along with 
the  analogous  ‘moral  supervenience  desideratum’  that  equally  constrains  moral 
discourse126.  This is far from accidental.  Both moral and epistemic discourses are 
normative, rational discourses and, as such, reasons can be asked and be given for 
126  See for instance J.Kim (2008). For epistemic supervenience per se see R.Feldman (2001a) and 
H.Vahid (2005).
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our actions and beliefs. Like in moral discourse we are concerned with what to do, in 
epistemic discourse we are concerned with what to believe. That is, in virtue of a 
natural property we confer positive epistemic status (‘…is justified, well-grounded, 
rational etc.) to beliefs and -all other equal- we form the beliefs in question. 
As in moral discourse we make moral evaluations that,  all other equal, lead to 
action, in epistemic discourse we make epistemic evaluations that, all other equal, 
culminate in the fixation of belief. But our moral and epistemic evaluations are not 
just ad hoc or arbitrary. They are based on reason-giving natural properties (even if 
these reasons are grossly capricious or plainly irrational). We form beliefs because 
we find them coherent, rationally intuitive, because they are motivated by epistemic 
virtues, because the informant is trustworthy, or even because our ‘mum says so’ etc. 
It  is  this  ‘reason-ableness’ that  makes  supervenience  a  binding  constraint  on 
epistemic discourse and, therefore, a desideratum calling for adequate explanation.  
For, we evaluate an event, action etc. as good and a belief as justified, reasonable 
etc. because we think that there is a certain natural property giving, respectively, a 
reason for action or a reason for belief.  In other words,  the normative properties 
(goodness, justification etc.) that guide our moral and epistemic conduct supervene 
on non-normative, natural properties. This imposes a rationality constraint on moral 
and epistemic discourses. Any theory of epistemic justification should explain how 
this tie of our epistemic evaluations on natural properties takes place. How normative 
properties are anchored on natural properties.
This  rationality  constraint  on  epistemic  discourse  implies  that  the  very  same 
natural  property  cannot  realize  contradictory  epistemic  evaluations,  though,  the 
converse  does  not  hold.  Namely,  there  can  be  the  same  epistemic  evaluation 
supervening on or being multiply realized by different natural properties. In short, 
there can be no two contradictory epistemic evaluations of two numerically identical 
states of affairs, events etc., unless these state of affairs etc. have some difference in 
terms of natural properties (though, the converse does not hold). 
Supervenience  theses  are  usually  given  a  global reading  in  terms  of  possible 
worlds127.  According  to  global  supervenience,  two  entire  possible  worlds  cannot 
127  See M.Ridge (2003) and B.McLaughlin and K.Bennett (2005). Also, possible worlds talk should 
not be taken to have the ontological implications that notoriously D.Lewis (1986) took them to have. 
Like S.Kripke (1981) I take possible worlds talk to be only a useful conceptual tool and remain 
neutral about the ontological implications. Besides, there are also antirealist understandings of 
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instantiate different normative properties, unless they also differ in at least some of 
their natural properties (but not vice versa). To deny this thesis is to accept that there 
could be two numerically identical possible worlds in terms of natural properties, but 
differing in the supervening epistemic properties these worlds instantiate. 
For example, we could have two numerically identical possible worlds with the 
same natural properties (geological data like fossils etc.) and the first possible world 
instantiates epistemic justification for the belief that earth is many millions years old, 
while the second world instantiates epistemic unjustifiedness. This would surely be 
bizarre.
To fully grasp the vital  importance of the supervenience relation on normative 
discourse, let us for the sake of the argument grant the counterfactual possible world 
were the supervenience relation on normative discourse does not hold. This scenario 
has some profoundly bitter repercussions. Repercussions difficult to be exaggerated, 
strongly suggesting that such a ‘supervenience-free’ counterfactual possible world is 
not really, metaphysically possible.
For,  if  the  supervenience  relation  between  normative  properties  and  non-
normative,  natural  properties was possible somehow to be severed,  then it  would 
seem that the rationality constraint on normative discourse just collapses. The upshot 
of the collapse of the rationality constraint would be that our moral and epistemic 
evaluations are not really based on reasons. They don’t supervene on certain reason-
giving natural properties. They are not anchored on natural properties but they are 
somehow ‘free-floating’. As one might surmise, this is as bad as it could get.
For, as we have said, the rationality constraint implies that the very same natural 
property  cannot  realize  different  epistemic  properties.  If  the  very  same  natural 
property could realize different epistemic properties, then epistemic discourse would 
simply cease to be a rational discourse. That is, a discourse for which the reasons 
grounding our epistemic evaluations can be asked and be given. It would cease to be 
a field of inquiry where there can be a legitimate exchange of the reasons supporting 
our epistemic evaluations.
It would cease to be a rational discourse because asking and giving the reasons 
supporting our epistemic evaluations would prove just to be ‘idle talk’. Two agents 
possible worlds talk. See for example S.Blackburn (1993: 52-75).
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could  ground  their  contradictory  epistemic  evaluations  on  the  very  same  natural 
property and, hence, any rational examination of the reasons supporting the epistemic 
evaluation would have no dialectical force, no dialectical implications. It would just 
be rhetorical idle talk with no potential of ever reaching convergence and that would 
be the end of the rational practice of asking and giving reasons for our epistemic 
evaluations.
This bitter repercussion is far-reaching and, I think, should be considered to be a 
reductio ad absurdum against anyone who might be tempted to think that we can 
reject without impunity the moral and epistemic supervenience desideratum. It shows 
that we should better take the supervenience of the normative on the natural very 
seriously, if we don’t want to taste this bitter repercussion.
However,  despite  the  intuitive  plausibility  of  the  epistemic  supervenience 
desideratum,  a  challenge  to  the  desideratum  might  come  from  strong  forms  of 
epistemic  externalism.  Such  externalists  might  stress  that  the  epistemic 
supervenience  desideratum rests  on the internalist  ‘accessibility requirement’  and, 
once this is discarded, the supervenience desideratum is sidelined. It is not any more 
a desideratum. 
This  thought  might  be  prompted  by the  fact  that  the  epistemic  supervenience 
desideratum  is  set  in  terms  of  an  epistemic  property  supervening  on  a  natural 
property and this seems to imply that the agent needs to have direct access to the 
reasons supporting his epistemic evaluation. Yet the externalist denies that we need 
to have direct access to the reasons supporting our epistemic evaluations. We can 
have justified beliefs without being aware of the reasons or grounds supporting these 
justified beliefs. Hence, the supervenience constraint is not a much of desideratum 
for the undaunted externalist128.
This  point  is,  I  think,  well-taken by the externalist.  But  this  should not  really 
create  any  trouble  for  us  because,  as  we  clarified  in  section  1.4,  we  don’t  ally 
ourselves with such a form of strong externalism, though, we don’t ally ourselves 
with a strong form of internalism either. As the reader might recall, our stance has 
been  reconciliatory  towards  the  internalism/externalism  controversy.  We  didn’t 
expand the exact details of our reconciliatory stance in that context and the current 
128  A.Goldman (1991) and T.Williamson (2000) might be such externalists. 
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context remains equally inopportune for such a task. The exact detailed explication 
should wait for a more convenient circumstance. But for current purposes our short 
discussion  is,  I  think,  sufficient.  Since  we  don’t  commit  ourselves  to  strong 
externalism,  we  should  feel  no  challenge  coming  from  these  externalist 
considerations against the supervenience desideratum. 
To wrap up the above discussion,  we have found the epistemic supervenience 
desideratum  to  be  plausible.  On  the  one  hand,  renouncing  the  epistemic 
supervenience  constraint  seems  to  lead  to  a  reductio  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
externalist considerations do not really touch us. Reasonably then, the supervenience 
of normative properties on non-normative, natural properties has been considered so 
plausible  that  many  philosophers  would  concur  and  consider  the  supervenience 
relation  necessary (and a  conceptual  truth).  That  is,  necessarily,  there  can  be  no 
possible world where normative discourse is not constrained by the supervenience 
relation. 
With  the  epistemic  supervenience  desideratum  introduced  and  motivated,  the 
promised second step is to pose the question whether ‘naïve’ nonnaturalism does 
explain the desideratum. The answer seems profound enough. It seems that it does 
not.  Let  me  explain.  An  adequate  explanation  of  the  epistemic  supervenience 
desideratum demands an account  of how epistemic  properties  supervene  on non-
epistemic, natural properties. That is, how epistemic properties are being grounded or 
anchored on natural properties. 
According to the global reading we gave to epistemic supervenience, two entire 
possible worlds cannot differ in their epistemic properties, unless they also differ in 
their natural properties (but not vice versa). To deny this thesis is to accept that there 
could be two numerically identical possible worlds in terms of natural properties, but 
differing in the supervening epistemic evaluation about these worlds. This would be 
absurd. 
The  nonnaturalist,  presumably,  as  a  response  to  pressure  to  explain  epistemic 
supervenience, would be forced to concede the following account. The property of 
epistemic justification is nonnatural and supervenes on a certain natural property or a 
certain  conjunctive  concatenation  of  natural  properties.  For  example,  epistemic 
justification could supervene on coherence or self-presentation or the conjunction of 
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coherence and empirical evidence etc.
Yet, such an account seems entirely hopeless. For, it is clearly possible that the 
nonnatural  property  of  epistemic  justification  in  at  least  some  cases  might  not 
supervene on any natural property we might think of. This is clearly possible because 
we  can’t  see  how  to  forge  a  metaphysical  supervenience  relation  between  two 
different realms of properties: one natural and one nonnatural. For example, let us for 
the  sake  of  argument  say  that  the  nonnatural  property  of  epistemic  justification 
supervenes on coherence. Then it seems clearly possible that there might be coherent 
beliefs, theories etc., which are not justified and do not realize epistemic justification. 
In terms of possible worlds, it seems clearly possible that we can have two identical 
possible worlds in terms of natural  properties  and still  have a different  epistemic 
property realized by the two worlds. 
This much seems to follow from ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ because it remains 
an  ‘open  question’  whether  epistemic  justification  is  reducible  to  any  natural 
property. If epistemic justification was reducible to a certain natural property, then 
‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ would have been blunted and epistemic justification 
would trivially supervene on the natural  property reducing epistemic justification. 
For,  trivially,  any property supervenes  on itself.  But  as we have argued, and the 
nonnaturalist agrees, this is not what happens. ‘The Moorean/Humean lesson’ holds 
fast  and  seriously  undermines  such  reductive  efforts.  Thus,  the  nonnaturalists’ 
attempt to explain supervenience seems doomed from the very beginning. 
As  a  result,  I  conclude  that  ‘naïve’  nonnaturalism  does  not  seem  able  to 
adequately  explain  the  epistemic  supervenience  desideratum and  this  is  surely  a 
serious liability. It is a serious liability because as we have discussed, any normative 
discourse is constrained by a supervenience relation. Any normative discourse is a 
rational one and as such reasons can be asked and be given for our beliefs. And if in 
situations identical  in terms of natural properties we have contradictory epistemic 
evaluations  then  the  discourse  is  not  rational  any  more.  Rational  exchange  of 
argument collapses and epistemic talk proves to be just idle talk. That is, talk that has 
no  impact  on  the  way  we  form,  retain  and  revise  our  beliefs.  Belief-fixation, 
retention and revision turns out to be simply capricious.
Overall,  the  epistemological  and  ontological  discontents  coupled  with  the 
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apparent  difficulties  nonnaturalism  has  with  the  epistemic  supervenience 
desideratum seem to prompt the conclusion that there is no nonnatural property of 
epistemic  justification.  In  terms  of  ‘the  epistemic  justification  puzzle’,  this  is 
translated  as  ‘the  nonnaturalism-denial  assertion’  (P4)  is  plausible:  justification 
assertions  and  attributions  do  not  purport  to  refer  to  a  nonnatural  property  of 
epistemic justification. 
But this inference might be too quick, as J.McDowell has defended a subtle and 
sophisticated  nonnaturalist  theory  in  a  naturalistic  cloth.  In  the  next  section  we 
examine McDowell’s interesting proposal. 
5.5 J.McDowell’s Quietist Nonnaturalism Introduced
J.McDowell (1994, 1998) has pursued a quietist line in order to rescue normative 
realism129.  McDowell  is  not  any  typical  sort  of  ‘naïve’  nonnaturalist.  In  fact,  he 
(1994:77-8)  renounces  what  he  calls  ‘rampant  Platonism’  and declares  himself  a 
committed  naturalist.  Albeit,  a  naturalist  of  a  neoaristotelian  sort:  ‘naturalist  of 
second nature’.  That  is,  a naturalist  that  steers  between the straits  of extravagant 
‘rampant Platonism’ and narrow-minded scientistic (not scientific) ‘bald naturalism’. 
Let me explain because this is not a mere play of the word ‘naturalism’. 
Inspired  by Aristotle,  McDowell  (1994:  xix-xxiv,  1998)  distinguishes  between 
two forms of naturalism: ‘bald naturalism’ and ‘naturalism of second nature’. Bald 
naturalism is the naturalism that equates nature with what he calls ‘the realm of law’. 
That is, with the realm of independent causal efficacy constantly being explored by 
scientific  inquiry.  This  is  a  fairly  standard  way of  understanding  the  term of  art 
‘naturalism’ and this is how we ourselves understood naturalism and natural property 
in Section 2.2.
‘Naturalism of second nature’, however, does not identify nature with ‘the realm 
of  law’.  To  do  so,  McDowell  suggests,  would  have  been  to  submit  to  the 
unwarranted scientism of ‘bald naturalism’ which mistakenly identifies nature with 
‘the  (causal)  realm  of  law’.  Historically  speaking,  McDowell  (1994:70-72) 
continues,  this biased equation of nature with ‘bald naturalism’ and ‘the realm of 
law’ has specific traceable origins. It is a modern construction that came about under 
the impact of the rise of modern science (Galilean revolution etc.) and its impressive 
129  A similar quietist approach to McDowell’s has been sketched by P.Strawson (1987).
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achievements. Nothing of it exists in Aristotle’s pre-modern conception of naturalism 
and it is to such (uncontaminated by the impact of science) conceptions of naturalism 
that we need to return. 
Indeed, McDowell’s own positive proposal follows the dictates of this diagnosis 
and the plea for a return to an uncontaminated Aristotelian form of naturalism. In 
contrast  with  ‘bald  naturalism’,  McDowell’s  own  neoaristotelian  ‘naturalism  of 
second nature’ leaves open logical space for what he calls (after W.Sellars (1997)) 
‘the logical  space of  reasons’.  That  is,  the precious  realm of (human)  rationality 
anchored, as Sellars (1963:39-40) would have put it, in ‘the framework of being a 
person’. 
According to McDowell’s neoaristotelian virtue-based account, a rational agent is 
one that,  if  being virtuously brought up in a social context, responsiveness to the 
right practical reasons for action and the right theoretical reasons for belief will come 
to be his ‘second nature’. He will come to acquire a practical know-how (Aristotelian 
‘phronesis’ or practical wisdom) of what to do and what to believe from case to case 
and from context to context130.  Yet, ‘the space of reasons’ is not one that can be 
included in ‘the realm of law’131. Reasons are one thing, causes are another and their 
respective domains of explanatory responsibility are clearly distinct and should not 
be conflated. 
 Here is a nice quote (1994:82-84): 
‘… a decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of thinking, our eyes 
are  opened to  the  very existence  of  this  tract  of  the  space  of  reasons…
ordinary upbringing can shape the actions and thoughts of human beings in 
a  way  that  brings  these  demands  into  view…The  point  is  clearly  not 
restricted to ethics. Moulding ethical character, which includes imposing a 
specific  shape on the practical  intellect,  is  a particular  case of a  general 
phenomenon:  initiation  into  conceptual  capacities,  which  include 
responsiveness  to  other  rational  demands  besides  those  of  ethics.  Such 
initiation  is  a  normal  part  of  what  it  is  for  a  human  being  to  come  to 
maturity… one’s eyes [are] opened to reasons at large by acquiring a second 
nature’. 
130  A full-blown virtue epistemology of this broad ilk has been developed by L.Zagzebski (1996).
131  In D.Davidson’s (2003: 42) terms, ‘the constitutive ideal of rationality’.
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Armed  with  the  ‘bald  naturalism’/  ‘naturalism  of  second  nature’  distinction, 
McDowell (1994) then insists that, by any means, we should not be allured by ‘bald 
naturalism’ which identifies nature with ‘the realm of law’ and promises,  in Max 
Weber’s  (1982)  famous  expression,  to  fully  ‘disenchant  the  world’132.  That  is, 
promises  in  the  prospect  of  a  mature  science  to  bring  natural  workings  under 
nomological  causal  regulation.  Nature  cannot  be  fully  disenchanted  as  the 
enlightenment  project  has  arrogantly  promised;  or  at  least  human  nature.  Human 
nature resists disenchantment because the realm of reasons, which is the key mark of 
being a human primate, eludes inclusion to the realm of causes. 
For  human  nature decisively  belongs  to  the  realm of  reasons,  not  causes.  We 
explain and predict intentional action by appeal to reasons for action, we explain and 
predict belief-fixation by appeal to reasons for belief etc. and not by any appeal to 
causes133.  Any  appeal  to  causes  for  an  explanation  of  such  phenomena  seems 
hopelessly irrelevant. And for McDowell, this is a brute fact about the constitution of 
the natural world. And it is here that the quietist element enters the scene. For this is 
simply how things are and we cannot further analyze why this is the case. This is 
how far philosophy can go in terms of addressing the core philosophical  puzzles 
(normativity,  mental  causation,  free  will,  meaning,  personal  identity  etc.). 
Philosophy, thus, rests in peace only when this line is drawn (and realized) between 
what we can understand and what we cannot understand. 
To come to our specific point of interest, McDowell (1994) argues that once we 
grasp this fine-grained distinction between ‘bald naturalism’/‘naturalism of second 
nature’, the concomitant renunciation of ‘rampant Platonism’ and that this theory is 
only  a  modest  ‘naturalized  Platonism’,  the  epistemological  and  ontological 
discontents evaporate. They evaporate because we neither postulate the existence of 
any ‘queer’ Platonic, nonnatural properties nor of a spooky faculty of intuition. 
Rather, we only make the modest claim that as rational animals (initiated through 
acculturation into the social realm), we come to acquire the cognitive ability to be 
responsive to reasons (practical  and theoretical).  That  is,  through initiation to the 
132  Compare M.Weber (1982): ‘…rational, empirical knowledge has consistently worked through to 
the disenchantment of the world and its transformation into a causal mechanism’ (1982:350) and ‘The 
fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and, above all, by the disenchantment of the world’ 
(1982:155).
133  See M.Smith (1994), G.E.M. Anscombe (2000), D.Davidson (2001b) and D.Dennett (2003) for 
discussion of action explanation by appeal to reasons.
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social realm we actualize ‘the structure of the logical space of reasons’. This potency 
for acquisition of the cognitive ability for reasons-responsiveness constitutes part of 
our natural endowment and it should be taken as primitive. It is simply a brute fact 
about  the  natural  constitution  of  our  cognitive  architecture.  Nothing  more 
informative can be said about ‘the logical space of reasons’ and the philosophical 
puzzles associated with it134.
This concludes our brief presentation of McDowell’s quietist proposal. Let us now 
turn to the critical examination of his proposal. 
5.6 J.McDowell’s Quietist Nonnaturalism Criticized
While McDowell’s heroic proposal has been well received by some philosophers, 
other philosophers have expressed strong reservations135. For McDowell’s proposal 
has been criticized as only sweeping the epistemological and ontological discontents 
under the carpet of quietism, though, not really answering them. And this seems fair 
enough to my eyes. For it does not explain neither to what normative properties we 
are  sensitive and responsive to as rational  animals  nor  how we are sensitive  and 
responsive to such properties, if these properties do not populate ‘the realm of law’. 
That  is,  how we  are  sensitive  to  an  action’s  property  of  goodness  or  a  belief’s 
property of justification and what kind of properties these normative properties are, if 
these properties do not reside in nature and have independent causal powers. 
These  were  basically  the  ‘queerness’  and  ‘epistemic  access’  problems  of 
nonnaturalism we encountered in the last chapter and McDowell’s theory does not 
seem to really address them. As far as I can see, McDowell’s claim that as rational 
animals  we have  the  cognitive  ability  to  be  responsive  to  reasons  (practical  and 
theoretical) is not all that modest, unless we are able to spell out in lucid naturalistic 
terms  how this  reasons-responsiveness  ability  works.  That  is,  what  is  the modus 
operandi of ‘the logical space of reasons’. How it tracks normative properties in spite 
of the fact that these do not populate ‘the realm of law’. 
McDowell himself seems to be aware of this line of criticism but thinks he can 
rebut it. As he (1994:82-3) says:
‘…the very idea of sensitivity to real demands of reason looks spooky, 
134  It should be noted that McDowell (1994: 123-4) appears hostile to evolutionaty considerations that 
might be called in to help us out with accounting for ‘the logical space of reasons’.
135  See for example P.Goldie (2002) who seems to follow McDowell.
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unless  we  can  reconstruct  it  from  materials  that  are  naturalistic  in  the 
relevant sense’ and ‘…the outlook I am attributing to Aristotle looks like a 
kind of Platonism. But it is not what I called ‘rampant platonism’. We fall 
into rampant Platonism if we take it that the structure of the space of reasons 
is  sui generis, but leave in place the equation of nature with the realm of 
law.  That  makes  our  capacity  to  respond to  reasons  look like  an  occult 
power, something extra to our being the kind of animals we are, which is 
our situation in nature’ (McDowell’s own emphasis). 
Yet, unlike McDowell,  I don’t think he can rebut this line of criticism just by 
recourse to neoAristotelian ‘naturalism of second nature’. And he can’t because talk 
of ‘naturalism of second nature’ is not to ‘reconstruct the very idea of sensitivity to 
real demands of reason from materials that are naturalistic’.  These ‘materials’  are 
naturalistic  only  in  McDowell’s  ‘relevant  sense’  of  naturalism and this  ‘relevant 
sense’ stretches naturalism to a breaking point. It stretches naturalism to the point of 
being nonnaturalism in naturalistic (in McDowell’s ‘relevant sense’) disguise. And, 
unfortunately, this is only to push the problem one step back but not to really rebut it. 
Let me explain why I think this is the case.
The worry I have in mind has been well made by J.Fodor (1998). J.Fodor (1998) 
chastises the fact that all McDowell has to provide in relation to these problems is 
picturesque ocular metaphors and that his ‘naturalism of second nature’ is not, after 
all, naturalistic itself. Given that Fodor (1998:7-8) expresses the point nicely, I quote 
freely: 
‘Having situated the rational (and the ethical, and a lot else that we care 
about) outside the realm of law, McDowell needs to face the embarrassing 
question how, by any natural  process, do we ever manage to get at  it?... 
Likewise,  and more  so,  in the nonperceptual  cases,  where the objects  of 
cognition are normative or otherwise intentional aspects of things: how do 
we get at those if they aren’t in the natural order? Maybe better, how do they 
get at us? How can what is not in the realm of law make anything happen? 
… ‘Bringing into view’ is a metaphor; only what is in nature can literally be 
viewed. And ‘resonating’ is also a metaphor; only what is in nature can be 
literally  attuned  to  ...  The  forms  of  human  sentience  resonate,  as  far  as 
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anybody  knows,  only  to  aspects  of  the  ‘disenchanted’  world.  Mere 
exhortation won’t fix that. Second nature is what we get when ‘our Bildung 
actualizes some of the potentialities we are born with;
… But the question arises how second nature, so conceived, could itself 
be natural. It is no good for McDowell just to say that it is and you can get 
some at the Bildung store; he has to say how it could be short of spooks… a 
dualistic  naturalism  isn’t  in  the  cards.  If  that’s  right,  then  epistemology 
needs to bend and McDowell will have to cool it a little about justification. 
Justification can’t require what can’t happen, on pain of there not being any; 
and  whatever  happens,  happens  in  the  realm  of  law’;  (Fodor’s  own 
emphasis). 
As  we  already  saw  in  our  discussion  of  intuitionism  in  section  5.3,  ocular 
metaphors  are  part  and  parcel  of  the  problem and,  hence,  Fodor  is  right  in  his 
criticism of McDowell. Ocular metaphors cannot constitute a real response to ‘the 
epistemic access’ and ‘queerness’ problems. And this is not simply to inveigh against 
any  philosophical  use  of  metaphors.  Metaphors  can  be  useful  and  suggestive 
philosophical  tools  as  far  as  they  are  harmless  and  innocuous  in  terms  of 
implications136. 
McDowell’s  use  of  ocular  metaphors,  however,  is  not  so  harmless  because  it 
obscures how we are sensitive to normative properties (if at all) and what kind of 
normative properties we are sensitive to (if any). That is, how we are sensitive to 
normative properties that do not reside in the causal realm of nature, McDowell’s 
‘realm of law’. To normative properties that do not seem to have independent causal 
powers  and,  therefore,  are  not  in  any obvious  way difference-making  properties. 
They don’t bring about any change in the realm of nature. 
McDowell’s argument aside, it seems that his ‘naturalism of second nature’ turns 
out to be, in essence, only a variant of nonnaturalism in naturalistic disguise. It seems 
to  be  a  variant  of  nonnaturalism  in  disguise  because,  although  denounces  the 
‘rampant Platonism’ of nonnatural properties, he still speaks in terms of the language 
of ocular metaphors we chastised in section 5.3. Namely, in terms of ‘seeing’ that a 
136  Of course, metaphors are tricky tools and have to be used with caution in philosophical debates. 
For one thing metaphors  are often ambiguous and susceptible to multiple  interpretations  and this 
makes it difficult to grasp their full inferential implications. See W.Lycan (2006: Ch.14) for discussion 
of metaphor.
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certain  situation  merits  a  certain  response,  of  ‘being  sensitive’  to  normative 
properties, of ‘bringing into view’ etc. The language of ocular metaphors, though, 
seems  to  be  nothing  more  than  the  vehicle  of  a  subtle,  covert  articulation  of 
nonaturalist  positions;  unless  of  course  they  are  spelled  out  in  naturalistic  terms 
something McDowell does not perform. 
McDowell still has a subtle rejoinder, though. His rejoinder would probably be 
that  with  our  ‘equation  of  nature  with  the  realm of  law’  we  unduly  restrict  the 
domain of nature and slide back to the snare of bald naturalism’s philistine scientism. 
A snare McDowell has taken pains to warn us about. That is, a scientism that does 
not leave open logical space for the reality of such precious things like norms of 
rationality,  normative  facts  and  truths,  mental  states  etc.  and  aspires  to  fully 
‘disenchant the world’. 
For such entities, if exist at all, they don’t seem to exist in nature, in ‘the realm of 
law’. And if such precious entities are to be excised, then surely something has gone 
badly  wrong in  our  contentions.  The  obvious  candidate  of  what  has  gone  badly 
wrong is our commitment to ‘bald naturalism’ and, therefore, we should discard it 
and embrace his own more liberal ‘naturalism of second nature’ that does not fall 
prey to the excision of philosophically precious notions. 
My  line  of  response  is  Sellarsian  (and  indeed  I  think  Sellars’  (1963)  own 
attitude)137. We need first to distinguish between being committed to bald naturalism 
and being committed to scientism. The two claims should not be conflated so light-
heartedly  because  bald  naturalism need not  entail  scientism,  (though,  the reverse 
does hold). McDowell, however, conflates the two commitments while I think (with 
Sellars) we should not. In Sellars’ (1963:32) terms, one can be committed to ‘the 
primacy of the scientific image’ over ‘the manifest image of perennial philosophy’ 
and still resist scientism. This might appear surprising to some people, but I think it 
should not. Let me explain. 
Although one can be committed to ‘the primacy of the scientific image’ and the 
verdicts  of ‘the realm of law’,  he might  still  remain  firmly pessimistic  about the 
possibility of ‘the space of reasons’ (and related notions like values, norms, truths, 
137  Although I can’t flatter myself for being a Sellars’ scholar, it seems to my eyes that this has been 
Sellars’ position as well. But for more on this interpretation I should better point to Sellars’ sholars. 
See W.de Vries (2005) and J.O’Shea (2008).
134
mental states etc.) being reduced to naturalistic terms. Like Sellars, although I am of 
course  committed  to  the  primacy  of  a  scientific-naturalistic  worldview,  I  remain 
deeply sceptical about the reduction (not to mention elimination) of ‘the space of 
reasons’  to nomological  causal  relations.  The mental  is  and will  remain,  I  think, 
‘anomalous’ in D.Davidson’s (2003) memorable characterization138. 
I remain sceptical about the possibility of being fully naturalized, as eliminativist 
materialists like P.Churchland (2003) think will happen sometime in the future with 
the maturation of neuroscience. Of course, this deep scepticism does not, naively, 
preclude the logical possibility of such an event, which clearly appears to be wide 
open. I am only sceptical about the metaphysical possibility of such an event because 
the step from logical to metaphysical possibility (as we know from modal arguments 
in philosophy of mind) is a big one and I really doubt whether this step could ever be 
taken. 
Why I remain sceptical about the metaphysical possibility of such a reductionism 
is a big question to pursue here, but I can afford a general hint.  In principle, my 
thorough  scepticism  is  not  motivated  by  any  quaint  feeling  that  the  mental  is 
sacrosanct,  inviolable  etc.  or  any  other  such  backward  form  of  thinking.  This 
wouldn’t comport with my commitment to a scientific-naturalistic picture.  I am a 
pessimist about the metaphysical possibility of such a reduction because I don’t quite 
see how this  is  to be done either  on a priori  conceptual  grounds or by empirical 
means at all.
 Analytic  naturalistic  reductionism  as  an  approach  to  normative  concepts 
employed  by  ‘the  space  of  reasons’  (rationality  etc.)  fails  since  Plato  and 
neuroscience  despite  its  advancements  does  not  seem able  to  reduce  the  mental 
(propositional attitudes or qualia) to neural activity139. On this point, for reasons that I 
cannot belabour more here, my Sellarsian intuitions incline me to side in agreement 
with McDowell (1994) and Davidson (2003). 
This thorough pessimism is also wed with a certain -Sellarsian again- background 
picture  about  the  relation  between  philosophy  and  the  special  sciences.  This 
138  Davidson (2003) makes clear that he is talking only of propositional attitudes and not qualia that 
appear to be even more difficult to accommodate in a naturalistic context.
139  The type-identity reductionism of the 50’s-60’s in philosophy has been famously twharted by 
Putnam’s  (2003)  ‘multiple  realizability  argument’  and  ushered  theorists  towards  functionalist 
approaches like J.Fodor’s (1975), D.Chalmers’(1996) and J.Kim’s (2000, 2005).
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background picture contends that philosophy is not reducible to the special sciences 
but, in tandem, is not totally independent either. As Sellars (1997:80) have put it, we 
should not  ‘confuse the sound idea that philosophy is not science with the mistaken 
idea that philosophy is independent of science’. Philosophy is autonomous, though, 
empirically informed; or at least it should be. 
As a consequence, philosophical methodology should not be cornered between the 
unpalatable horns of the dilemma of austere a priori conceptual analysis or abject 
surrender of the philosophical  branches to the special  sciences140.  That  is,  to wit, 
between pensive Platonic beard scratching and Quinean naturalization-liquidation of 
philosophy (e.g.  epistemology reduced  to  cognitive  psychology and sociology of 
knowledge etc.). Science might be very important for philosophy but it is not in the 
Quinean sense ‘the final arbiter of truth’ in matters philosophical. The dilemma is not 
exclusive and a third ‘middle’ way along the Sellarsian lines we just draw is both 
possible and plausible141.
I  conclude that  McDowell’s  equation  of bald naturalism with scientism is  too 
quick. As I explained following my reading of Sellars (1963), one can legitimately be 
committed to ‘the primacy of the scientific image’ and still remain non-scientistic, 
though,  properly  scientific.  He  can  do  so  because  remains  sceptical  about  the 
metaphysical  possibility  of  a  naturalization  of  ‘the  space  of  reasons’  and  the 
concomitant  handing  over  of  philosophy  (and  its  problems)  to  special  scientists 
(neuroscientists, psychologists, sociologists etc.). 
In  virtue  of  this  scepticism,  I  find  the  bright  optimism  of  philosophers  like 
Churchland  and Quine  unwarranted,  too  impressed  and allured  by  the  impact  of 
science  and  its  achievements.  This  much  I  found  indeed  scientistic,  not  merely 
scientific. Of course, they could also charge me with analogous comments for my- 
despite the impact and achievements of science- Sellarsian pessimism but given my 
priorities at hand, I think I have to cut the chase of this issue at this juncture. This 
fascinating discussion can wait for another occasion.
Last but not least, McDowell does not really take into consideration ‘the epistemic 
supervenience  desideratum’.  As  far  as  I  know,  he  nowhere  addresses  the 
140  See  W.Quine  (1953,  2008)  and  for  discussion R.Feldman (2001).  Feldman (2001a)  calls  the 
Quinean approach ‘replacement naturalism’.
141  This stance is what R.Feldman (2001a) calls ‘cooperative naturalism’.
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supervenience  relation  of  the normative  on the natural.  Still,  McDowell  needs  to 
explain  how epistemic  properties  supervene  on  non-epistemic,  natural  properties. 
Granted  McDowell’s  ‘naturalism  of  second  nature’  (which  we found  to  be  only 
nonnaturalism in disguise) I don’t see how this is to be done. 
Our  criticism  of  nonnaturalism  in  section  5.4  is,  therefore,  revived.  For  it  is 
always  possible  for  a  nonatural,  epistemic  property  to  fail  to  supervene  on  a 
nonepistemic, natural property.  That is, no matter which natural  property we may 
invoke it seems that is always possible that the nonnatural, epistemic property might 
fail to supervene. And this is sufficient to constitute a severance of the supervenience 
relation of the normative on the natural. It is sufficient to make clear that no matter 
which  natural  property  we  might  invoke,  the  epistemic  property  might  fail  to 
supervene (or be ‘anchored’) on it.
To sum up, McDowell’s ‘naturalized platonism’ fails to neutralize the problems of 
nonaturalism  because  it  does  not  really  address  the  ‘queerness’  and  ‘epistemic 
access’ problems. His distinction between ‘bald naturalism’/ ‘naturalism of second 
nature’ and the appeal to our primitive natural endowment of ‘the space of reasons’ 
(actualized by socialization) does not make the trick. He still needs to explain how 
we  are  sensitive  to  normative  properties  (if  at  all)  and  what  these  normative 
properties are (if any), if these properties do not reside in the natural realm. 
The playful wrap in the language of ocular metaphors does not suffice to conceal 
these  problems;  unless,  of  course,  McDowell  spells  out  the  metaphors  in  lucid 
naturalistic terms something he does not do (and I do not see how it could be done, at 
any rate). McDowell also does not address epistemic supervenience and, even if he 
did,  his  ‘naturalized  platonism’  does  not  really  seem  in  position  to  adequately 
account for it.
With  our  criticism  of  McDowell’s  quietist  proposal,  our  criticism  of 
nonnaturalism  comes  to  an  end.  McDowell’s  quietist  proposal  has  been  found 
inadequate to rescue nonnaturalism from the thorny problems we have highlighted in 
sections 5.3-5.4. 
5.7 Conclusion and Summary of the Argument
In  this  chapter,  I  have  performed  two  basic  things.  First,  in  section  5.2  I 
introduced the theoretical  commitments  of ‘naïve’  nonnaturalism and the twofold 
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motivation  for  pursuing  the  nonnaturalist  project.  That  is,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
accommodation  of  ‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’  and  ‘the  epistemic  twin  earth 
lesson’ and, on the other hand, the explanation of our pre-theoretical realist intuitions 
about epistemic discourse. 
Second, in sections 5.3-5.4 I explained why the ‘naïve’ nonnaturalist  approach 
seems to be a theoretical giant with feet of clay. Why although it prima facie seems 
to be particularly auspicious, it  threatens to collapse to rubble once we realize its 
epistemological  and  ontological  discontents.  That  is,  ‘the  epistemic  access’  and 
‘queerness’  problems  presented  in  section  5.3  and  the  apparent  inability  of 
explaining  the ‘epistemic supervenience  desideratum’  presented in section 5.4.  In 
sections 5.5-5.6 I then looked into McDowell’s ‘naturalism of second nature’ and 
found his subtle version of nonnaturalism also wanting. Overall, the discussion of the 
problems of nonaturalism seems to prompt the conclusion that ‘the nonnaturalism-
denial assertion’ (P4) is plausible. Our justification assertions and attributions do not 
purport to refer to a certain nonnatural property of epistemic justification. 
Chapter 5 also marks the end of the critical ‘Part I: The Problems of Epistemic 
Referentialism’. In the next chapter 6, we inaugurate the more constructive ‘Part II: 
The Possibility of Epistemic Expressivism’. We look into a very different approach 
to normative discourses from the ones we have examined and found implausible so 
far.  Unlike the approaches  we have examined and found implausible  so far,  this 
approach is nonreferential. That is, it rejects ‘the referential semantics assumption’ 
(P2),  namely,  that  ‘justification  assertions  and  attributions  purport  to  refer  to  a 
certain property (natural  or natural)  of epistemic justification’.  This approach is a 
nonreferential, expressivist one that comports nicely with the premises of the puzzle 
we have found to be plausible,  namely,  ‘the naturalism-denial assertion’ (P3) and 
‘the nonnaturalism-denial assertion’ (P4).
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Part II The Possibility of Epistemic Expressivism
Chapter 6 The Advent of Normative Expressivism
6.1 Introduction
So  far,  in  the  previous  chapters  2-5  we  have  criticized  referentialist/realist 
approaches: analytic and synthetic naturalistic reductionism, epistemic kinds realism, 
‘naïve’  nonnaturalism  and  McDowell’s  ‘naturalism  of  second-nature’.  All  this 
critical work has bolstered the assumption that premises 3 and 4 of ‘the epistemic 
justification  puzzle’  are  plausible,  that  is,  the  naturalism-denial  and  the 
nonnaturalism-denial  assertions  are  plausible.  As  these  claims  state,  justification 
assertions and attributions do not purport to refer to a certain natural or nonnatural 
property of epistemic justification. 
Yet, given that premises 3 and 4 have been found to be plausible and premise 1, 
namely,  ‘the property assumption’  (stating that all  properties are either natural  or 
nonnatural) seems to be a mere truism then, by elimination, a solution to the puzzle 
should  go  through  a  rejection  of  the  remaining  premise  2.  That  is,  it  should  go 
through  a  rejection  of  ‘the  referential  semantics  assumption’,  namely,  that 
justification  assertions  and  attributions  purport  to  refer  to  a  certain  property  of 
epistemic justification (natural or nonnatural). 
Thus, the argument of the thesis can be seen as  an argument by elimination. It 
eliminates one-by-one possible ways out of the puzzle, by means of arguments for 
their  implausibility,  and  then  suggests  that  the  way  out  should  go  through  the 
rejection of the remaining ‘referential semantics assumption’. At least, it should go 
down this path if two assumptions hold: the assumption that the arguments we gave 
for the implausibility of the other ways out do hold and the assumption that such a 
nonreferential approach will not have any unpalatable implications that could count 
as a reductio against it. The former assumption is one that we have already embraced 
and the latter is one that can be evaluated only after we fully explore a nonreferential 
approach and we haven’t yet even started doing this. Hence, it is premature to say 
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anything about the latter assumption.
Such a nonreferential way out of the puzzle I intend to explore to some depth in 
this chapter 6 and, more substantially, the next chapter 7. My intention is to reject 
‘the referential  semantics  assumption’  and explore an expressivist  solution  to  the 
puzzle. This nonreferential solution is to be an expressivist one because, as I will 
argue in section 6.4, expressivism easily evades the semantic problems of the realist 
approaches we have made explicit  in chs.2-5 and this  motivates the possibility of 
expressivism.  At  least,  it  motivates  the  conceptual  exploration  of  this  interesting 
approach in good hope that it will both prove explanatorily fruitful and free of any 
counter-intuitive implications. 
In  particular,  expressivism  accounts  for  the  Moorean/Humean  ‘open  feel’ 
semantic intuitions as these have been witnessed in ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ 
and ‘the epistemic twin earth lesson’, it avoids ‘the epistemic access’ and ‘queerness’ 
problems  of  the  nonnaturalist  and  promises  to  account  for  ‘the  epistemic 
supervenience desideratum’ that also nonnaturalism has failed to accommodate.
My dialectical intention now made explicit, this chapter 6 is mostly preparatory 
for the more constructive chapter 7 where I explore an original form of epistemic 
expressivism. This chapter serves a twofold preparatory purpose: to  introduce the 
basic ideas of expressivism as a semantic programme and motivate the possibility of 
such  an  expressivist  approach  to  epistemic  justification  discourse  by  means  of 
showing  how  it  can  easily  evade  the  referentialist’s  problems  (just  enumerated 
above). For the mere sake of this twofold purpose, I will use as a ‘toy’ expressivist 
theory  a  theory  largely  inspired  by  early  A.Gibbard’s  (1990)  influential  norm-
expressivism142. 
This is then how this preparatory chapter will unfold. In section 6.2 I introduce 
the semantic  programme of expressivism and explain  some of its  basic  ideas.  In 
section 6.3, I outline Gibbard’s norm-expressivism about moral rationality and then 
in section 6.4 explain how it could be applied to epistemic justification discourse (as 
has  already been in  a  relativist  form by H.Field  (2000,  2009)).  In  section  6.5,  I 
explain how our ‘toy’ expressivist theory of norm-expressivism can easily evade the 
problems of the various realist approaches we have encountered in chs. 2-5 and how 
142  Philosophers influenced by A.Gibbard (1990) include H.Field (2000, 2009), M.Chrisman (2007) 
and K.Kappel (2010, ms).
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this motivates the possibility of an expressivist approach to epistemic justification 
discourse. Finally, in section 6.6 I preview the argument of this preparatory chapter 
and pave the way for the more constructive chapter 7.
 6.2 What Expressivism Is: Some Basics
In this section 6.2 we introduce the basic ideas of the semantic programme of 
expressivism. Expressivism is an approach that goes against standard orthodoxy in 
semantics and its origins can be traced at least back to insights found in the work of 
Locke and Hume143. But let us start with an outline of what standard approaches to 
semantics  suggest  and  then  introduce  an  outline  of  the  semantic  programme  of 
expressivism and how it aspires to contest this semantic picture and establish itself as 
a full-blown semantic theory.
 From Frege onwards, standard semantic theories have been referential and truth-
conditional in character144. They follow a broadly  referential semantic strategy and 
assume that  meaning is reference. That is, they purport to explain the meaning of 
sentences in terms of what the subject-predicate of the sentence purport to refer to. 
That is, if the subject refers to an individual (e.g. grass) that falls within the extension 
of the predicate (e.g. green), then the sentence satisfies its truth-condition and it is 
true (i.e. ‘Grass is green’ is true if and only if Grass is green). If the subject refers to 
an individual (e.g. my dog) that does not fall within the extension of the predicate 
(e.g. green), then the sentence does not satisfy its truth-condition and is false (e.g. 
‘My dog is not green’ is true if and only if My dog is not green). 
Atomic sentences  then like {P,Q}, courtesy of logical  operators (conjunctions, 
conditionals  etc.),  can  be  conjoined  in  logically  complex  ways  like  {PvQ}  and 
appear embedded in truth-functional contexts like disjunctive syllogisms {PVQ, ¬P, 
Q},  modus  ponens  {P→Q,  P,  Q}  etc.  When  embedded  in  such  truth-functional 
contexts, we can easily predict their logical properties (validity,  consequence etc.) 
recursively by reference to the truth-tables of the logical operators of propositional 
logic and the various rules of inference. In a parallel way we can predict the logical 
properties of sentences as they are being expressed in predicate logic and beyond. In 
this sense, in standard truth-conditional semantics linguistic content explains mental 
143  See J.Locke’s (1973) ruminations on language and D.Hume’s (1986) account of moral language.
144  For discussion of Frege’s views and contribution to philosophy of language see D.Wiggins (1999) 
and C.Travis (2006).
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content. That is, language explains thought.
This  core  semantic  idea  has  been  exemplified  in  ‘the  referential  semantics 
assumption’  (P2)  itself.  Justification  assertions  and  attributions  are  true  if  their 
atomic parts (subject-predicate) do refer and thereby satisfy their  truth-conditions. 
For  example,  ‘Mike’s  belief  that  is  raining  is  justified’  is  true if  and only if  the 
subject,  that  is,  ‘Mike’s  belief  that  is  raining’  falls  under  the  extension  of  the 
predicate, that is, the property of ‘being justified’. Analogously, ‘Mike’s belief that is 
raining is justified’ is false if and only if the subject, that is, ‘Mike’s belief that is 
raining’ does not fall under the extension of the predicate, that is, the property of 
‘being justified’.  
Yet, unlike standard truth-conditional semantics that assume a referential semantic 
strategy,  expressivist  semantics  assume  a  use  semantic  strategy.  A  use  semantic 
strategy assumes that meaning is use145. The meaning of a sentence is not determined 
by what  the atomic parts of the sentence purport  to refer to,  but by the way the 
sentence (and its atomic parts) is used in ordinary discourse. Expressivism purports 
to explain the meaning of sentences  in terms of the mental  content  expressed by 
speakers when they use the sentence in the light of sociolinguistic conventions. Thus, 
the expressivist framework reverses the order of semantic explanation as now mental 
content explains linguistic content (and not vice versa as in standard truth-conditional 
semantics). That is, thought explains language.
For  example,  Grass  is  green  means  ‘Grass  is  green’  because  this  is  how the 
subject-predicate  of the sentence  is  used to  mean,  according  to the semantic  and 
syntactic linguistic conventions that govern English language. That is, the semantic 
conventions that take grass to mean ‘grass’, green to mean ‘green’ and the syntactic 
conventions  that  regulate  the  role  ‘is’  plays  and  the  formation  of  grammatical 
sentences.
 But as normative reference and truth-conditions do not necessarily show up in 
such an expressivist, use semantic picture, some use theorists like A.J.Ayer (1946), 
J.Austin (1962) and A.Gibbard (1990) have taken normative discourse to be non-
truth-apt146.  Reference  and  truth-conditions  are  simply  explained  away  in  their 
145  For some discussion of use theories see A.Avraamides (1999).
146  J.Austin (1962) in particular takes all nondescriptive ‘performative’ discourse to be non-truth-apt 
and not just normative discourse.
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picture of the semantics of normative discourse and this implies sliding to some form 
of  normative  relativism.  Indeed,  other  use  semantic  theorists  like  H.Field  (2009) 
have straightforwardly appealed to a relativistic expressivist conception of normative 
truth. 
However,  other  use  theorists  like  S.Blackburn  (1998),  A.Gibbard  (2003)  and 
R.Brandom  (2000)  have  not  been  prepared  to  give  up  the  precious  notions  of 
normative  reference  and  truth-conditions  and,  more  sanguinely,  took  them to  be 
derivative of the use of normative sentences147. How to exactly gloss the notion of 
normative truth in such a use-theoretic framework is a very tricky question but their 
clear aim with this manoeuvre was to rescue the precious notion of normative truth. 
And, arguably, such a manoeuvre is a wise one as there are deep philosophical 
reasons to think that the notion of normative truth is one that we should rescue, if our 
theory is to have any luck as a semantic theory of normative discourse. For a start, if 
we are to account for the validity of valid normative inferences, then we need some 
sort of expressivist-friendly account of truth as truth-preservation is necessary for 
validity148. But at any rate, all use theorists concur that reference should not taken to 
be the master concept of our semantic theory. 
 Expressivists  usually  rely  on  the  seminal  work  of  ‘ordinary  language 
philosophers’  like  J.Austin  (1962)  and,  especially,  P.Grice  (1989).  Gibbard 
(1990:85)  relies,  for  example,  on  P.Grice’s  (1989)  seminal  work  on  ideational 
semantics.  Along with J.Austin (1962),  Grice’s  work on ideational  semantics  has 
been the starting point of contemporary work on ideational  expressivism and has 
sparked a resurgence of interest to such a semantic approach149. But let me elaborate 
a bit on Grice and how his ideas are exploited by normative expressivists. 
The central  thing Grice (1989:  22-57) did was to famously explain how quite 
often the meaning of a sentence is not exhausted by what is merely being said. To 
show how this occurs he drew the distinction between what is being said and what is  
being implicated. According to Grice, what is being said is merely what is explicitly 
expressed by the atomic parts  of the sentence,  (that  is,  the words composing  the 
sentence) in the light of the semantic and syntactic sociolinguistic conventions that 
147  I have in mind S.Blackburn’s (1998) and A.Gibbard’s (2003) Quasi-realism and R.Brandom’s 
(2000) inferentialism.
148  For a discussion of this point see M.Schroeder (2008: 161-3).
149  See W.Davis (2010) for discussion.
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govern the natural language in play. 
For example,  the descriptive ‘snow is  white’  expresses the belief  that  snow is 
white  according  to  the  sociolinguistic  conventions  that  govern  English  language. 
That is, the semantic conventions governing the meaning of words and the syntactic 
conventions governing the grammatical structuring of words into sentences150. Given 
that what is being said it is explicitly conveyed, this part of content is often called 
‘explicature’151. 
But as Grice pointed out, quite often what is being said implicates things that go 
beyond what is merely being said, that is, the explicature. What is being implicated is 
what is being implied to an audience, according to the speaker’s semantic intentions, 
over and above the sentential meaning of what is merely being said152. Given that 
such  meanings  are  implicitly  conveyed,  Griced  called  this  part  of  content 
‘implicature’. 
Grice  distinguished  between  conventional and  nonconventional  implicatures. 
Conventional implicatures are the ones  non-cancellably tied to what is being said, 
that is, the explicature. He gave this example: ‘He is an Englishman, therefore, he is 
brave’. In this example, what is said also implicates that he is brave because he is an 
Englishman.  This  conventional  implicature  is  expressed  in  all  contexts  that  the 
sentence is uttered and therefore it is not cancellable. It is part and parcel of what is 
being said.
Instead,  nonconventional  implicatures  are  the  cancellable meanings  carried  by 
explicatures,  usually  due  to  the  speaker’s  semantic  intentions,  the  conversational 
context and relevant background information. Other factors that might play a role in 
conveying nonconventional implicatures include intonation,  facial  expressions and 
overall body language. 
Grice called such nonconventional implicatures conversational and distinguished 
150  ‘Syntactic conventions’ should be taken with a pinch of salt here because if N.Chomsky’s (1980) 
work on the syntax of natural languages is to the right direction then syntactic conventions are not all 
that conventional. But not everyone is convinced from Chomsky’s arguments. For arguments against 
‘syntactic universals’ in natural languages see N.Evans and S.Levinson (2009).
151  See W.Davis (2010).
152  Audience should be understood in a technical rather colloquial sense in order to cover cases where 
the speaker speaks to himself. In such a case the speaker's audience is just himself. Grice (1989: 86-
117) himself discusses how should one understand the notion of audience in cases where there is no 
interpersonal audience.
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between  generalised ones  and  particularized ones.  Generalised  conversational 
implicatures gradually tend to become conventionalised and when this happens they 
are  rendered  noncancellable153.  Figures  of  speech  like  idioms,  dead  metaphors, 
proverbs etc. seem to be paradigmatic examples of such generalised conversational 
implicatures.  For  example,  while  the  dead  metaphor  ‘She  has  thrown oil  on  the 
flame’ expresses what the sentence is  literally saying,  conversationally implicates 
that she has aggravated an already bad situation by means of fuelling more tension 
etc. 
Particularized conversational implcatures are ones that arise often spontaneously 
out of the conversational context. Such implicatures might be entirely novel or of 
some  limited  use  that  has  not  yet  allowed  them  to  become  generalized  and 
conventionalized  at  the  grander  level  of  social  circles  or even society itself.  The 
production of novel witticisms, subtle ironies, sarcastic and humorous expressions 
etc. might be good examples of such cases. For example: 
John:  ‘Are we going to win the game?
Sally: ‘Does the sun set in the east?’. 
Sally’s response here is an example of a particularized conversational implicature, 
somewhat cynically suggesting that their team does not really stand a chance and the 
possibility  of  winning  is  out  of  question.  Such  conversational  implicatures  are 
cancellable, as in a different context a speaker could utter the very same sentence 
without implicating that their team does not stand a chance and the possibility of 
winning is out of question. For example:
Sally the teacher: ‘Does the sun set in the east?’. 
Pupil: ‘No, it sets in the west’.
In this case, Sally utters the same sentence but does not conversationally implicate 
anything germane to the chances of any team winning any game.
This short digression provides some of the basic ideas Grice worked out in his 
ideationalist  framework.  Grice,  of  course,  didn’t  speak  directly  about  normative 
sentences as such which is the object of our interest here154. The closest he comes in 
saying  something  relevant  about  how  his  approach  could  apply  to  normative 
153 When  conversational  implicatures  became  generalised  and  conventionalized  and  therefore 
noncancellable they are, in essence, rendered conventional implicatures.
154  Austin (1962) only mentions in passing legal, epistemic and ethical discourses and in his (1961) 
elaborates some of his ideas to epistemic discourse.
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discourse  is  when  he  (1989:  213-224)  briefly  makes  the  distinction  between 
descriptive  (or  ‘informative’)  sentences  and  imperative  sentences,  as  normative 
sentences  resemble  imperatives  in  interesting  ways155.  But  this  has  not  really 
hindered Gibbard from borrowing and applying Gricean ideas on the semantics of 
the normative, rationality discourse himself.
 As we will shortly see in the next section 6.3, Gibbard is following Grice’s work 
on ideational semantics when he proposes that when we express normative sentences 
we are not merely saying something but, importantly, we are also implicating things. 
For Gibbard, the class of normative sentences are one class of sentences where what 
is being said does not exhaust their meaning because such sentences also implicate 
things.  Indeed,  for  Gibbard  what  we  really mean  when  we  express  normative 
sentences is not what is being said but what is being implicated. 
Gibbard  makes  this  claim  because  he  thinks  that  the  surface-level referential 
pretensions of normative language are deceptive and misguiding. They are deceptive 
because,  as  we  saw  ourselves  in  Chs.2-5,  is  far  from  clear  what  the  epistemic 
justification property (or other normative properties) could be or how we could track 
such  a  property  and  this  inspires  scepticism  about  the  prospects  of  referential 
semantics. For Gibbard, the real meaning of these sentences lies at the bottom-level 
of what is being implicated and what is implicated, according to ordinary rationality 
discourse,  is  a  non-cognitive  mental  state,  namely,  an  attitude  of  norm-
endorsement156. In J.Austin’s (1962: 4) terms such sentences are ‘masquerades’, they 
are  sentences  in  referential  syntactic  disguise  which,  nonetheless,  are  not 
semantically referential. 
With some of the basic ideas of the semantic programme of expressivism (and its 
Gricean  underpinnings  introduced),  let  us  now  turn  to  A.Gibbard’s  norm-
expressivism about moral rationality.
 6.3 A.Gibbard’s Moral Norm-Expressivism
In his influential book Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, A.Gibbard (1990:4-5) sets out 
searching for an understanding of ‘what ‘rational’ means’ and how an understanding 
155  For discussion of how normative sentences resemble imperative sentences see R.M.Hare (1952: 1-
31) and M.Schroeder (2008: 10-12). 
156  The surface-level/bottom-level distinction here parallels L.Wittgenstein’s (1953: 168e) ‘surface 
grammar/ depth grammar’ distinction.
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of  the  meaning  of  ‘rational’  could  subsequently  elucidate  the  species  of  moral 
rationality. That is, what makes our moral choices to ‘make sense’ or ‘to be wise’. 
He (1990:6-12) patently renounces a  referential semantic strategy in favour of an 
ideational  use  semantic  strategy  as  an  approach  to  the  meaning  of  rationality 
assertions and attributions. That is, he rebuffs referentialist efforts to either reduce 
rationality  to  any  naturalistic  property  or  to  assert  that  there  is  an  irreducible 
nonnatural rationality property. 
Instead,  he  suggests  that  we  should  start  with  how  rationality  assertions  and 
attributions are actually being used in ordinary linguistic practice. For Gibbard, what 
ordinary  linguistic  practice  reveals  is  that  with  normative  sentences  we  express 
noncognitive mental states, namely, attitudes of norm-endorsement. That is, attitudes 
of endorsement for the moral norms that license the action in question as rational. He 
calls this approach to the semantics of rationality discourse  norm-expressivism. Let 
me elaborate on how exactly he arrives at norm-expressivism.
Gibbard starts with a subtle dialectic manoeuvre. Gibbard’s dialectic manoeuvre is 
to crucially  reverse the order of semantic explanation. Referentialists-reductionists 
start  with  alleged  analyses  of  the  nature  of  normative  properties  like  rationality, 
goodness  etc.  and  think  that  endorsement  will  simply  follow  from  the  correct 
analysis. Once we have the correct analysis of such normative notions, they presume, 
endorsement  will  nicely fall  in  place.  But  due  to  the  familiar  ‘Moorean/Humean 
lesson’ this does not seem to be forthcoming. 
In  the  face  of  ‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’  and  the  pessimism  it  inspires, 
Gibbard reverses the order of semantic explanation157. He starts with the use of these 
sentences and the element of endorsement and sets out to explain norms of (moral) 
rationality as something following from this use. That is, he sets out from our attitude 
of endorsement to what we take to be rational and how this endorsement seems to be 
licensed by certain norms. Norms that constrain what can count as rational and what 
cannot. These norms, however, are neither somehow meant to be ‘out there’ nor they 
are meant  to be mind-independent  and objective in the traditional  realist  fashion. 
They are norms following from the use of justification assertions and attributions by 
epistemic agents.
157  Gibbard, as a philosopher that adheres to methological naturalism, he is not willing to go 
nonnaturalist by any means.
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With  Gibbard’s  reversal  of  the  order  of  explanation  and the  invocation  of  an 
ideational ‘use semantic strategy’, the notion of norm-endorsement comes to lie at 
the heart of the proposal. Gibbard claims that the use of such normative sentences 
indicates the importance of the element of norm-endorsement and that this should be 
the  cornerstone for  a  theory  of  the  semantics  of  rationality  assertions  and 
attributions. As he puts (1990:6) it: 
‘...start  with  the  use  of  the  term.  Fix  on  the  dictum ‘To call  a  thing 
rational is to endorse it’, and search for a sense of ‘endorse’ for which the 
dictum holds true’. He then adds (1990:7) that ‘to call something rational is 
to express one’s acceptance of norms that permit it’. 
According to Gibbard, the meaning of ‘rational’ should be understood in terms of 
the noncognitive state of mind it  expresses, namely,  the nonreferential  attitude of 
acceptance (or endorsement) to norms that permit the action, event or state of affairs 
in question. 
Gibbard has some very good reasons for making the notion of norm-endorsement 
the cornerstone of his expressivist theoretical construction. For, on the one hand, as 
we  have  seen  in  section  2.3,  referentialist  approaches  seem  to  exactly  miss the 
element  of  endorsement158.  As  you  might  recall,  ‘the  Moorean/Humean  lesson’ 
suggested that it is always possible for a clear-headed agent, without any semantic 
confusion,  to  question  whether  any  normative  property  N  (e.g.  rationality)  is 
reducible  to  a  natural  property  N* (e.g.  full  information,  desire  satisfaction)  and 
therefore resist endorsement of the belief in question. I can see, he might retort, the 
full information about, let us say, the Armenian genocide facts but I can’t see why 
full information makes them rational. 
As Gibbard (1990:10) puts it:  ‘On that diagnosis,  what descriptivistic  analyses 
miss is a general element of endorsement- an element an expressivistic analysis can 
capture’.  And an expressivistic  analysis  can capture  this  element  of  endorsement 
because it reverses the order of explanation and starts with what agents endorse when 
they use rationality assertions and attributions. What they endorse when they state 
that ‘φ-ing is rational’ or ‘S’s  φ-ing is rational’. Thus, the endorsement element in 
the  norm-expressivist  story  allows  us  to  account  for  what  we  may  call  ‘the 
158  See also Gibbard (1990:10).
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endorsement intuition’, namely, the intuition that when we use rationality assertions 
and attributions we seem to express some sort of general endorsement. 
On the other hand, Gibbard is attaching to endorsement the ‘norm-’ prefix because 
a sense of ‘endorse’ should have something to do with norms. Intuitively,  norms 
seem to constrain what can count as rational (moral or epistemic) and what cannot 
and Gibbard is sensitive to this fact. Wisely, although wants to dispense with ‘robust’ 
norms  or  facts  (realistically  construed)  about  rationality,  he  does  not  want  to 
relinquish the normative element inherent in rationality assertions and attributions. 
As he (1990:8) says :
 ‘In many ways, normative judgements mimic factual judgements, and indeed 
factual  judgements  themselves  rest  on  norms...Normative  discussion  is 
much like factual discussion, I shall be claiming, and just as indispensable’. 
Thus, the ‘norm-’ prefix allows us to account for what we may call ‘the norm-
constraining  intuition’,  namely,  the  intuition  that  our  rationality  assertions  and 
attributions are being constrained by norms.
This  concise  sketch  clarifies  a  bit  the  ideational  semantic  underpinnings  of 
Gibbard’s norm-expressivism and delivers its contours. But a last point is due before 
we conclude this  section.  It  is  important  not to fail  to appreciate  what motivates 
Gibbard’s  overall  norm-expressivist  project.  His  motivation  for  an  ideational  use 
semantic  strategy  and  a  norm-expressivist  account  of  the  semantics  of  moral 
rationality  springs  from  his  strong  commitment  to  methodological  naturalism. 
Gibbard, as a philosopher with methodologically naturalistic orientation, intends to 
firmly situate the genus of rationality (and the species of moral rationality) in nature. 
He wants to understand in thoroughly naturalistic terms how we, human animals, 
have possibly come to be the animals with the marvellous practical and cognitive 
capacities we have. 
To that effect, he also speculates about the naturalistic origins of our capacity for 
norm-endorsement.  His intriguing speculations suggest that the human capacity to 
‘accept  or  endorse norms’  has  been  the  product  of  biological  adaptation  through 
Darwinian  natural  selection159.  This  capacity  has  been  adapted  through  natural 
159  Gibbard’s (1990: 29-30, 256) invocation of evolutionary theory is subtle. He is well aware of the 
complexities surrounding evolutionary theory and his approach cannot be seen, I think, as a form of 
crude adaptationism. 
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selection for serving a certain evolutionary advantageous functional purpose. 
The functional purpose of our capacity for judgemental endorsement of norms is 
to coordinate interpersonal interaction in a way that would enhance our reproductive 
success and survival chances.  It is to coordinate  social  life and cooperation often 
with mutual benefit for the persons involved. In line with this thoroughly naturalistic 
picture,  Gibbard also speculates  about  the evolutionary origins  of our  ‘emotional 
propensities’,  often  involved  in  expressing  our  attitudes  of  norm-endorsement. 
According to Gibbard, they are largely the consequence of our evolutionary history 
and had been adapted to function as social lubricants that regulate coordination and 
guide social co-operation.
Now,  my  intention  in  this  chapter  6  is  to  borrow  Gibbard’s  (1990)  norm-
expressivist  framework  for  moral  discourse  and  with  some  twists  apply  it  to 
epistemic discourse and, in particular, to epistemic justification which is the specific 
object  of  my inquiry.  I  will  use it  as  an approach to  ‘the  epistemic  justification 
puzzle’ and explore what explanatory fruit such an approach could reap. 
It should be made clear, however, that as far as the question of the origins of our 
capacity for norm-endorsement is concerned, I won’t mimic Gibbard’s evolutionary 
speculations and choose to demur. It would have been deeply interesting to parallel 
Gibbard’s  speculations  about  the  evolutionary  origins  of  our  capacity  for  moral 
norm-endorsement and speculate about the evolutionary origins of our capacity of 
epistemic norm-endorsement, but this parallel would lead us too far from what the 
scope of this work allows. 
The  idea,  though,  is  bold  and  challenging  and  not  obviously  misguided  or 
incoherent.  Indeed, there are philosophers who speculate along those evolutionary 
lines  like R.Millikan (2003),  D.Papineau (2003) and,  also,  Gibbard’s (2003) own 
later  work  on  epistemic  plan-reliance  expressivism fits  nicely  in  such  a  context. 
Unfortunately,  I  will  have  to  forgo  here  the  chance  for  speculative  evolutionary 
ruminations on our capacity for norm-endorsement and will remain neutral about its 
provenance. 
With Gibbard’s (1990) norm-expressivist semantics about rationality sketched, in 
the  next  section  we apply  a  version  of  norm-expressivist  semantics  to  epistemic 
justification discourse.
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6.4 From Moral Norm-Expressivism to Epistemic Norm-Expressivism
In  this  section  I  apply  a  version  of  norm-expressivist  semantics  to  epistemic 
justification discourse. This application has already been executed by H.Field (2000, 
2009),  though,  Field  executes  the  application  towards  what  he  (2009)  calls  ‘an 
expressivist relativist’ direction that, for reasons I shall explain, I resist here. This 
also marks  a departure  from Gibbard’s own gloss of the theory because Gibbard 
(1990), like other early expressivists, took normative discourses to be non-truth-apt 
and this seems to imply sliding to a form of relativism that, as I said, I want to resist. 
In the footsteps of Gibbard, the norm-expressivist proposal starts from the claim 
that a  referential semantic strategy as an approach to the meaning of justification 
assertions  and  attributions  is  misguided.  As  a  result,  the  ‘referential  semantics 
assumption’  (P2)  is  false  and  this  is  the  way  out  of  the  puzzle.  When  we  use 
justification  assertions  and  attributions  we  don’t  purport  to  refer  to  a  certain 
epistemic justification property (natural or nonnatural). 
Despite  the  surface-level  referential  pretensions  of  justification  assertions  and 
attributions, the semantic function of such normative sentences is not referential at 
all. What is being said when we express normative sentences should not be allowed 
to deceive and misguide us. Instead, the semantic function of normative sentences is 
expressive of a noncognitive and nonreferential mental state. The real meaning of 
such sentences lies at the bottom-level of what is being implicated. As a result, we 
should neither strive to reduce the notion of epistemic justification to necessary and 
sufficient conditions nor postulate a sui generis property of epistemic justification. 
We should not postulate the existence of an epistemic justification property at all.
Rather, it suggests that we should employ an ideational ‘use semantic strategy’ for 
understanding  the meaning of  justification  assertions  and attributions.  This  is  the 
paramount  dialectical  manoeuvre  for  building  a  theory  of  semantics  for  such 
sentences.  We  should  start  with  how  epistemic  justification  assertions  and 
attributions are actually being used in ordinary discourse. The idea is that the actual 
use of such sentences in ordinary discourse will reveal to us what determines the 
meaning of these sentences.
Following Gibbard (1990),  the  core ingredient  the use of  normative  sentences 
seems to reveal, and a theory of the semantics of such sentences should better take 
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seriously, is the feature of ‘endorsement’160. That is, when epistemic agents state that 
‘p is  (epistemically)  justified’  or that  ‘S justifiedly believes  that  p’ they seem to 
express some sort of general endorsement (or acceptance/approval) for the belief in 
question as being (epistemically) good. The agent seems to approve the belief as if it 
is something (epistemically) good or valuable. 
All  things  considered,  epistemic  agents  feel  that  holding  a  justified  belief  is 
something that is (epistemically)  good and praiseworthy,  something they can take 
credit  for.  This  is  because  epistemic  justification  seems  to  be  necessary  for 
knowledge (broadly construed) and, generally speaking, we think that knowledge is 
something desirable because it is (both instrumentally and finally) valuable161. 
But  with  justification  assertions  and  attributions  epistemic  agents  don’t  just 
express  endorsement  for  the  belief  simpliciter.  They  seem  to  express  ‘norm-
endorsement’. The ‘normative’ character of endorsement should be understood in the 
sense that epistemic agents implicitly endorse certain epistemic norms that license 
the belief in question. For, clearly,  by the agent’s lights not just any belief can be 
endorsed as justified. By the agent’s lights, there should be some epistemic norms 
constraining what can be taken as justified and what not. 
These comments make clear that the feature of norm-endorsement is one of the 
basic  desiderata  that  a  theory  of  the  semantics  of  justification  assertions  and 
attributions must accommodate.  This is exactly what we do. Following Gibbard’s 
(1990) norm-expressivist semantics, the core element of norm-endorsement lies at 
the very heart of this proposal and allows us to vindicate two central intuitions about 
epistemic discourse, namely, ‘the endorsement intuition’ and ‘the norm-constraining 
intuition’. That is, it allows us on the one hand, to easily capture the endorsement 
element  that  referentialist  approaches  seem to  exactly  miss,  as  we  have  already 
discussed above and seen in Chs.2-4, and on the other hand, to explain how norms 
constrain epistemic discourse (though not in the traditional realist sense). 
Taking the norm-endorsement ingredient to be the cornerstone of our approach, 
this is then a first rough and general statement of the norm-expressivist proposal. The 
160  See A.Gibbard (1990:6-10).
161  On the problems surrounding the value of knowledge see D.Pritchard (2007, 2010) and K.Kappel 
(2010). In my ‘Evolutionary Ruminations on ‘the Value of Knowledge Intuition’’ (forthcoming), I also 
provide some tentative evolutionary psychological ruminations on why we are so effortlessly inclined 
to find knowledge valuable.
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semantics of epistemic justification assertions and attributions are expressivist and 
the state of mind expressed noncognitive .i.e. attitudes of norm-endorsement. That is, 
attitudes of endorsement (or approval) of the epistemic norms that license the belief 
in question. 
When we make justification assertions and attributions we don’t purport to refer 
to  a  certain  natural  or  nonnatural  ‘epistemic  justification’  property.  Rather  we 
express nonreferential mental states, namely, noncognitive attitudes of endorsement 
for  the  norms  that  license  the  belief  as  justified.  By  analogy,  when  we  make 
unjustifiedness  claims  and  attributions  we  again  express  attitudes  of  norm-
endorsement. That is, attitudes of endorsement for the epistemic norms ruling out the 
belief from being justified. 
This rough norm-expressivist picture, obviously, implies the rejection of the key 
theoretical commitments of the referentialist positions we have examined in Chs.3-5: 
‘the  referential  semantics  assumption’,  ‘the  realist-ontological  assertion’  and ‘the 
existential assertion’. As we have seen, the assumption that justification assertions 
and attributions purport to refer to an epistemic justification property gives rise to the 
further ontological assumption that there is such a property. Realists think that there 
must be such a property because justified beliefs, inferences etc. should be justified 
in virtue of a property of epistemic justification. This is what we have called ‘the 
realist-ontological assertion’. 
Yet, as I have taken pains to argue, it seems very tricky to see what this property 
(natural or nonnatural) could ever be. For one thing, we have noted that the ‘in virtue 
of’ seems to be causal and it is not clear how such a normative property could have 
independent causal powers. The rejection of ‘the realist-ontological assertion’ seems 
to also imply the rejection of ‘the existence assertion’, namely, that there are at least 
some justified beliefs, theories etc. This implication might seem unpalatable because 
no one -perhaps with the exception of some sceptic -not just about knowledge but 
even  about  epistemic  justification-  would  welcome  such  a  conclusion.  Almost 
everyone seems to think that there are at least some justified beliefs, theories etc.. 
Besides,  even  some  sceptics  might  concede  that  scepticism  about  knowledge  is 
legitimate but not legitimate about justification162. 
162  As it is sometimes noted, there is less pressure to take scepticism about justification seriously than 
scepticism about knowledge. See R.Wedgwood (2009).
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But from the rejection of ‘the referential semantics assumption’ and ‘the realist-
ontological assertion’ the norm-expressivist insists that we should not hasten to infer 
that there are no justified beliefs. At least we should not hasten to infer that there are 
no justified beliefs in some interesting sense of ‘justified’. Admittedly, there are no 
justified beliefs in the traditional realist sense that demands a property of epistemic 
justification  in  virtue  of  which  justified  beliefs  are  being  justified.  This 
understanding  of  ‘the  existential  assertion’  we  may  call  ‘the  realist existential 
assertion’ and it is the one the realist has been assuming all along. But the norm-
expressivist can settle for an ontologically light assertion:  ‘the minimalist existential 
assertion’. Let me explain. 
As we have seen, the realist thinks that there are at least some justified beliefs (i.e. 
this is the initial ‘(realist) existential assertion’) and that in order to account for these 
we need to postulate a property of epistemic justification in virtue of which justified 
beliefs are justified. Norm-expressivism contests this claim and suggests that we can 
have justified beliefs even without any epistemic justification property. We can have 
justified belief in some interesting sense of ‘justified’, though, not in the full-blooded 
ontologically burdened sense of the realist. 
Our  justified  beliefs  etc.  will  be  justified  due  to  the  norm-governed  use  of 
justification  assertions  and  attributions,  not  due  to  the  existence  of  an  elusive 
property of epistemic justification. For the norm-expressivist, the epistemic practice 
of using justification assertions and attributions is something following from plain 
norm-governed  linguistic  activity  without  any  extra  ontological  and  meta-
epistemological baggage.
Here  is  an  example  of  such  a  minimally  justified  belief.  Suppose  I  say:  ‘I 
justifiably  believe  that  Hannibal  was  a  great  strategist’.  According  to  our  norm-
expressivist story what I express is a noncognitive attitude of endorsement of the 
epistemic norms that license this belief as justified. Many different sorts of epistemic 
norms (foundational, coherentist, virtue-based  etc.) are eligible to license this belief 
as justified but let us say for the sake of exposition that my epistemic norms are 
foundational. In that case, I express an attitude of endorsement for the foundationalist 
epistemic  norms  that  license  as  justified  my  belief  that  Hannibal  was  a  great 
strategist.
154
In the light of my foundationalist norms, I might find this belief ‘self-presenting’ 
due  to  other  background beliefs  about  what  it  takes  to  be  a  good strategist  and 
Hannibal’s military exploitations.  I might believe,  for example,  that  any strategist 
that has mastered and employed the pincer movement must have been a good one 
and  also  believe  that  Hannibal  masterfully  used  that  stratagem  at  the  battle  of 
Cannae.  Therefore,  in  the  light  of  these background beliefs  I  find the belief  that 
Hannibal was a great strategist ‘self-presenting’ and thus justified.
Of course, there might be minimally justified beliefs where the agent’s epistemic 
norms are simply fanciful and whimsical from an epistemic point of view. That is, 
from the point of view of being truth-conducive, as some agent’s epistemic norms 
might not be truth-conducive in any sense. Suppose for example that an agent makes 
justification assertions and attributions  on the basis of the epistemically irrational 
norm of blind hunches. He claims: ‘I justifiably believe that Gaius Terentius Varro 
was a great strategist’. 
According to our norm-expressivist story, he expresses an attitude of endorsement 
for the epistemic norms that license this belief, namely, the epistemic norm of blind 
hunches that licenses this belief as justified. He might think, for instance, that Gaius 
Terentius Varro is a cool-sounding name and therefore it is intuitive that he must 
have been a good strategist by all means. This is another case of a minimally justified 
belief licensed, though, by epistemic norms that are not just as truth-conducive as in 
the former example.
Having  minimally  justified  beliefs,  though,  that  permit  at  least  some of  these 
beliefs  to  be  not  truth-conducive  in  any  interesting  sense  raises  the  legitimate 
question  of  how  revisionist  is  this  norm-expressivist  conception  of  epistemic 
justification  we have  arrived  at.  That  is,  how much it  departs  from the  ordinary 
notion of epistemic justification as we have discussed it in section 2.2. 
For  as  we canvassed in  section  2.2,  a  theory of  epistemic  justification  should 
satisfy  ‘the  truth-conducivity  intuition’,  namely,  the  intuition  that  epistemic 
justification is truth-conducive as it makes beliefs likely to track the truth. Yet norm-
expressivism seems to allow that many norm-justified beliefs are not truth-conducive 
as they are being licensed by merely fanciful epistemic norms. This, at first instance, 
suggests that minimally justified beliefs  are not really justified as justified beliefs 
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should be truth-conducive and at least many minimally justified beliefs are not to be 
considered truth-conducive.
This  is  a  serious  challenge  for  norm-expressivism as  it  threatens  to  provide  a 
theory  of  epistemic  justification  too  revisionary  for  what  our  ordinary  notion  of 
epistemic justification allows. One direction of response here is to bite the bullet like 
H.Field (2009) and appeal to a norm-relative conception of truth and be a happy 
‘expressivist relativist’, as he says. But I think this response is inadequate for two 
reasons.
 First,  it  departs  from  what  we  seem  to  mean  when  we  make  justification 
assertions and attributions,  as ordinary normative  discourse is  pervasively realist-
seeming. When we make justification assertions and attributions we seem to do so 
from a realist standpoint, namely, we seem to imply that there is a fact about what is 
justified and what is not. Relativism, therefore, seems to be too revisionary for one 
like  me  that  takes  realist-seeming  intuitions  seriously  and  wants  ‘to  save  the 
epistemic phenomena’. 
The second point follows, really, from the first. If we want to capture our realist 
intuitions about justification discourse but seem to meet difficulties, as we have seen 
in chs.2-5, then maybe we can capture these intuitions from the inside out with the 
antirealist  standpoint  of  expressivism.  Indeed,  this  is  what  many  proponents  of 
expressivism think is its great promise, namely, to account for our realist standpoint 
in normative discourse in an antirealist fashion163. Gibbard (2003), for example, goes 
as  far  as  to  mimic  Kant  and  talk  of  expressivism  as  effecting  ‘a  Copernican 
revolution’  to  philosophy  because  he  thinks  expressivism can  explain  the  realist 
seemings of normative discourse in an antirealist framework164.
 Based  on  these  considerations,  a  better  response,  I  think,  is  to  build  on  the 
broadly social, interpersonal realm. We could suggest that minimally justified beliefs 
that  are based on irrational,  non-truth-conducive norms can be criticized from an 
interpersonal,  social  point  of  view.  Agents  employing  irrational  norms  like 
premonitions, hunches, lucky guesses etc. are to be castigated from the social point 
of view because these norms can’t function as a means to the social good of truth. 
Instead,  coherentist,  foundational,  virtue-based  etc.  norms  that,  although  do  not 
163  See S.Blackburn (1993, 1998), M.Timmons (1999) and A.Gibbard (2003).
164  Austin (1962: 3-4) is equally enthusiastic and talks of ‘…producing a revolution in philosophy’.
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reduce epistemic justification, can often function as a means to truth are to be praised 
and encouraged. There is more to be said about this aspect of epistemic justification 
discourse but  this  is  sufficient  for  present  purposes.  I  will  return  to  the  issue of 
epistemic improvement in the next chapter 7 when I will introduce my proposal.
A last point remains before we pass to the next section. As I said in section 6.1, 
Gibbard (1990) (like Ayer and Austin) took normative discourse to be non-truth-apt. 
Normative  sentences  are  not  to  be  assigned truth-conditions  and be  evaluated  in 
terms of truth and falsity. Yet, as I have already hinted in section 6.1, there are deep 
philosophical  reasons to avert  us from such a move.  I  need not expand on these 
reasons  here  but  a  key one  is  that  if  we are  to  hope  to  account  for  the  logical 
properties of normative sentences as found embedded in unasserted truth-functional 
contexts (conditionals, disjunctions etc.), then we require some sort of expressivist-
friendly account of truth for normative discourse. 
Gibbard (2003) himself in later work recants from taking normative discourse to 
be non-truth-apt and follows Blackburn’s (1993, 1998) appeal to minimalism about 
truth and his so-called program of ‘quasi-realism’. The ‘quasi-realism’ idea is that we 
can have normative realism in an antirealist fashion, that is, without the ontological 
and  epistemological  package  of  the  realist  that  seems  to  have  the  familiar  dire 
consequences.  Hence,  the  ‘quasi-’  prefix  on realism.  In  this  way,  Blackburn  and 
Gibbard  suggest  we  can  take  normative  discourse  to  be  truth-apt  and  therefore 
evaluable in terms of truth and falsity, even if as antirealists-expressivists we don’t 
postulate normative properties.
I  won’t  expand much on how we could rescue normative truth in such a use-
theoretic  framework  but  I  can  hint  that  one  approach  that  seems  prima  facie 
appealing to me comes from R.Brandom (2000). Brandom has argued that we can 
ground normative  truth  and objectivity  on the  social  level,  at  the  level  of  social 
articulation of reasons for or against a normative claim. As I understand him, his idea 
is that normative truth is something that is being born at the social level where the 
transaction of reasons takes place. As such, normative truth is the outcome of a social 
and  historical  process  and  takes  time  and  argument  to  crystallize  and  show  up. 
Similar ideas in some respect are being suggested by Blackburn (1998: 200-212), 
though,  Blackburn is  inclined  to trace the idea of grounding normative  truth and 
157
objectivity at the social level to A.Smith and D.Hume while Brandom back to Hegel.
 For example, ‘slavery is wrong’ or ‘heliocentricism is justified’ are normative 
claims that came to be seen as undoubtedly true because of a social and historical 
process that took time and argument. Reasons for and against were given and in time, 
as passions and prejudices subsided, it became clear that the reasons for had by far 
the upper  hand.  A convinced realist  might  object  here that  this  is  no better  than 
social-cultural relativism but I will leave the issue at this point. All I mean to make 
explicit  here is that  I don’t follow Gibbard’s jettison of normative truth and I do 
acknowledge  the  need  for  an  expressivist-friendly  account  of  truth.  How  this  is 
exactly to be achieved it remains to be explored and hopefully to be shown. 
Admittedly,  it  is not immediately evident that such an antirealist conception of 
normative truth will be in the end defensible nor that it won’t be as there is fierce 
disagreement surrounding ‘truth debates’ but, in any event, it is good to make clear 
what commitments our approach needs to take aboard.  Whether it  can eventually 
discharge these commitments is an independent question165.  
With the emulation step now completed, in the next section 6.5 I step forward to 
examine how our ‘toy’ norm-expressivist theory can easily evade the referentialists’ 
discontents and, therefore, motivate the possibility of an expressivist approach to the 
epistemic justification discourse. 
6.5 Motivating Expressivism: How Expressivism Can Evade Referentialist 
Problems
 As we already said in section 6.1, the expressivist approach to ‘the epistemic 
justification puzzle’ seems to easily evade the referentialists’ problems we presented 
in the critical Chs.2 -5 and this motivates the possibility of an expressivist approach 
to epistemic justification discourse. I will here use our version of norm-expressivism 
as a ‘toy’  theory in order to explain how the expressivist theory can evade these 
problems. As I said, this is just for the sake of expounding how expressivist theories 
can evade the referentialists’ discontents. 
First,  contra  the  analytic  naturalistic  reductionist,  norm-expressivism seems  to 
explain the existence of Moorean/Humean ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions that thwart 
165  Some people argue that it can’t. See Kvanvig (2003), Cuneo (2007) Lynch (2008). But for 
expressivist responses see K.Kappel (ms) and M.Crisman and A.Carter (ms).
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attempts to reduce the notion of epistemic justification to a natural  property.  The 
norm-expressivist suggests that the existence of our Moorean/Humean intuitions can 
be  best explained as due to the inexistence of such a property. There is no natural 
property capable of reducing epistemic justification and, hence, the notion should be 
considered  to  be  unanalyzable.  For  the  expressivist,  justification  assertions  and 
attributions do not purport to refer to such a property at all. They express attitudes of 
norm-endorsement and this follows from the plain norm-governed use of epistemic 
concepts in ordinary linguistic activity.
Second,  contra  the  synthetic  naturalistic  reductionist  and  the  epistemic  kinds 
realist (under a naturalistic reading), it seems to explain ‘the epistemic twin earth’ 
semantic intuitions that twhart attempts to either reduce epistemic justification to a 
natural kind or postulate it as a natural ‘epistemic kind’. For the norm-expressivist, 
our persistent  ‘open feel’  semantic  intuitions can be  best explained as due to the 
inexistence of such a natural kind or a natural ‘epistemic kind’ property of epistemic 
justification.  This  is  why  our  ‘open  feel’  semantic  intuitions  persist  unabated 
independently of whether we talk of reduction by semantic analysis,  reduction by 
appeal to a natural kind or reduction by an elusive natural ‘epistemic kind’. 
Third, contra the nonnaturalist, the norm-expressivist approach seems to avoid the 
triumvirate of its  discontents.  On the one hand, it  seems to provide a naturalistic 
account  of  epistemic  justification  and  thus  eschews  ‘the  epistemic  access’  and 
‘queerness’  problems  that  beset  nonnaturalist  approaches.  For  the  expressivist, 
justification assertions and attributions do not purport to refer to a ‘queer’ sui generis 
property of epistemic justification. They assert that there is no such ‘queer’ property 
and  take  justification  assertions  and  attributions  to  express  attitudes  of  norm-
endorsement. 
Equally,  for  the  expressivist  there  is  no  special  cognitive  faculty  of  rational 
intuition tracking the property of being justified as instantiated by beliefs, theories 
etc.. All we have as human beings are conceptual powers, bestowed to us through 
language  acquisition  in  the  social  setting  of  a  community  and  these  conceptual 
powers enable us to express our attitudes by means of using words and sentences. In 
the case of justification assertions and attributions sentences, we express our attitudes 
of norm-endorsement, that is, our attitudes of endorsement for norms that license the 
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belief in question as justified. 
In addition, contra nonnaturalist approaches, norm-expressivism seems to explain 
the ‘epistemic supervenience desideratum’. As it is often pointed out, and as we have 
seen, any theory of the semantics of epistemic discourse must explain how epistemic 
properties  (e.g.  being  epistemically  justified  or  being  epistemically  rational) 
supervene  on  non-epistemic,  natural  properties  (e.g.  coherence,  self-presentation 
etc.)166.  That  is,  how two  distinct  but  naturalistically  identical  situations  (that  is, 
sharing  the  very  same  natural  properties)  cannot  realize  different  epistemic 
properties. In slogan form, there can be no epistemic difference without a natural 
difference. 
To  contest  supervenience  is  to  accept  that  there  could  be  a  possible  scenario 
where two distinct but naturalistically identical situations realize different epistemic 
properties;  something  that  appears  absurd.  For  example,  in  two  distinct  but 
naturalistically identical situations, if in the first situation natural facts (fingerprints, 
eyewitnesses’ testimony, motives etc.) justify the belief that there has been murder 
then in the other situation it would have been absurd to think that the same natural 
facts justify, instead, the belief that there has been suicide.  
One  way  to  explain  epistemic  supervenience  is  in  the  ontological  terms  just 
formulated above, despite the fact  that for the expressivist  there are no epistemic 
properties.  The  expressivist  could  still  ‘speak  with  the  vulgar’  as  if  there  are 
epistemic  properties  and  suggest  that  two  distinct  but  naturalistically  identical 
situations should not differ in terms of realization of epistemic properties. For the 
expressivist,  if  the situations are naturalistically identical  then the epistemic agent 
should  express  the  same  epistemic  evaluation.  Otherwise,  he  would  breach  the 
supervenience desideratum and be charged with irrationality167. 
A better way for the expressivist to explain epistemic supervenience is to follow 
R.Hare (1952) and A.Gibbard (2003) and spell out the notion of supervenience in 
terms of concepts, not properties168.  This approach would allow us to sidestep the 
gratuitous invocation of the Humean notion of ‘speaking with the vulgar’ about an 
epistemic justification property. 
166  See J.Kim( 2008); R.Feldman (2001); H.Vahid (2005).
167  See M.Ridge (2003) for taking this line of an expressivist explanation of moral supervenience.
168  This is what J.Klagge (1988) has called ‘ascriptive’ instead of ‘ontological supervenience’.
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According  to  this  concepts-based  conception  of  epistemic  supervenience, 
supervenience  constrains  how  we  should  use epistemic  concepts  and  not  how 
epistemic properties are realized, as for the expressivist there are no such properties. 
If two distinct situations are found to be naturalistically identical then, our epistemic 
evaluation should be the same in both situations. Otherwise, our use and application 
of epistemic concepts will threaten to verge on the irrational and arbitrary for the 
reasons just explained above.
In  conclusion,  expressivism  easily  outflanks  the  referentialists’  problems  we 
identified in Chs.2-5 and this shows that expressivism is an approach that we should 
take seriously. Expressivism has certain important explanatory advantages compared 
to theoretical competitors that entitle one to pursue it in good hope.
6.6 Conclusion and Summary of the Argument 
This chapter 6 had a twofold dialectical purpose: to introduce the basic ideas of 
the semantic program of expressivism and motivate the possibility of an expressivist 
approach to the epistemic justification discourse by means of showing how a ‘toy’ 
version of norm-expressivism could easily evade the problems that have made the 
life of referentialist approaches so hard in the chs.2-5. In section 6.2, I introduced the 
basic ideas of the semantic programme of expressivism. As I said, unlike current 
orthodoxy  in  semantics  which  is  referential  and  truth-conditional,  expressivists 
explain the meaning of sentences in terms of the mental content expressed by the 
speaker  in  the  light  of  sociolinguistic  conventions.  Mental  content  thus  is 
semantically  primary  and  accounts  for  linguistic  content  too.  Thought  explains 
language, if you want, and not vice versa.
In section 6.3, I introduced the key ideas of A.Gibbard’s norm-expressivism for 
moral  rationality  discourse and in section 6.4 applied  it  to  epistemic  justification 
discourse. Unlike Gibbard (1990) himself who said that rationality discourses are not 
truth-apt and H.Field (2009) who has taken norm-expressivism to be a norm-relative 
theory I have suggested that expressivism could legitimately aspire to cling to our 
realist intuitions, though, in an antirealist fashion. To that effect,  I have hinted to 
R.Brandom’s  (2000)  grounding of  objectivity  to the social  realm of  the game of 
giving and asking reasons for our claims.
Finally, in section 6.5 I motivated the possibility of expressivism by explaining 
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how our toy expressivist theory can evade the problems of the referentialist theories 
we have witnessed in chapters 2-5. As I have explained our toy norm-expressivism 
can account for our Moorean/Humean ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions inherent in ‘the 
Moorean/Humean lesson’ and ‘the epistemic twin earth lesson’, evade ‘the epistemic 
access’ and ‘queerness’ problems for the nonnaturalist and, in addition, account for 
‘the epistemic supervenience desideratum’ that nonnaturalists fail to accomodate.
The ability of expressivism to evade the problems of the referentialists so easily 
motivates  the  conceptual  exploration  of  an  expressivist  approach  to  epistemic 
justification discourse and more generally the normative domain. For if expressivism 
can  reap  this  explanatory  fruit  so  easily  that  other  theories  struggle  with,  then 
expressivism is a potentially promising approach that needs to be explored to some 
depth. 
In the next chapter 7 I do exactly this. I explore how an original version of norm-
expressivism about epistemic justification discourse should go. The original version 
of norm-expressivism I arrive at I call ‘habits-endorsement expressivism’. I motivate 
this new version of norm-expressivism by means of arguing that it can evade two 
identified  problems  for  a  plan-reliance  expressivist  approach  to  justification 
discourse  while  also  embrace  the  virtues  of  both  norm-expressivism  and  plan-
reliance  expressivism.  Let  us  now turn  to  this  more  constructive  task of  theory-
building.  
162
Chapter 7 The Possibility of Habits-Endorsement 
Expressivism
7.1 Introduction
As we have argued in Ch.6, our ‘toy’ version of norm-expressivism easily evades 
the referentialist’s puzzling problems and this motivates the possibility of a broadly 
expressivist approach to ‘the epistemic justification puzzle’. At least, it motivates a 
conceptual exploration of an expressivist approach in good hope that this will prove 
both  interesting  and  explanatory  fruitful.  Yet,  even  if  we  grant  that  a  broadly 
expressivist  approach to  the  puzzle  should be explored  in  good hope,  it  remains 
unclear  what sort  of expressivist  story should that  be,  as a number  of competing 
expressivist approaches to epistemic discourse can be found in the recent literature169. 
From a  methodological  point  of  view,  no  doubt,  the  best  expressivist  theory 
should be the one that is the most explanatorily fruitful in -by fiat of Occam’s razor- 
the most simple and economic way possible. So, what we need is an expressivist 
theory that not only evades the referentialists’ problems but also explains more key 
intuitions  about  epistemic  justification  discourse than its  competitors  in  the most 
simple and economic way possible.  That is, it  explains intuitions that seem to be 
interwoven in the way we make justification assertions and attributions. 
This is  what I  intend to explore in the current  chapter.  I  intend to explore an 
expressivist  approach to epistemic justification discourse that not only evades the 
referentialists’  problems  but  also  promises  to  account  for  key  intuitions  about 
epistemic discourse that at least some other prominent expressivist theories do not. 
This hopeful new expressivist theory I call ‘habits-endorsement expressivism’ and it 
is in reality an enhanced version of early Gibbard’s (1990) norm-expressivism.
But as I can’t pursue at length here a comparative analysis of my proposal with all 
these expressivist theories, I will provide some motivation for my proposal by means 
of showing how it can evade some identified problems of A.Gibbard’s (2003, 2008) 
more recent plan-reliance expressivism. Or, to be accurate, A.Gibbard’s plan-reliance 
169  See A.Gibbard (2003; 2008), H.Field (2000; 2009), M.Chrisman (2007), M.Ridge (2007b), 
K.Kappel (2010; ms).
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expressivism as extended to cover epistemic justification discourse. As we have seen 
in  Ch.6,  early  Gibbard  (1990)  had  advocated  norm-expressivism  about  moral 
rationality discourse that has been relatively influential.  Yet, in later  work (2003, 
2008) he went on to develop a different, plan-reliance form of expressivism for both 
moral  and knowledge discourse and there are  good reasons to  suspect  that  plan-
reliance  expressivism,  even  if  it  works  for  knowledge  discourse,  it  cannot  be 
transposed to epistemic justification discourse with impunity. 
It cannot be transposed to epistemic justification discourse with impunity because, 
even  on  the  (controversial)  assumption  that  we  have  so  far  strived  to  motivate, 
namely,  that  epistemic  justification  discourse  is  to  have  an  expressivist  semantic 
treatment, this theory faces problems that undercut its prima facie promise. Instead, 
as  I  will  suggest,  the  old  norm-expressivist  version  of  expressivism  with  some 
helpful tweaks can do much better in regard to these problems. Let me explain.
On the one hand, plan-reliance expressivism was introduced by Gibbard (2003, 
2008) as a theory of the semantics of knowledge discourse and not the justification 
discourse and the problem is that, even if we grant the (controversial) assumption 
that  it  does  work  for  knowledge  discourse,  this  approach  runs  into  direct 
counterexamples that impede extension to epistemic justification discourse170. 
The  problem  is  that  Gibbard’s  plan-reliance  expressivism  suggests  that 
knowledge assertions and attributions express plans of reliance, namely, plans to rely 
on the belief in question and this seems clearly mistaken when applied to epistemic 
justification discourse. It seems clearly mistaken because we often attribute justified 
belief but do not plan to rely on this belief because we take it to be, nonetheless, 
false.  Such  cases  constitute  counterexamples  to  plan-reliance  expressivism  and 
impede extension  of  application  from knowledge to  justification  discourse.  Thus, 
plan-reliance  expressivism as  an  approach  to  the  semantics  of  overall  epistemic 
discourse remains incomplete, as it can’t extend to cover an important segment: the 
epistemic justification discourse. 
On  the  other  hand,  Gibbard’s  plan-reliance  expressivism  when  applied  to 
epistemic justification discourse also does not seem to account in any direct sense for 
170  See M.Ridge (2007a) for criticism of Gibbard’s (2003) plan-reliance expressivism for knowledge 
discourse.
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a  key  intuition  of  epistemic  discourse:  ‘the  nonvoluntarism  intuition’171.  The 
nonvoluntarism  intuition  draws  support  from  everyday  doxastic  experience  to 
suggest that (justified) belief-fixation is not subject to direct voluntary control. We 
can’t  choose  at  will  what  (justified)  beliefs  to  form as  (justified)  belief-fixation 
seems to be nonvoluntary.  But plan-reliance expressivism is build on the notion of 
normative plans of reliance, which has strong voluntary connotations, and this seems 
to  suggest  that  we can  choose our  epistemic  plans,  namely,  plans  about  what  to 
believe and rely on. Yet, this is something that the voluntarism intuition denies and 
plan-reliance expressivism seems to defy the intuition without an explanation. 
However, in spite of these problems things are not all that bleak for expressivists. 
The  good  news  is  that  philosophers  sympathetic  to  expressivist  approaches  to 
epistemic discourse should see no reason to despair in the face of these problems 
because, arguably, we could have the best of both worlds. That is, we could have an 
expressivist theory that both keeps the attractions of early and late Gibbardian stories 
while  at  the  same  time  avoids  the  problems  of  plan-reliance  expressivism  just 
mentioned above. Or at least this is what I will argue for here. 
I open the discussion with Gibbard’s (2003, 2008) plan-reliance expressivism for 
knowledge discourse and then outline how it would look like if it were extended to 
cover  the  epistemic  justification  discourse.  I  then  explain  how  plan-reliance 
expressivism runs into direct counterexamples and remains incomplete as an overall 
theory of the semantics of epistemic discourse whilst it also does not account for the 
nonvoluntarism intuition.
The final step will be to constructively synthesize insights in an original version 
of norm-expressivism that,  on the one hand, captures what is  attractive in norm-
expressivism and plan-reliance expressivism and, on the other hand, outflanks the 
problems plan-reliance expressivism meets when applied to epistemic justification 
discourse. At the core of the proposal will be laid the notion of epistemic habits, as 
exploiting  this  versatile  and  pregnant  notion  will  allow  us  to  both  outflank  the 
counterexamples  plan-reliance  expressivism  encounters  and  account  for  the 
nonvoluntarism intuition.
171  Often called ‘the involuntarism intuition’ in the literature. I prefer the ‘nonvoluntarism’ to the 
‘involuntarism’ label because it does not invite the thought that one believes against his will, as talk of 
‘involuntarism’ does.
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Just to provide a first glimpse of the core of habits-endorsement expressivism for 
the anxious, it will suggest that justification attributions of the form ‘S justifiedly 
believes that p’ express that: 
(a) S believes that p and
(b) Endorsement of the habits of belief-fixation in virtue of which S believes that 
p where these habits employ and are constrained by certain epistemic norms –even if 
the attributor has no clear, nuanced idea of what these epistemic habits and norms are 
or involve.
This  provides  a  dense  introduction  of  how the  dialectic  of  the  argument  will 
unfold and offers a forward glimpse to our positive proposal. In schematic form, this 
is  how  the  argument  of  the  chapter  will  go.  In  section  7.2  I  briefly  introduce 
Gibbard’s (2003, 2008) plan-reliance expressivism and explain its problems when 
extended to epistemic justification discourse. In section 7.3, I introduce the positive 
proposal in some detail  and then in section 7.4 explain how the proposed habits-
endorsement expressivism can both account for what seems attractive in these two 
theories  and,  at  the  same  time,  evade  the  identified  problems  of  plan-reliance 
expressivism and thus come out as the most explanatorily fruitful. In section 7.5 I 
add some more touches to our sketch of habits-endorsement expressivism and in 7.6 
quickly consider two anticipated objections and gesture towards directions possible 
answers might go. Finally, in section 7.7 I conclude and preview the argument of the 
chapter.
Let  us  now  turn  to  the  introduction  of  plan-reliance  expressivism  and  the 
identification of its problems.
7.2 Two Problems of Plan-Reliance Expressivism
Roughly, Gibbard’s (2003, 2008) plan-reliance expressivism for normative (moral 
and  knowledge)  discourses  suggests  that  normative  claims  like  assertions  and 
attributions are ‘plan-laden’, that is, express ‘contingency plans’. Contingency plans 
are ‘determinations’ about what to do and what to believe for expected or merely 
hypothetical  scenarios, as Gibbard (2003:53) says.   Idealizing somewhat,  Gibbard 
(2003:53-5) also suggests that  ‘a maximal contingency plan’ (or ‘hyperplan’)  is a 
plan about what to do or what to believe in every conceivable circumstance.
 In particular, for moral discourse he suggests that we express plans about the 
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thing to do. For example, to say that ‘Murder is wrong’ is to express your plan not to 
murder people. Or to say that ‘Caesar did the right the thing when he crossed the 
Rubicon’ is to express your plan to do the same if the circumstances ever present the 
same  (or  analogous)  challenges.  In  later  work,  he  (2008:  16-7)  adds  some more 
touches on this account and suggests that moral discourse does not just express plans 
about  what  to  do but  also sentiments.  Plans are  expressed with some ‘emotional 
flavour’, as he puts it. To say, for example, that an act is wrong is to express your 
plan not to engage in such acts and feel that the act merits resentment by others and 
guilt on behalf of the perpetrator.
In  the  case  of  knowledge  discourse,  things  are  slightly  different  as  Gibbard 
becomes  more  specific  about  the  kind  of  plans  we  express.  He  suggests  that 
knowledge discourse expresses plans of reliance.  Gibbard (2003:227) suggests that 
knowledge assertions and attributions express noncognitive plans of reliance on the 
belief in question. For instance the knowledge assertion, ‘I know that p’ expresses a 
noncognitive  plan to  rely on this  belief  as if  I  put trust  on it.  Again,  knowledge 
attributions  like  ‘S  knows  that  p’  express  a  noncognitive  plan  to  rely  on  S’s 
judgement, namely, the belief that p as if p is something that I put trust on.
Now, initially, one might naturally think that this plan-reliance expressivist theory 
could extend to cover epistemic justification discourse as well. This would mean that 
justification assertions and attributions express plans of reliance. For example, to say 
that ‘S justifiably believes that p’ is to express your plan to rely on S’ judgement that 
p if circumstances ever present the chance. You plan to rely on p as if you put trust 
on it and allow it to inform your actions. That is, if the circumstances ever present 
the chance, you can use p as a means-belief to the satisfaction of your end-desires172.
Such a transposition of plan-reliance expressivism from knowledge to epistemic 
justification discourse might prima facie seem promising as, like norm-expressivism 
we have encountered in Ch.6, plan-reliance discourse has certain attractions as an 
expressivist  theory.  On  the  one  hand,  as  an  expressivist  story  it  can  avoid  the 
referentialists’ problems in a way analogous with our ‘toy’ norm-expressivist theory 
in Ch.6. I need not expand on how it can avoid the referentialists’ problems and be 
dull and repetitive, as it  is easy to follow how in an analogous way plan-reliance 
172  I assume here a mainstream Humean approach to action as it is found in M.Smith (1994) and 
D.Davidson (2001).
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expressivism can accomplish that.
 On the other hand, it explains ‘the reliance intuition’, that is, the strong intuition 
that normative sentences express attitudes of reliance. Normative sentences like ‘p is 
good or rational’  or ‘p is justified’ or ‘I know that p’ seem to express, as Austin 
(1961) has pointed out, trust and guarantee for this claim as if the speaker stakes his 
reputation for that claim. The speaker expresses his trust to this course of action or 
certain belief and suggests that he intends to rely on this possible course of action or 
belief if the circumstances ever demand it. 
But despite its attractions, plan-reliance expressivism as an approach to epistemic 
justifiation discourse seems to have problems we have already foreshadowed in the 
introductory  section  7.1.  To  come  to  the  point,  according  to  Gibbard  (2003) 
knowledge assertions and attributions express attitudes of plan-reliance, that is, plans 
to  rely  on  the  belief  in  question  and  the  extension  of  this  account  to  epistemic 
justification discourse seems to run into a serious problem from the start. 
The problem is this: trivially, given that epistemic justification entails fallibility, 
justification attribution discourse includes attribution of justified belief even in cases 
where we think the belief is false. But then, intuitively, if we are rational we won’t 
plan to rely on this belief and this seems a clear counterexample to the plan-reliance 
analysis  of  justification  discourse.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  the  plan-reliance 
understanding  of  justification  attributions  cannot  make  sense  of  this  important 
segment of justification discourse. Let me elaborate in more detail.  
While knowledge assertions and attributions are factive and entail truth and non-
falsity, justification assertions and attributions are fallible and do not entail truth and 
non-falsity173.  You may very well  attribute  a justified  belief  to someone and still 
think that the belief is false while it seems counterintuitive to attribute knowledge 
and still think the belief is false. For if you believe that the belief in question is false 
then you won’t attribute knowledge in the first place. You might of course attribute 
knowledge claim like ‘S claims to know that p’ but this is a different matter as we 
can attribute knowledge claims and still think that the belief in question is false and S 
173  The  different  constraints  on  knowledge  and  justification  discourses  are  nicely spelled  out  in 
K.Kappel’s (2010; ms) distinction between knowledge-norms (i.e. ‘k-norms’) and justification-norms 
(i.e. ‘j-norms’). Also, most epistemologists think that knowledge although entails truth is fallible e.g. 
T.Williamson (2000), J.Greco (2003), D.Pritchard (2010). If this is the case then this could be seen as 
a problem for fallibilism about knowledge. At any event, this is beyond the point in discussion here.
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doesn’t really know.
The problem that impedes extension of plan-reliance from knowledge discourse to 
epistemic justification discourse is straightforward. The problem is that even if we 
grant  the  controversial  assumption  that  plan-reliance  expressivism  is  the  right 
expressivist  theory  for  knowledge  discourse,  clearly,  it  cannot  successfully  carry 
over  to  justification  discourse.  For,  unlike  knowledge attributions,  we can  easily 
attribute justified belief but not plan to rely on it because we think is false. At least if 
we are rational agents, we won’t plan to rely on a belief we think is false. 
For example, think of the stranded tourist who asks a local for the whereabouts of 
the museum but the informant intentionally lies to the tourist because he is a sadistic 
person that maliciously takes pleasure in others people trouble. Now, if we approve 
of the epistemic practice of asking seemingly trustworthy agents for information but 
still know that in this case the luckless stranded tourist has been misinformed, we 
would be inclined to attribute justified belief to the tourist but don’t plan to rely on it 
because we know is false. We would have said something like ‘S justifiedly believes 
that p but still p is false’. 
Such cases of justified belief attribution constitute direct counterexamples to any 
attempt  to  extend  plan-reliance  expressivism to  epistemic  justification  discourse. 
Thus, even if plan-reliance expressivism works for knowledge discourse –which is 
far  from  obvious  that  it  does-  it  can’t  be  transposed  to  epistemic  justification 
discourse  for  sure.  It  can’t  explain  our  epistemic  practice  of  attributing  justified 
belief that, nonetheless, we take to be false. If this diagnosis is right, then we need an 
expressivist  theory  of  epistemic  justification  discourse  that  can  account  for  our 
epistemic  practice  of  attributing  justifyied  belief  but  not  planning  to  rely  on  it 
because we also think that the belief is false. Plan-reliance expressivism won’t do. 
As if  this  problem wasn’t  enough, plan-reliance  expressivism owes us a  story 
about  ‘the  nonvoluntarism  intuition’.  That  is,  as  any  other  theory  of  epistemic 
justification,  it  owes  us  a  story  of  how  (justified)  belief-fixation  is  not  directly 
voluntary. The nonvoluntarism intuition is widely held among epistemologists and, 
yet, norm-expressivism says nothing about how to account for this strong intuition174. 
Let  me  explain.  The  nonvoluntarism  intuition  suggests  that  we  can’t  voluntarily 
174  For the nonvoluntarism intuition see B.Williams (1973), R.Feldman (2001b), R.Audi (2001), 
D.Owens (2003), W.Alston (2005) and D.Hume (1986). 
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come to form (justified) beliefs. We can’t form justified beliefs or, indeed, any other 
beliefs at will as belief-fixation seems to be directly nonvoluntary. We find ourselves 
either  forming  beliefs  or  with  already unconsciously  formed  beliefs  as  we don’t 
choose in any direct sense what to believe. 
That  belief-fixation  is  directly  nonvoluntary  can  be  easily  illustrated  with  a 
simple, instantaneous psychological ‘experiment’. Just try, intentionally, to choose to 
form a novel belief  that you have no clue about its truth-value like,  for instance, 
‘There are exactly 100 species of sharks’ or a novel belief you think is unjustified or 
even plain false,  say,  ‘The capital  of Nepal is Edinburgh’.  Why this  novel belief 
should  be  one  that  we  have  no  clue  about  its  truth-value  or  one  we  think  is 
unjustified or even plain false will be explained in a moment. 
If I may generalize from how this little ‘experiment’  strikes me, it seems that, 
sincerely,  no  matter  how  hard  we  try,  we  can’t  form  these  beliefs.  We  can’t 
voluntarily come to the mental state of believing these propositions. Even if there is a 
prize or bonus on the task of really believing such propositions and, therefore, we 
desperately want to form the belief and try to motivate ourselves to do so in order to 
win the prize, it seems that we can’t. If this diagnosis is right, then the philosophical 
moral  of  our  little  psychological  experiment  is  that  belief-fixation  is  not  directly 
voluntary. It just seems that for what human (epistemic) psychology allows belief-
fixation is not open to direct choice. 
At this point someone might object that this conclusion is a bit too quick as there 
are  at  least  some cases  where we do directly  choose what  to believe175.  Possible 
candidates for directly voluntary belief-fixation might be cases were we choose to 
form a novel belief that we have just discovered that it is well supported by evidence 
or plain true. Suppose, for instance, that we just read in an acclaimed encyclopaedia 
that ‘The capital of Nepal is Kathmandu’ and then choose to form this novel belief. 
Accordingly, one might think, in such cases we come to form the novel belief we 
have chosen to form. 
Yet, such cases should not mislead us into thinking that we can sometimes choose 
what to believe because in such cases we still don’t form the novel belief at will, that 
is, because we tried to choose to form the belief. Rather we form the belief because it 
175 See, for example, Carl Ginet (2001).
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was considered to bear positive epistemic status, that is, being true, justified or other. 
Indeed, we would expect agents to form the belief  even before they find the short 
time to entertain the thought of choosing to endorse this belief. On the assumption 
that the agent paid some attention to this piece of information and did not just read it 
mechanically or absent-mindedly, the belief will simply ‘assail’ him and be formed 
nonvoluntarily. 
Overall, what such cases really show is not that we can form justified beliefs at 
will,  but only that we seem to nonvoluntarily form beliefs  that  are found to bear 
positive  epistemic  status  (justified,  rational,  evidence-based,  true  etc.)  and  shun 
beliefs that are found to bear negative epistemic status (unjustified, irrational, false 
etc.). This is why I asked in the little psychological experiment above that we choose 
to believe a novel proposition that we are totally in the dark about its truth-value or 
one that we think is unjustified or plain false.
 The  reason is  that  our  doxastic  will  is  attracted  by epistemic  standings  with 
positive status and trying to choose to believe a proposition with positive epistemic 
status might have misled us into thinking that this is possible in some cases. Thus, as 
we nonvoluntarily form beliefs we find to have positive epistemic status, such cases 
not  only don’t  come as counterexamples  to the nonvoluntarism intuition  but also 
back the intuition that (justified) belief-fixation seems to be not directly voluntary. 
Pascal’s famous wager illustrates this very point nicely. If you are familiar with 
Pascal’s wager, Pascal urges people who find his pragmatic argument for believing 
in God convincing to attend masses, say prayers etc. He urges people to immerse 
themselves in religious practices because he knows very well that belief does not 
come at will and, therefore, as a means to gradual inducement of religious belief they 
should immerse themselves in religious practices. In this oblique way, Pascal thinks, 
agents can come to believe in God’s existence due to his pragmatic argument from 
maximum expected utility for believing in God’s existence176. 
Instead,  if  Pascal’s  argument  had  been  an  epistemic  argument,  that  is,  an 
argument that aims at truth (or any other positive epistemic standing) then Pascal 
wouldn’t  have  worried  because,  if  cogent,  rational  agents  should  nonvoluntarily 
come to form the belief that God exists. But just because his argument is a pragmatic 
176  For an excellent reconstruction and criticism of Pascal’s wager see E.Sober and A.Mougin (1994).
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one  arguing  for  believing  in  God’s  existence  from  the  prudential  grounds  of 
maximum expected utility,  he knows that  agents  must  somehow manipulate  their 
doxastic will into believing in God’s existence.  
This much being said about ‘the nonvoluntarism intuition’, the problem now for 
plan-reliance is that, in defiance of the nonvoluntarism intuition, as it extends from 
moral discourse to the epistemic discourse, also implies  uncritical extension  of the 
voluntarist commitment that we can choose what to believe as we can choose what to 
do.  A  mistake  that  is  not  entirely  uncommon  for  moral  philosophers  who  are 
sometimes quick to overlook this important disparity between moral and epistemic 
discourse177.
 But  in  the  practical  domain  this  voluntarist  commitment  is  relatively 
unproblematic as we literally have the power to make practical choices and act at 
will; at least if we are rational enough to be able to stick to our best choice. Just try 
out a practical version of our little psychological experiment and choose, say, to raise 
your hand or scratch your head. This ability for practical  choice seems to simply 
follow from our profound ability to somehow be free agents, that is, agents with the 
marvellous ability to freely choose among alternative courses of action. This is, after 
all, why we often say things like ‘p is the right course of action and this is what I 
choose to do’. 
But as we have just seen, in the epistemic domain this voluntarist commitment 
seems puzzling, as it appears that we can’t choose what to believe. We can’t choose 
at will what to believe, as doxastic volition is not under our direct voluntary control. 
Even if  we want to believe at  will  and form the intention to believe at will,  this 
appears  psychologically  impossible;  at  least,  for  what  human  psychology allows. 
This is why saying things like ‘p is the right thing to believe and this is what I choose 
to believe’ strike us as unnatural in terms of ordinary discourse. Rather, it is more 
natural  to  say that  ‘p  is  the rational  thing to  believe  and this  is  what  I  believe’ 
because we tend to nonvoluntarily form beliefs we take to have positive epistemic 
status  (evidence-based,  rational,  justified  etc.)  and  shun  beliefs  we  take  to  have 
negative epistemic status (not evidence-based, irrational, unjustified etc.). 
Unfortunately,  though,  plan-reliance  expressivism  defies  the  nonvoluntarism 
177  See for example C.Korsgaard (1996: 92-3)
172
intuition and suggests that we can form epistemic plans about what to believe and 
rely on at will. It uncritically extends to cover both moral and knowledge discourse 
and this presupposes that we can form beliefs at will, as if beliefs were a matter of 
our direct voluntary control. This seems to be especially the case because the notion 
of  ‘planning’  has  strong  voluntary  practical  connotations.  We  can,  intentionally, 
choose among various practical plans about what to do in certain circumstances. As I 
graduate I can choose, say, to plan to pursue a Ph.D rather than plan to pursue my 
luck in the job market.
Yet, although planning may seem relatively unproblematic in the practical domain 
where we do seem to be able  to  choose to  form plans  about  what  to do among 
alternatives, in the epistemic domain planning seems clearly problematic. We don’t 
seem psychologically able to form at will epistemic plans about what to believe and 
rely on. Even if I form the intention to form the epistemic plan to only believe and 
rely on what is, let us say, coherent with my overall web of beliefs this does not show 
that I will eventually be able to form such a coherentist epistemic plan and come to 
believe and rely on what is coherent with my web of beliefs. 
A fortiori, even if I somehow manage to follow my intention and come to form 
the coherentist epistemic plan, it is far from obvious that I will be able to form beliefs 
according to the dictates of the epistemic plan. Thus, intuitively, we can’t exert any 
direct voluntary control on our doxastic volition and thereby to belief-fixation.
The problem for plan-reliance expressivism is that it seems to assume that as in 
the practical sphere of our agential life we can choose what practical plans to adopt 
for the regulation of our practical conduct, equally in the epistemic sphere of our 
agential life we can choose what epistemic plans to adopt for the regulation of our 
epistemic conduct. But as the simple psychological experiment above has illustrated, 
this  uncritical  extension  of  the  voluntarist  commitment  from  the  practical/moral 
domain to the epistemic it is far from being unproblematic. For, belief-fixation seems 
to be directly nonvoluntary and plan-reliance seems to assume again that  we can 
choose what to believe and rely on through choosing epistemic plans. 
This  concludes  a  concise  introduction  of  Gibbard’s  plan-reliance  expressivism 
and the identified problems it runs into if extended to cover epistemic justification 
discourse.  The  scene  is  now  ready  for  the  advent  of  habits-endorsement 
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expressivism,  which  is  meant  to  constructively  synthesize  insights  in  an  original 
manner that will allow the theory to assert itself as the explanatorily more fruitful. 
Let us now turn to the exploration of this conceptual synthesis.
7.3 The Possibility of Habits-Endorsement Expressivism
So far, we have argued that plan-reliance expressivism defies the nonvoluntarism 
intuition  about  epistemic  justification  discourse  and,  in  addition,  runs  into 
counterexamples because it fails to explain how we can attribute justified belief and 
still think that the belief is false and, thereby, as rational agents don’t plan to rely on 
it.
 In this section we constructively synthesize insights in order to build an original 
norm-expressivist  theory  for  epistemic  justification  discourse  that  keeps  what  is 
attractive in both norm-expressivism and plan-reliance expressivism theories while 
avoids  the  identified  problems  of  plan-reliance  expressivism.  This  original 
expressivist theory will be constructed on the basis of the notion of epistemic habits. 
The  rich  and  versatile  notion  of  habits  will  be  placed  at  the  foundations  of  the 
proposal and will allow us to connect and cement insights in an original way that 
will, hopefully, prove elegant and explanatorily fruitful. Let us now turn to theory 
building. 
 Needless to say, in order to analyse what we mean when we make justification 
assertions and attributions we need to reflect on what we implicate when we attribute 
justified belief. What we seem to express in such discursive contexts. This is what 
we do then. But in order to simplify things, in what follows I will focus exclusively 
on  what  we  mean  when  we  make  justified  belief  attributions  of  the  form  ‘S 
justifiedly  believes  that  p’,  though,  the  expressivist  semantic  picture  I  will  paint 
should be broadly analogous for justification assertions as well. 
 The first obvious thing to notice is that in discursive contexts where we say ‘S 
justifiedly believes that p’ we express that ‘S believes that p’. This seems quite easy 
to follow as expression of attribution of justified belief (i.e S justifiedly believes that 
p)  obviously  implicates  attribution  of  belief  (i.e.  S  believes  that  p).  The  second 
obvious  thing  that  quickly  comes  to  the  eye  is  that  we  express  some  sort  of 
endorsement  or  approval  for  S’s  believing  that  p.  That  is,  we  seem to  see  ‘S’s 
believing that p’ in some favourable light. 
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For as we have already noted in section 6.2, expressivist approaches reverse the 
order of semantic explanation and embark from the element of endorsement that the 
referentialists  fail  to accommodate due to ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’. And, of 
course, as expressivist approaches embark from the element of endorsement, habits-
endorsement  expressivism  could  not  but  also  embark  from  the  element  of 
endorsement. Accordingly, when we say ‘S justifiedly believes that p’, we seem to 
implicate a general attitude of endorsement or approval of ‘S’s believing that p’. 
This  much  of  analysis  is  pretty  standard  for  an  expressivist  account  of 
justification.  The apparent  question now is  what sort  of endorsement  this  general 
attitude of endorsement is. It is here that the notion of epistemic habits enters the 
theoretical scene in order to play the needed explanatory role. As we all acknowledge 
from our everyday lives, habits constitute ‘the great guide of human life’, as Hume 
(2005:44)  has  put  it178.  We  have  sleeping,  eating,  cooking,  drinking,  studying, 
writing,  talking,  walking,  shopping,  playing,  thinking,  driving,  cycling,  diving, 
cleaning habits and much more. If therefore Hume is right, as he seems to be, and we 
are  at  bottom such  ‘creatures  of  habit’  then  the  epistemic  segment  of  our  lives 
couldn’t  be an exception.  Our epistemic  lives,  and hence,  justified belief-fixation 
should accordingly be guided by epistemic habits, namely, habits of belief-fixation. 
Indeed,  intuitively,  (justified)  belief-fixation  seems importantly  to  be habitual, 
that is, based on habits of belief-fixation. For, as we have seen in section 7.2, belief-
fixation seems to be directly nonnvoluntary and for the most time unreflective and 
unconscious and these are emblematic properties of habits. That is, the very notion of 
habits as such implies both at least some grip on our psychology and quite often 
unreflectiveness and unconsciousness. This is why sometimes we say things like ‘He 
is at the mercy of the force of his evil habits’ or ‘He always buys the same toothpaste 
out of habit and doesn’t even realize!’. Or think of the more concrete example of the 
habit of going by the stairs rather than the elevator. This habit is a habit insofar it has 
a grip on our psychology, namely, we are disposed to act accordingly and we do so 
for at least the most part unreflectively and unconsciously. 
As  many  epistemologists  take  the  lead  from  the  pervasiveness  of  habits  in 
everyday life and the properties belief-fixation and habits share and from time to 
178  To be exact, ‘Custom, then, is the great guide of human life’(2005:44).
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time talk about ‘epistemic habits’, ‘habits of belief-formation’, ‘cognitive schemes, 
plans, stances, policies or heuristics’ etc., the idea that epistemic habits could lie at 
the heart of our epistemic practices should not come as a surprise179. 
Thus,  if  we  would  like  to  build  an  expressivist  story  that  would  capture  the 
habitual character of justified belief-fixation the idea would then be that when we 
express endorsement of ‘S’s believing that p’, our endorsement is an endorsement of 
S’s epistemic habits, that is, S’s habits of belief-fixation in virtue of which S believes 
that p. In this picture, epistemic habits are bestowed with the cognitive functional 
role of (justified) belief-fixation, that is, their function in our mental economy is to 
guide (justified) belief-fixation.
Here  is  an  example  of  how  this  is  supposed  to  work.  Suppose  I  say  ‘Mary 
justifiedly  believes  that  her  next  pottery  class  will  take  place  this  weekend’. 
According to the expressivist semantic picture we have painted so far what I, the 
attributor, mean with this sentence is that Mary believes that her next pottery class 
will take place this weekend and endorse Mary’s habits of belief-fixation in virtue of 
which she has formed this belief. Maybe the habit of belief-fixation responsible for 
the  formation  of  Mary’s  belief  is  her  habit  to  trust  what  reliable  sources  of 
information (like the pottery classes website) say. 
Of important note is that the attributor may endorse S’s habits of belief-fixation in 
virtue of which S believes that p, even if he has no clear idea of what these epistemic 
habits are or involve. This seems to occur quite often, if not most of the time, in our 
epistemic practice of justified belief attribution as attributors are not aware of other 
agents’ epistemic habits but still readily attribute justified belief. 
If we take the example above, as an attributor I could still feel inclined to attribute 
justified belief to Mary, even if I didn’t have much of an idea of the habit of belief-
fixation in virtue of which she has formed the belief. I could attribute justified belief 
to Mary just on the basis of, say, that I trust her as an epistemic agent. That this is the 
case should not perplex or puzzle us, for thinking that an attributor should be aware 
of  S’s  habits  in  order  to  attribute  justified  belief  would  seem  cognitively  too 
demanding and, as a result, it would have over-intellectualized and thereby distort 
179  See D.Hume (1986, 2005), C.S.Peirce (1991), J.McDowell (1995) , L.Zagzebski (1996), 
R.Wedgwood (2009), G.Harman (1996), A.Goldman (1978), P.Helm (1994). The importance of habits 
in our lives is also often acknowledged in literature. Compare F.Dostoyevsky (2008): ‘…to what 
monstrous extent we are creatures of habit’.
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the everyday practice of attributions of justified belief. 
Such attributions of justified belief without awareness of the epistemic habits in 
play  is  especially  widespread  in  our  modern  societies  of  overspecialization  and 
rigorous division of epistemic labour where the epistemic practice of attribution of 
justified  belief  to  experts  is  an  everyday  practice.  We  say,  for  instance,  ‘The 
physicists’ community justifiedly believes that the universe is constituted by minute 
particles called atoms’ and, according to the proposal, express endorsement for the 
habits of belief-fixation in virtue of which the academic community of physicists has 
reached this conclusion, even though the vast majority of us have no clear idea what 
these habits are. 
Nowadays, perhaps, most laymen have some inkling that science goes hand with 
hand with experimenting, as it is now common lore that science progresses by means 
of experimental trial and error. But for most people this general inkling is all they are 
aware of scientists’ habits of belief-fixation, as they are far from being experts in the 
history and philosophy of science. 
Clarifying, though, what sort of endorsement the attributor’s endorsement of ‘S’s 
believing that p’ is seems to be just the tip of the (semantic) iceberg as there is yet 
much more going on when we express such endorsement. The third thing to notice is 
that  in  such discursive contexts  the  habits  of  belief-fixation  we endorse seem to 
implicate  constraint by  certain  epistemic  norms.  Reasonably,  when  we  attribute 
justified  belief  and express  endorsement  for  S’s  habits  of  belief-fixation  we also 
imply that these habits employ and are constrained by certain epistemic norms. 
For, surely,  by S’s epistemic habits  (no matter  what these are) own lights  not 
everything goes as some beliefs count as justified and others as unjustified. Habits of 
belief-fixation, thus, commit to epistemic norms that license beliefs as justified or 
rule out beliefs as unjustified.  These norms might be coherentist,  foundationalist, 
deontologist,  reliabilist,  virtue-theoretic,  relaxed  or  austere,  conservative  or 
revisionist etc.  
If we take the Mary example above, where ‘Mary justifiedly believes that her next 
pottery class will take place this weekend’ because she is in the habit to trust what 
reliable sources of information (like the pottery classes website) say, we may say that 
her habit employs  and is constrained by certain epistemic norms about testimony. 
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That is, norms dictating what sort of testimonial sources of information are reliable 
and what sources are not. In this case her norms seem to be ‘credulist’ as they are 
relaxed and permissive enough, in the absence of any countervailing reasons, to take 
the pottery classes’ website to be a reliable source of information.
Again, as with epistemic habits of belief-fixation,  the attributor might have no 
clear  idea of what these epistemic  norms employed  by the habits  are  or involve. 
Attributors can readily ascribe justified belief to Mary but neither have a clear idea of 
Mary’s habits of belief-fixation nor of the employed norms. All that is needed for 
attribution  of  justified  belief  is  endorsement  or  approval  of  the  habits  of  belief-
fixation  in  virtue  of  which  Mary formed  the  belief.  That  said,  our  rather  simple 
‘Mary example’ should not give the wrong signals, namely, that the relation between 
an  agent’s  habits  and employed  norms  is  all  that  simple  and monolithic.  On the 
contrary, the relation between habits and norms is very complex and I will return to 
this issue in section 7.6. But for the time being our priority is to outline the basics of 
the theory and we have to stay focussed on that.
Let us now take stock of where we have arrived at so far. According to habits-
endorsement expressivism, attributions of justified belief like ‘S justifiably believes 
that p’ express that:
(a) S believes that p and 
(b) Endorsement of the habits of belief-fixation in virtue of which S believes that 
p  where  these  habits  of  belief-fixation  employ  and  are  constrained  by  certain 
epistemic norms. Awareness of what these epistemic habits and norms are or involve 
is not necessary for the attributor.  
But  it  seems  that  there  is  still  plenty  that  is  implicated  in  such  contexts,  as 
endorsement of habits of belief-fixation seems to implicate and be  constrained by 
more. This leads to two more points: a fourth and a fifth one. Fourth, as a normative 
discourse, in justification discourse we tend to have  attitudes of appraisal towards 
the agents180. We implicate praise for people that have justified beliefs because this is 
a  cognitive  achievement  and,  accordingly,  implicate  blame  for  people  that  have 
unjustified beliefs because this is a cognitive failure. We say things like ‘Copernicus 
justifiedly believed in heliocentrism well ahead of his contemporaries’ and imply that 
180  See J.Greco (2003) for appraisal attitudes expressed in knowledge discourse. 
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Copernicus is to take credit for having this justified belief or say things like ‘Many 
people unjustifiably believe in astrological predictions’ and imply that these people 
are blameworthy for having this unjustified belief.
Yet, we don’t always imply praise when we attribute justified belief as there are 
cases where we think that, although ‘S justifiedly believes that p’, there isn’t much to 
praise because the belief was all too easy to acquire. There are cases where an agent 
has a justified belief due to, let us say, perceptual evidence but we don’t praise or 
give credit to the agent because acquiring this justified belief was all too easy and 
can’t  be seen  as  a  cognitive  achievement.  Think,  for  example,  of  the agent  who 
thinks that ‘ripe bananas are yellow’ because he has seen a lot of ripe bananas and all 
were yellow.  Inductive  scepticism aside,  this  is  a  case where  we are  inclined  to 
attribute justified belief but no praise, though, we also don’t want to blame people for 
having a justified belief even if this was acquired ‘on the cheap’ and does not count 
as a cognitive achievement.
 In the light of such cases of justified belief  attribution where we don’t imply 
praise,  we should  avoid  commitment  to  the  thesis  that  justified  belief  attribution 
always conveys praise. What we should say instead is that justified belief attribution 
allows praising and forbids blaming people for having justified belief. For although 
justified belief attribution seems to allow praise it doesn’t necessitate praise and, of 
course,  always  forbids  blame.  It  always  forbids  blame because  even on cases  of 
justified belief attribution where the belief was acquired on the cheap we wouldn’t by 
any means be inclined to attribute blame. 
 Fifth,  as  J.Austin  (1961)  and  Gibbard  (2003)  have  pointed  out,  epistemic 
discourse also implicates attitudes of trust and reliance. We trust the habits of belief-
fixation we endorse and therefore rely on their belief output, even when we have no 
clear idea of what these habits of belief-fixation involve. For example, think again of 
the  epistemic  practice  of  attribution  of  justified  belief  to  experts.  We  say,  for 
instance,  ‘Mathematicians  justifiably believe  that  π is  approximately 22/7 and an 
irrational number’ and express endorsement for the habits of belief-fixation in virtue 
of which the academic community of mathematicians has reached this conclusion. 
We trust that these habits of belief-fixation are truth-conducive and thereby rely on 
their belief output, even if we have no very clear idea of what these habits involve. 
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Now, if endorsement of habits of belief-fixation implicates and is constrained by 
both appraisal attitudes and attitudes of trust and reliance, then our analysis should 
somehow account for that. Otherwise, our analysis would appear elliptical in these 
central aspects of justification discourse. And to account for these central aspects our 
analysis  needs  to  incorporate  in  the  initial  scheme the  attitudes  of  appraisal  and 
trust/reliance. The obvious way to do that is to suggest that condition (b), namely, 
‘endorsement  of  habits  of  belief-fixation  in  virtue  of  which  S  believes  that  p’ 
rationally commits to a regulative norm which:
(i) Permits  praise  and  forbids  blame  for  agents  whose  beliefs  are  formed  in 
virtue of such habits of belief-fixation.
(ii) Requires trust on these habits of belief-fixation and reliance on their belief 
output. 
I say here ‘rationally commits’ to a regulative norm because we expect all rational 
agents  who  attribute  justified  belief,  if  made  explicit  to  them,  to  acknowledge 
commitment to attitudes of appraisal and trust/reliance. If an agent who attributes 
justified belief and by the lights of our analysis endorses S’s habits of belief-fixation, 
refuses to acknowledge commitment to a regulative norm of attitudes of appraisal 
and trust/reliance we would be inclined to think that this agent is missing something. 
Perhaps he is conceptually confused and needs some more explaining of what this 
regulative norm is about and why as an attributor of justified belief he is committed 
to that. But if he shows signs of clear understanding of what is the point at issue and 
yet refuses to acknowledge commitment to this regulative norm, then we would be 
inclined to coin him irrational and abandon the futile argument with him.
So  far,  so  good,  but  still  condition  b  (ii)  seems  too  crude  as  it  stands.  For, 
although  we trust  the  habits  of  belief-fixation  we approve  of,  there  are  cases  of 
justified belief attribution where as attributors we do not rely on their belief output in 
spite of all our trust and approval. There are cases where although we approve of S’s 
habits of belief fixation we have reasons to think that the produced justified beliefs 
are likely to be false or even be plain false. These are the cases where we say things 
like: ‘S justifiedly believes that p but I still think that p is false’. If this is right, as it 
seems to be, then reliance on the habits’ belief output should only be defeasible as 
there are cases where agents may have good reasons to think that despite attribution 
180
of justified belief and, thereby, trust and endorsement of S’s habits of belief-fixation 
they should not rely on their belief output. That is, the beliefs these habits of belief-
fixation produce. 
Think, for instance, of the police detective that arrives at a certain belief about 
who is the murderer. I, as an attributor, I am inclined to attribute justified belief to 
him and say that ‘S justifiedly believes that Mary is the murderer’ but still think that 
the belief is false indeed and therefore don’t rely on this belief. This might happen 
because, say, I have reliable testimony that Mary has a strong alibi and therefore all 
evidence against her is merely circumstantial. Yet, I attribute justified belief to the 
detective because I endorse and trust his habits of belief-fixation in virtue of which 
he has reached this belief. I may trust and endorse his habits of belief-fixation for a 
variety  of  reasons,  perhaps,  because  he  has  the  reputation  of  being  an  excellent 
detective with difficult crimes resolved in his record etc. We can thus talk of default  
reliance on the belief-output of habits of belief-fixation where reliance is defeasible 
and not mere reliance simpliciter. 
Interestingly,  someone  might  naturally  suspect  that  the  converse  could  also 
obtain, namely, that as we trust habits of belief-fixation and only defeasibly rely on 
their belief output we could, conversely, rely (simpliciter or defeasibly) on the belief 
output of certain habits of belief fixation that we only defeasibly trust and rely on 
them. 
This could happen only if there are cases of justified belief attribution where as 
attributors we invest only ‘default trust’ on the habits of belief-fixation we endorse 
because we have reasons  to  think that  the subject’s  habits  are  not  ideal  from an 
epistemic point of view. We have reasons to think that the habits of belief-fixation 
the subject is relying on are not the ones he should be relying on, even if a certain 
belief produced by these habits of belief-fixation is considered to be justified. And 
this,  of  course,  could  happen only  in  cases  where  attributors  have  at  least  some 
general idea of what the subject’s epistemic habits are or involve. 
Yet, this suspicion is too quick because in such cases the attributor would not say 
‘S justifiedly believes that p’. Instead, he would say things like: ‘S’s belief that p is 
justified, though, the habits of belief-fixation responsible for this belief are not ideal’. 
The difference between the two attributions is subtle but important because what we 
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attribute to the subject in such a case of ‘default  trust’ on the subject’s habits  of 
belief-fixation  is  having  a  justified  belief and  not  justified  believing and  this, 
accordingly, should not be included in an analysis of ‘S justifiedly believes that p’.
 The attribution is of having a justified belief not of justified believing because the 
subject’s habits of belief-fixation responsible for the fixation of this belief are not 
ideal from an epistemic point of view. The subject has a justified belief but this belief 
was  not  acquired  by means  of  epistemic  habits  we approve  of.  This  is  why the 
attributor  says  ‘‘S’s belief  that  p is  justified,  though,  the habits  of belief-fixation 
responsible for this belief are not ideal’ instead of ‘S justifiedly believes that p’. 
Here is an example. Think of a German subject during WWII who believes that 
‘French  resistance  has  collapsed’  because  he  has  the  habit  of  belief-fixation  to 
uncritically accept whatever people in authority say and by means of this habit has 
formed the aforementioned belief because it was officially proclaimed by Goebbels, 
the notorious Nazi minister of propaganda. In this case, as an attributor if I somehow 
diagnose that S has this habit of belief-fixation and that this habit is responsible for 
the fixation of the -indeed justified- belief ‘that the French resistance has collapsed’, 
then I would be inclined to say something like ‘S’s belief that p is justified, though, 
the habit responsible for the fixation of this belief is not ideal’. But I wouldn’t be 
inclined to say ‘S justifiedly believes that p’ because that would imply that he has 
acquired the belief by means of a truth-conducive habit and this was not the case.
Such cases  of  attribution  of  having a  justified  belief  would have also created 
problem for condition b (i),  namely,  that  endorsement  of habits  of belief-fixation 
‘permits praise and forbids blame’. It would have created problem for b (i) because 
in such cases of attribution of having a justified belief the attributor also conveys 
blame because of cognitive failure. The subject acquired the justified belief on the 
basis  of  a  habit  that  is  not  truth-conducive  and  could  have  easily  produced  an 
unjustified belief instead. But conveying blame contradicts b (i) that clearly forbids 
blaming and this would have constituted a counterexample to b (i). Fortunately, as 
we said, we need not worry about this because what we are analysing here is the 
practice of justified belief attribution and not the practice of attribution of having a 
justified belief.
This point set to the one side, the last semantic observation is that even this trust 
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on habits  of belief-fixation and ‘default  reliance’  on their  belief  output  seems to 
rationally commit to other epistemic habits, this time  habits of reliance. That is, a 
habit to rely on certain habits of belief-fixation and a habit to rely on their produced 
beliefs.  For,  as  habits  are  acquired  through  constant  repetition  and,  indeed, 
habituation into a practice, reasonably, it is to be expected that trusting certain habits 
of belief-fixation and relying on their belief output over a substantial period of time 
will create habits of reliance on these habits of belief-fixation and their belief output. 
In this sense, trust on habits of belief fixation and ‘default reliance’ on their belief 
output commit themselves to habits of reliance, that is, a habit to trust and rely on 
certain habits of belief-fixation and a habit  to rely on their belief  output. But the 
habits of reliance on belief output should also be defeasible because, as have just 
seen above, there are cases where we do not rely on the belief output of the habits we 
approve of. Thus, habits enter the picture of habits-endorsement expressivism twice: 
first, as habits of belief-fixation and, second, as habits of reliance on these habits of 
belief-fixation and their belief output. 
Let us now pull the strings of our enriched analysis of condition (b), namely, of 
‘endorsement of habits of belief-fixation in virtue of which S believes that p’. In the 
footsteps  of  our  diagnosis  above  of  what  justified  belief  attribution  implies,  we 
analyse condition (b) in terms of rational commitment to a regulative norm which:
(i) Permits praise and forbids blame for people whose beliefs are formed in 
virtue of such habits of belief-fixation.
(ii) Requires trust on these habits of belief-fixation and ‘default reliance’ on 
their belief output. Trust and ‘default reliance’ also implicate habits of reliance on 
these habits of belief-fixation and their belief output where the habit of reliance on 
the belief-output of the trusted habits is only defeasible.
We are now poised to bring all the pieces of our analysis together and see what 
the big picture is like. According to habits-endorsement expressivism, attributions of 
justified belief like ‘S justifiably believes that p’ express that:
(a) S believes that p and 
(b) Endorsement of the habits of belief-fixation in virtue of which S believes that 
p  where  these  habits  of  belief-fixation  employ  and  are  constrained  by  certain 
epistemic norms. Awareness of what these epistemic habits and norms are or involve 
183
is not necessary for the attributor.
Condition  (b)  is  then  further  analysed  in  terms  of  rational  commitment  to  a 
regulative norm which:
(i) Permits  praise  and  forbids  blame  for  people  whose  beliefs  are  formed  in 
virtue of such habits of belief-fixation.
(ii) Requires trust on these habits of belief-fixation and ‘default reliance’ on their 
belief output. Trust and ‘default reliance’ also implicate habits of reliance on these 
habits of belief-fixation and their belief  output where the habit of reliance on the 
belief-output of the trusted habits is only defeasible.
 This  concludes  our  sketchy introduction  of  habits-endorsement  expressivism. 
With habits-endorsement expressivism now introduced let us turn to the next section 
and see how it fares against the identified problems of plan-reliance expressivism.
7.4 The Explanatory Power of Habits-Endorsement Expressivism
Let us now examine how this proposal, first, captures what is attractive in norm-
expressivism  and  plan-reliance  expressivism  theories  and,  second,  tackles  the 
identified problems of plan-reliance expressivism and therefore asserts itself as the 
explanatorily more fruitful. 
First of all, as an expressivist story habits-endorsement expressivism dodges the 
referentialists’  problems  in  a  way  analogous  to  our  ‘toy’  version  of  norm-
expressivism in Ch.6. As I have already said before, there is no reason to be dull and 
repetitive, as it is quite easy to follow how it does that. Second, habits-endorsement 
expressivism  easily  captures  the  attractive  intuitions  that,  respectively,  norm-
expressivism and plan-reliance expressivism capture because these are virtually build 
into the account. Plus, it explains what I call ‘the habits-constarining intuition’. Let 
me elaborate.
 It can easily explain ‘the endorsement intuition’ because, like other expressivist 
stories, it starts from what agents endorse when they express normative sentences. 
For  habits-endorsement  expressivism,  it  expresses  endorsement  for  the  habits  of 
belief-fixation in virtue of which the belief was formed. Thus, endorsement is pretty 
much built into the account.  It also accounts for ‘the norm-constraining intuition’ 
because for the proposal epistemic justification sentences express endorsement  of 
habits  of  belief-fixation  where  these  habits  of  belief-fixation  employ  and  are 
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constrained  by  certain  epistemic  norms.  Again,  constraint  by epistemic  norms  is 
pretty much built into the account.
 Finally,  it  explains  ‘the  reliance  intuition’  because  for  habits-endorsement 
expressivism,  expression  of  endorsement  of  habits  of  belief-fixation  rationally 
commits to a regulative norm that requires trust on these habits of belief-fixation and 
‘default reliance’ on their belief output. Indeed, we come to have habits of reliance 
on our habits of belief-fixation and their belief output. Once again, reliance is build 
into the account and therefore habits-endorsement expressivism easily captures ‘the 
reliance intuition’ too.
Third,  habits-endorsement  expressivism  explains  ‘the  habits-constraining 
intuition’, namely, the intuition that belief-fixation is constrained by the operation of 
habits of belief-fixation – an intuition that as we have mentioned above has been 
attested  by  many  epistemologists.  It  explains  ‘the  habits-constraining  intuition’ 
because  for  the  proposal  epistemic  justification  assertion  and attributions  express 
endorsement of certain habits of belief-fixation. 
Fourth, habits-endorsement expressivism outflanks the problems we identified for 
plan-reliance expressivism. It evades the counterexamples plan-reliance expressivism 
runs into and accounts for the nonvoluntarism intuition. Let us start expounding how 
it  can do this  much with how it  easily evades  the counterexamples  plan-reliance 
expressivism runs into. 
 Habits-endorsement  expressivism  evades  the  counterexamples  plan-reliance 
expressivism runs into because it easily accounts for attribution of justified belief in 
cases where we think that nonetheless the belief is false and therefore don’t plan to 
rely on it. We can do that because we can endorse S’s habits of belief-fixation even 
though we might think that his habits of belief-fixation in this particular case have 
led him astray to a false belief and, therefore, do not intend or plan to rely on this 
belief if circumstances may demand it. 
For example, think again of ‘the stranded tourist example’ where the tourist asks a 
local for the whereabouts of the museum but the informant intentionally lies to the 
tourist because he is a sadistic person that maliciously takes pleasure in others people 
trouble. In such a case, although we know that the tourist has been misdirected, we 
could still attribute justified belief to the tourist because we approve of the habit of 
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belief-fixation of asking seemingly trustworthy locals for information,  though, we 
wouldn’t  intend  or  plan  to  rely  on  the  belief.  We would  say  something  like  ‘S 
jusifiedly  believes  that  p,  though,  p  is  false’.  This  is  exactly  why we have been 
careful enough to say that reliance on the belief-output of our endorsed habits of 
belief-fixation  is  only defeasible  and,  hence,  ‘default’.  For attribution of justified 
beliefs should be able to handle such cases, something that plan-reliance as applied 
to epistemic justification discourse does not. 
Let us now turn to how the proposal accounts for the nonvoluntarism intuition. 
Habits-endorsement  expressivism  can  account  for  the  nonvoluntarism  intuition 
because it suggests that we nonvoluntarily form (justified) beliefs due to habits of 
belief-fixation. The gambit is made by the introduction of the theoretically versatile 
notion of habits. For as we briefly mentioned in section 7.4, the very notion of a habit 
implies a certain grip on our psychology and for the most part unreflectiveness and 
unconsciousness, and these properties of habits entitle us to account for the directly 
nonvoluntary character of belief-fixation.
 These  properties  of  habits  entitle  us  to  do  so  because  by  appeal  to  these 
properties, namely,  a grip on our psychology, unreflectiveness and uncosciousness 
we can suggest that  (justified) belief  fixation is not directly voluntary due to the 
operation  of  epistemic  habits.  Belief-fixation  is  not  directly  voluntary because  is 
guided by habits of belief-fixation and ‘a grip on our psychology’ is one of the very 
properties habits as such exhibit. This is why we often say ‘Oh, I struggle with this 
bad  habit  but  to  no  avail.  It  seems  to  have  taken  the  best  of  me’.  Thus,  the 
nonvoluntary grip habits have on our psychology explains why our justified belief-
fixation  is  also  directly  nonvoluntary.  Justified  belief-fixation  is  directly 
nonvoluntary because it is guided by habits of belief-fixation and these by nature 
have a grip on our psychology. 
Habits-endorsement  expressivism  also  accounts  for  epistemic  improvement, 
something  we  briefly  touched  in  Ch.6  with  our  distinction  between  ‘the  realist 
existential assertion’/‘the minimalist existential assertion’ that entitled us to talk of 
‘minimally justified beliefs’. For it allows that through an ‘ideal epistemic observer 
standpoint’ we can reflect on and criticize our habits of belief-fixation and come to 
have different sort of habits by initiating cultivation of the habits of belief fixation 
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we think ideal181. Such ideal habits of belief-fixation are, presumably,  to be habits 
that  are  conducive  to  the  social  good  of  truth  and  are  therefore  approved  and 
encouraged from the social point of view.
 Thus, through the ideal epistemic point of view the agent can criticize and change 
his  habits  of  belief-fixation,  even  though  this  can  often  prove  a  hard  and 
psychologically  demanding  process  if  the  habits  are  deeply-rooted  in  our 
psychological profile. The agent can change his habits of belief-fixation with more 
truth-conducive  habits  and  therefore  his  justified  beliefs  come  out  of  cognitive 
ability. They come out of his ability to observe his epistemic habits, reflect on them 
and if  not  satisfied with them criticize  and revise  them with epistemic  habits  he 
considers better from an epistemic point of view. 
This process of self-observation, criticism and revision of epistemic habits occurs 
because there are cases where we have reasons to think that our habits are not ideal 
from an epistemic point of view. We have reasons to think that the habits of belief-
fixation  we are  relying  on are not  the ones we  should be relying  on.  This could 
happen in cases where agents have at least some general idea of what their epistemic 
habits are or involve, as they might grow dissatisfied with these habits and decide to 
revise them with others they consider better from an epistemic point of view. 
Here is an example of how such habits-revision is to work. John is a great admirer 
of crime fiction and especially of the all-time-classics of A.Conan Doyle’s Sherlock 
Holmes and A.Christie’s  Heracles Poirot.  He thinks that these fictional characters 
embody the ideal epistemic agents and aspires to emulate their habits of justified 
belief-fixation.  So,  after  some meticulous  self-observation  of his  habits  of belief-
fixation he becomes convinced that his habits are far from being even similar to his 
heroes and decides to revise them. He finds, say,  that he is in the habit  of being 
impatient and jumping to conclusions, lacks persistence, he is often inattentive and 
overlooks  facts,  prone to probabilistic  fallacies,  easily clouded by selfish desires, 
emotions etc. while his epistemic heroes are in the habit of being patient, thoughtful, 
persistent, attentive and diligent, resist probabilistic fallacies and being clouded by 
their selfish desires, emotions etc. 
Our friend John, thus, decides to take measures and start cultivating the epistemic 
181  ‘Ideal observer’ ideas can be traced back to A.Smith (2007) and I.Kant (2006). Such ideas are 
often explored by contemporary philosophers, for example, M.Smith (1994) and R.Firth (2007).
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habits  of his ideal  epistemic heroes Sherlock and Heracles.  Every time he thinks 
what sort of epistemic habits should have he asks: ‘What epistemic habits Sherlock 
and Heracles have?’ and then tries to emulate these habits and cultivate them in order 
to gradually through repetition come to get a grip on his psychology. He learns, for 
instance, to resist his probabilistic fallacies that, in general, as epistemic agents we 
are so psychologically prone to fall prey to (as abundant evidence from cognitive 
psychology suggests)182.  That is,  as evidence from cognitive psychology suggests, 
our intuitions about probabilities often lead us astray as it happens, for example, in 
‘the conjunction fallacy’, ‘the gambler’s fallacy’ etc. 
Take  for  example  the  conjunction  fallacy.  The  conjunction  fallacy  is  a 
probabilistic fallacy often committed by many epistemic agents prone to think that a 
conjunction of probabilities is more probable than one of its conjuncts. This is, of 
course, mistaken as any individual conjunct is necessarily more probable than the 
whole conjunction itself.  Any P(a) is more probable than P(a)  and P(b); given of 
course that the probability of P(b) is not one or zero. Reasonably, it is more probable 
that it will rain today than both it will rain today and pass my viva. Yet, like John, 
many  agents  quite  often  seem  to  take  this  wrongly,  presumably,  because  they 
mistakenly associate conjunction with the notion of addition and therefore increase 
of  probability.  But,  unlike  addition  in  arithmetic  calculus,  addition  in  probability 
calculus  requires  multiplication  and,  therefore,  decreases  rather  increases  the 
probability rate as it makes the events less likely to all conjunctively occur. 
However, an agent like John who aspires to improve his epistemic performance, 
can  either  at  some  point  understand  how  this  fallacy  works  on  his  own  or  be 
instructed  from reliable  epistemic  peers  who already understand how the  fallacy 
works.  And  once  he  realizes  how  the  fallacy  works  (and  the  psychological 
mechanism of the habit of belief-fixation operating behind it), then he can take steps 
to get rid of the habit of belief-fixation in virtue of which the false beliefs are formed 
and learn to resist committing the fallacy. A fortiori, he can through repetition and 
habituation come to have the habit of belief-fixation to believe that the probability of 
any conjunct is greater than the probability of the conjunction. 
He can start cultivating the epistemic habit to consider a conjunct more probable 
182  See A.Tversky and D.Kahneman(1985)
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than the probability of the whole conjunction. The way to do that is to pay extra 
attention and diligence when he encounters conjunctive probabilities, keep an eye on 
the fallacy and resist the disposition to believe that a conjunction is more probable 
than an individual conjunct. In time, if he is diligent, persistent and patient enough, 
he will get rid of the fallacious epistemic habit and come to have the epistemic habit 
to consider a conjunction of probabilities less probable that any of its conjuncts.
As one might have noticed in ‘the John example’ just canvassed, habits-revision 
relies substantially on the character of the agent in question. For as habits by nature 
have  a  grip  on  our  psychology,  habits-revision  might  be  often  a  psychologically 
demanding  process  and  therefore  an  agent  should  exhibit  some  virtues  (or 
excellences) of character if he is to manage to effect habits-revision. That is, in our 
example learn to resist the habit  of belief-fixation responsible for the conjunction 
fallacy and moreover acquire the habit of belief-fixation that sets things right and 
take individual conjuncts to be more probable then the conjunction.
 Such  virtues  of  character  are  diligence,  patience,  persistence,  cautiousness, 
courage,  integrity,  a  love  of  truth,  self-respect  etc.  This  point,  moreover,  raises 
interesting virtue-theoretic issues about the role character plays in matters epistemic 
like  the  relation  between  normative  habits-formation  and  character,  character 
formation itself etc. that, unfortunately, I can’t pursue and do full justice with them 
here.
This  discussion concludes  our sketch of  how habits-endorsement  expressivism 
captures the attractions of norm-expressivism and plan-reliance expressivism while 
at the same time evades the problems we identified for plan-reliance expressivism. 
Perhaps, it is not as theoretically simple as these theories but this does not disrespect 
Occam’s razor because what habits-endorsement expressivism loses in simplicity it 
gains in explanatory power and this is the primary desideratum for any theoretical 
choice. 
If  we are  right  then,  habits-endorsement  expressivism has  a  good prima facie 
claim for being explanatorily more fruitful of plan-reliance expressivism. But this 
presumptive  case  for  habits-endorsement  expressivism  does  not  lull  us  into 
complacency, as the theory is still crude and sketchy in many key respects and may 
even fail in some crucial  respect yet  to be noticed. What is more, there might be 
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another  theoretical  story  that  can  reap  the  explanatory  fruit  habits-endorsement 
expressivism does (or even more) in a simpler and more economical way. If that is 
the case, then that theory will have a better claim for being the best of the lot, but as 
far as I can see in the theoretical horizon there is no such theory. At any rate, what I 
am convinced of is that habits-endorsement expressivism is an interesting approach 
that needs to be further explored in good hope that it can make full sense of  the 
epistemic justification discourse.
With  the  sketch  of  habits-endorsement  expressivism  at  hand  and  with  its 
explanatory sharpness just tested, in the next section I add some more touches to 
habits-endorsement  expressivism.  These  touches  purport  to  show  that  habits-
endorsement expressivism is not all that simple and monolithic, as our crude sketch 
in section 7.3 might have suggested.
7.5 Some More on Habits-Endorsement Expressivism
In the section 7.3 I have argued that justified belief attributions (and justification 
discourse more generally) implicate endorsement of habits of belief-fixation where 
these habits employ and are constrained by epistemic norms. When I suggested this I 
also  hinted  that  the  relation  between  epistemic  habits  and  norms  should  not  be 
assumed that is all that simple and monolithic and promised to return to this point in 
this next section 7.6. This is what I first take up in this section where I add some 
more touches to the proposal.
As I suggested that justified belief attributions express endorsement of habits of 
belief-fixation constrained by certain epistemic norms, I gave ‘the Mary example’ 
where  ‘Mary  justifiedly  believes  that  her  next  pottery  class  will  take  place  this 
weekend’. Mary, recall,  forms this belief because she is in the habit to trust what 
reliable sources of information (like the pottery classes website) say and her habit 
employs  and is  constrained by certain  epistemic  norms about  testimony.  That  is, 
norms  dictating  what  sorts  of  testimonial  sources  of information  are  reliable  and 
what  sources  are  not.  In  this  case,  her  norms  seem to  be  ‘credulist’  as  they are 
relaxed and permissive enough, in the absence of countervailing reasons, to take the 
pottery classes’ website to be a reliable source of information.
But  of  course,  the  rather  simple  ‘Mary example’  should not  convey the false 
impression  that  agents  employ  always  the  same  epistemic  habits  (and  epistemic 
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norms) across all contexts. This might happen in certain cases but surely it doesn’t 
happen always and, perhaps, it doesn’t happen often too. For, intuitively, there are 
plenty  of  cases  where  the  same  agent  in  different  contexts  employs  different 
epistemic  habits.  This  is  sufficiently  obvious  from  the  context-sensitive  way 
justification  assertions  and  attributions  (as  well  as  other  normative  notions  like 
‘good’) are being used in ordinary discourse183. 
In ordinary discourse justification assertions and attributions are being used in 
different contexts with a varying degree of demandingness. What counts as justified 
belief in one context might not count as justified belief in another context, as the 
context swiftly changes and the epistemic norms’ demandingness varies accordingly. 
Intuitively, this fluctuation of the demandingness of the epistemic norms that license 
justified belief happens because our epistemic lives are very complicated and, as a 
result, different contexts and circumstances may be found to pose different epistemic 
demands. 
Here  are  two examples  where  the  demandingness  of  epistemic  norms  in  play 
varies according to the demands of the context.  First,  a philosophy student might 
switch epistemic habits when in the epistemology seminar. So, while in ordinary life 
and outside the epistemology seminar she has the epistemic habit to believe what she 
sees and,  hence,  accepts  that  she justifiably believes  that  has hands,  when in  the 
seminar the epistemic habit changes, epistemic norms are accordingly conceived in 
much more demanding terms and she now resists that this belief is really justified. 
She thinks that mere seeing her hands is not sufficient to really justify the belief that 
she has hands, as a Cartesian evil demon might be deceiving her.
Second, a doctor might switch epistemic habits from case to case and from patient 
to patient relative to what practical stakes his justification assertions might imply. He 
might, for instance, think that he justifiedly believes that in the case of a patient with 
a  harmless  flu  he  should  prescribe  some  antibiotics.  Yet  in  the  case  of  life-
threatening situations he might be reluctant to consider himself as a justified believer 
of what medication should be prescribed. He might be reluctant because any such 
183  As I have already canvassed in section 1.4, it might be noticed that epistemic justification is not 
much used in ordinary discourse as it is more of an academic term. This is I think right but doesn't 
spoil the intended point here because there are many mundane epistemic notions (e.g. well-grounded, 
supported by evidence etc.) that are ordinarily used in the sense of epistemic justification. These 
mundane expressions are equivalent to the more technical notion of epistemic justification. For this 
point see also R.Wedgwood (2009).
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decision possibly will be one of life and death, as a false prescription might result in 
the death of the patient.  Such a life-threatening case might be that of a patient with a 
harmless  flu  but  with  a  record  of  serious  allergy  in  antibiotics.  This  switch  of 
epistemic habits (and epistemic norms) happens because our justification assertions 
and attributions are sensitive to the high or low practical stakes involved184.
However,  not  only the  same  epistemic  agent  may endorse  different  epistemic 
habits in different contexts but also different epistemic agents might have different 
epistemic  habits  in  the  very same contexts.  They might  have  different  epistemic 
habits because they see the same context as posing different epistemic demands. This 
happens because different epistemic agents may have different epistemic goals. As 
William James (1979) famously pointed out, there are different epistemic goals an 
agent may pursue and this affects what one thinks he ought to believe. As James 
claimed, one may value avoiding error over attaining the truth while others might 
value attaining the truth over avoiding error.
These two epistemic goals seem to be in tension as the goal for attaining truth 
calls for more relaxed epistemic norms that would permit a number of false beliefs 
on the condition that we are to attain at least some true beliefs. Instead, the goal of 
avoiding error calls for more demanding epistemic norms that would not permit any 
false beliefs  even if that  would allow the attainment  of a number of true beliefs. 
Accordingly, some agents in certain contexts may raise the demandingness of norms 
for justification because they might have the epistemic goal of avoiding error. Other 
agents in certain contexts may be more lax and lower the demandingness of their 
epistemic norms because they might have the epistemic goal of attaining truth rather 
than avoiding error.
Here is  an  example  where agents  have different  epistemic  habits  in  the same 
context because they entertain different epistemic goals. A religious person may be a 
coherentist with the epistemic habit to take any belief as justified if it coheres with 
his religious background web of beliefs. His religious beliefs are in the centre of his 
web of beliefs where the more certain beliefs (like those of logic and mathematics) 
lie. This agent thinks coherence with the rest of his religious beliefs is sufficient to 
license any belief as justified. Thus, for him the belief that ‘angels and demons exist’ 
184  Such cases of ‘pragmatic encroachment’ are discussed in J.Stanley (2005) and E.Craig (1990).
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is justified because he has the epistemic habit to consider anything licensed by the 
norm of coherence as justified. In this sense, he is an agent with the goal of attaining 
truth rather than avoiding error as he employs more relaxed and permissive epistemic 
norms.  
Instead, a non-religious agent may have the epistemic habit to take any belief as 
justified only if it is licensed by the norm of epistemic duty where one’s epistemic 
duty is to endorse only what is licensed by adequate empirical evidence. He thinks 
that  religious  beliefs  are  not  based on adequate  empirical  evidence  and therefore 
considers  it  as  his  duty  to  take  ‘the  belief  that  angels  and  demons  exist’  as 
unjustified.  It  is  unjustified  because  it  is  not  licensed  by  the  epistemic  norm of 
empirical evidence fixed by the relevant epistemic habit. 
In this sense he is an agent with the goal of avoiding error rather than attaining 
truth  as  he  employs  more  demanding  and  restrictive  epistemic  norms.  Thus,  the 
employment  of  epistemic  habits  is  not  only  sensitive  to  the  different  epistemic 
demands different epistemic contexts might pose but it is also sensitive to the kind of 
epistemic goals the agent has and the way these goals might imply more lax or more 
stringent epistemic norms for justification185.
In  addition,  not  only  different  epistemic  habits  may  be  endorsed  in  different 
contexts but also different  kinds of habits may be endorsed in different contexts by 
epistemic justification assertions and attributions. One obvious species of habits can 
be distinguished on the basis of the strength of the psychological grip of the habit. In 
some  cases  the  habits  endorsed  might  be  deeply-rooted,  the  product  of  rigorous 
internalization  during  childhood  (which  as  everyone  knows  is  a  very  malleable 
period). Such deeply-rooted habits will have a very strong grip on the agent and will 
be very difficult to get rid of them.
 Some of these deeply-rooted habits maybe consciously endorsed by the agent, if 
the agent is sufficiently self-reflective and of a philosophical bent. The agent might 
acknowledge that  he has such a habit  and approve of that  habit.  But it  is  fair  to 
assume that in most  cases deeply-rooted habits are probably unconscious and the 
agent unbeknownst to him forms justified beliefs on their principle. This is probably 
the case because it is hard to keep track of one’s epistemic habits, especially if one is 
185  For some discussion of this point see Craig (1990).
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absorbed in the non-academic concerns of everyday life.  In other cases the agent 
might acknowledge the existence of the habit and refuse to endorse or approve it but 
still be in the grip of the habit186. The habit might have grown so strong and deeply-
rooted that the agent by now cannot control the exercise of this habit. Intuitively, 
deeply-rooted habits are very difficult to get rid of and, theoretically at least, such 
irrationality cases might occur. 
Further, in yet other cases we might have newly-established habits. That is, a habit 
might  have  been  recently  established  and  consciously  or  unconsciously  still  be 
cultivated on behalf of the agent by practice. Reasonably, the grip of such habits on 
the psychology of the agent will be significantly weaker than the grip of the deeply-
rooted habits. In cases of such newly-established habits there might be even instances 
where  the  agent  consciously  motivates  and  cultivates  irrational  habits  for  some 
pragmatic reason. 
Think, for example, of an agent who realizes that he is afraid of heights because 
he  is  a  very  bad  jumper.  On the  face  of  this  realization,  he  might  intentionally 
cultivate an epistemic habit of forming pragmatically justified beliefs that support the 
conviction  that  he  is  a  great  jumper.  He  might  intentionally  cultivate  such  an 
irrational epistemic habit because he foresees that belief in the improvement of his 
jumping ability will mitigate his heights phobia. 
Also,  there  are  inchoate habits  that  are  just  now starting to be consciously or 
unconsciously cultivated and therefore they might initially seem ‘out of (habitual) 
character’. These habits will have a relatively weak grip on the psychology of the 
agent and will be the easiest to get rid of. Such inchoate habits surely exist and this 
might account for the intuition that in some cases we don’t form justified beliefs on 
the  basis  of  an  existent  epistemic  habit  or  even  form justified  beliefs  positively 
against an epistemic habit. In such a case what really happens is that we act or form 
justified  beliefs  on  the  basis  of  a  new inchoate  habit  that  has  just  started  being 
cultivated and is yet a long way from being a typical deeply-rooted habit (or even a 
newly-established habit). In such cases there might be a ‘struggle for ascendancy’ 
between  habits,  as  habits  will  struggle  to  gain  the  primary  grip  on  the  agent’s 
psychology and finally utterly expel the rival habit.
186  Such cases are reminiscent of the irrationality cases H.Frankfurt (1971) has described.
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So far,  on the basis  of the strength of the psychological  grip  of  the habit  we 
distinguished  three  different  kinds  of  habits  that  might  endorse  in  justification 
discourse:  deeply-rooted,  newly-established  and  inchoate  habits.  Yet  another 
interesting  way of distinguishing a species  of epistemic  habits  is  on the basis  of  
amenability to learning. On the basis of this property we may draw the distinction 
between constitutive and acquired epistemic habits187.
 Constitutive  habits  are  ones  that  although  ‘triggered’  by  learning  within  the 
margins  of  a  sociolinguistic  community,  they  do  not  really  seem  amenable  to 
learning. That is, although these habits lie dormant and are triggered to manifestation 
by learning (and other social stimulation), they don’t seem to be revisable according 
to the dictates of various forms of learning. In this sense, once constitutive habits are 
being triggered and cultivated for some time they become deeply-rooted habits. They 
become habits that are extremely difficult, if not impossible to get rid of. 
Such  constitutive  epistemic  habits  paradigmatically  involve  mathematical  and 
logical  justification  (and  perhaps  perceptual  justification  too).  Mathematical  and 
logical justification seem to be paradigmatic examples of regulation by constitutive 
epistemic habits because almost any agent with a proper conceptual development in 
the social context of a linguistic community seems to have non-amenable-to-learning 
and broadly similar mathematical and logical norms188.  
On the one hand, mathematical and logical justified beliefs seem non-amenable to 
learning. For if we try to teach that, let us say, ‘1+1=3’ and that ‘a triangle is four-
sided’ this will be resisted even if the agent tries hard for the opposite. Even primary 
school children, I suppose, if inculcated to believe that ‘1+1=3’ or that ‘a triangle has 
four sides’ at some point will resist these as counter-intuitive. They will count fingers 
and find them two, they will draw triangles and find them three-sided etc. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  relative  general  agreement  about  logical  and 
mathematical norms. Few agents would dare question, for example, that ‘The belief 
that 1+1=2 is justified’, that ‘The belief that a square has four equal sides is justified’ 
or that ‘The belief that necessarily p and not-p is false is justified’. These simply 
strike us as deeply intuitive and, presumably, that is why foundationalists who appeal 
187  I borrow the distinction between constitutive and acquired habits from C.S.Peirce (1991).
188  Feral children or other cases of agents who didn’t have proper conceptual development in the 
social context of a linguistic community, put to one side.
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to rational  intuitions (e.g. L.Bonjour 1998) tend to appeal to maths and logic for 
convenient examples189. 
These features of constitutive epistemic habits might incline people to appeal to 
nativist ideas in order to account for their reality. For instance, someone could wield 
a  Chomskian  ‘poverty  of  stimulus  argument’  for  mathematical  and  logical 
justification. That is, as N.Chomsky (1980) famously argued that the richness and 
complexity of our implicit grammatical knowledge cannot be wholly explained by 
appeal to learning of grammatical rules because this is relatively impoverished, we 
could argue along the same lines for maths and logic. Our richness and complexity of 
mathematical and logical justification and our capacity to constantly generate new 
and diverse mathematical  and logical  justification cannot  be wholly explained by 
appeal  to  learning  and,  therefore,  we  should  postulate  innate  mathematical  and 
logical faculties. 
To be sure,  there  might  be more species  of habits  to  be distinguished but for 
present purposes this much of conceptual digging is I think enough. It is sufficient to 
make  the  intended  point,  namely,  stress  the  complexity  of  epistemic  habits  and 
norms endorsed in epistemic justification discourse. In the next section we quickly 
consider  two  objections  to  habits-endorsment  expressivism:  ‘the  over-
intellectualization objection’ and ‘the situationist challenge’.
7.6 Two Anticipated Objections and Quick Replies
In this  final  section,  I would like to very quickly fend off two objections that 
might have arisen to the minds of some readers. No doubt, these objections are far 
from exhaustive and even for the two ones discussed much more could be said. But I 
think that the quick responses presented here will  help stifle the initial  appeal  of 
these objections. I admit, though, that a more comprehensive and detailed response is 
needed and should come elsewhere for these objections. 
The first one is ‘the over-intellectualization objection’. The habits-endorsement 
expressivist picture of the semantics I have strived to sketch so far, might strike some 
people  as  hopelessly  over-intellectualizing  ordinary  epistemic  practice;  a  charge 
189  Of course, after turning an expert in mathematics or logic an agent might start scrutinizing the 
relevant mathematical and logical norms in play. This is presumably how non-Euclidean geometries 
and non-classical logics have been conceived. But scrutiny come at a level of high expertise and does 
not really affect the point being made here, namely, that these mathematical and logical habits are 
constitutive.
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often  made  against  many  philosophical  theories.  For  to  claim  that  justification 
assertions and attributions express, -among other things like commendation that I 
didn’t touch - this mouthful: endorsement of the habits of belief-fixation in virtue of 
which  S  believes  that  p  where  these  habits  of  belief-fixation  employ  and  are 
constrained by certain  epistemic norms etc.  etc.  seems to  over-intellectualize and 
therefore distort the everyday practice of justification assertions and attributions. 
Yet, this objection is too quick. For no one wants to suggest that ordinary agents 
are really aware of the semantic implications of what they think and say. Indeed, few 
agents are really aware of their epistemic habits and norms. As Kant (2003) would 
have put  it,  this  comes  to the surface in the process of reason’s journey of self-
knowledge.  And  this  journey  of  reason  knowing  itself,  insofar  it  is  relentlessly 
systematic, is an academic philosopher’s job. I conclude therefore that this objection 
misses its mark. We are not in conflict with common epistemic practice, we rather 
relentlessly analyse common epistemic practice and arrive to such conclusions that 
seem too far from ordinary epistemic experience. But this does nothing to vitiate our 
proposal. 
A second objection comes from the so-called situationist challenge against virtue 
theories. Recently, a number of philosophers have drawn empirical data from social 
psychology experiments in order to argue that the central virtue-theoretic notion of 
character  is  illusory  (both  for  philosophers  and  laymen)190.  These  experiments, 
predominantly S.Milgram’s (1974) famous obedience experiments, are taken to show 
that in reality the notion of character does not exist. It does not exist because in these 
experiments the agents’  action is not guided by their  character  and their  relevant 
virtues and traits but by the situational context they are found in. 
These philosophers insist that although of course we have and use the concept of 
character in philosophical and everyday discourses, the concept has no referent and it 
is of the same order as unicorns and Santa Claus are. If true, it is obvious what dire 
implications this view has for approaches like habits-endorsement expressivism that 
rely on the virtue-theoretic notion of character. If true, such approaches are based on 
an illusion about human psychology.
 However,  things  are  not  all  that  bleak  for  such  approaches  because  the 
190  See for example G.Harman (1999).
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situationist  challenge  seems to  get  things wrongly.  Intuitively,  these philosophers 
draw  the  wrong  conclusion  from  the  experimental  data  they  adduce.  The 
experimental data they cite simply shows at least some agents’ actions to be guided 
by  the  situational  context  they  are  being  found  in.  From this,  they  jump  to  the 
conclusion that character does not really exist, as what guides the conduct of agents 
is not character but simply the situational context they are found in. 
Yet, these experimental results do not yield the conclusion that these philosophers 
are eager to draw, namely, that character is mere fiction and does not exist. First of 
all, if seen from the right angle these experimental results seem to corroborate rather 
than  refute  what  virtue-theoretic  approaches  predict  about  human  action  and 
psychology.  For  virtue-theoretic  approaches  suggest  that  is  very  difficult  for 
someone  to  have  a  really  virtuous  character  and,  therefore,  the  character 
inconsistencies found in these experiments are to be expected by virtue theory’s own 
lights.  Besides,  that  is  why we think that  being a  virtuous  agent  is  an important 
achievement to some important extent creditable to the agent himself. It is because 
few can come to be really virtuous. 
Second, the notion of character is consistent with character inconsistencies. It is 
only the notion of virtuous character that is not. Many people have weak characters, 
as we say,  but this doesn’t mean that they don’t have a character. This is exactly 
what we mean in ordinary discourse when we talk about weak characters or weak-
willed persons. They are persons that do not seem to have a consistent behaviour, as 
their conduct seems to be fluctuating, prone to be drifted away by the current of the 
situational  context  they  might  find  themselves  in.  Sometimes  they  are  just  other 
times unjust, sometimes patient other times impatient, sometimes self-restraint other 
unrestrained and so on. They might exhibit brave behaviour in some circumstances 
and cowardice in others. The might exhibit self-restraint in relation to chocolate but 
not to red wine etc. 
Third, that  the situationist  challenge goes too far is obvious from the fact that 
character  is  an  indispensable  notion  deeply  interwoven  in  folk-psychology  and 
reasons-explanations.  Both in  philosophical  and ordinary discourse,  in  explaining 
intentional action or belief-fixation we do not merely appeal to reasons for action or 
reasons  for  belief.  We  also  quite  often  appeal  to  the  character  of  the  agent  in 
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question.  If,  for example,  I know that Mike is a person who is committed to the 
pursuit  of argument  wherever  it  leads then I can predict  that  he will  endorse the 
conclusion of a compelling argument. Again, if I know that Matthew is a person who 
highly values human life, then I can predict that he will save a boy from drowning in 
a shallow pond despite the muddied clothes. 
This  brief  and,  admittedly,  inadequate  to  do  full  justice  to  these  (and  other) 
objections  section  marks  the  end  of  the  discussion.  Let  us,  finally,  turn  to  the 
conclusion and summary of the argument.
7.7 Conclusion and Summary of the Argument
I  have  argued  for  a  novel  version  of  norm-expressivism  dubbed  ‘habits-
endorsement  expressivism’.  The  starting  point  of  my  argumentation  for  habits-
endorsement  expressivism  was  Gibbard’s  (2003,  2008)  theory  of  plan-reliance 
expressivism for knowledge discourse. I introduced the theory, extended it to cover 
the epistemic justifcation discourse and then identified some of its problems. As I 
have  argued,  plan-reliance  expressivism  cannot  account  for  the  nonvoluntarism 
intuition while it also runs into direct counterexamples.
 As a response to these discontents, I introduced habits-endorsement expressivism 
by means of analysing what we seem to implicate in discursive contexts of justified 
belief  attribution.  Afterwards, I went on to argue that habits-endorsement is more 
explanatory  powerful  from  plan-reliance  expressivism  because  it  can  keep  the 
attractions of both norm-expressivism and plan-reliance expressivism while at the 
same time outflank the identified problems of plan-reliance expressivism.  Next, I 
added some more touches on my initial sketch of habits-endorsement expressivism 
and finally anticipated two quick objections to habits-endorsement expressivism and 
tried  to  provide  two  quick  responses  meant  to  stifle  the  initial  appeal  of  these 
objections.  These objections  were ‘the over-intellectualization  objection’  and ‘the 
situationist challenge’. 
Yet, this is not the end of the road. For even if my version of expressivism evades 
these objections, there are still other important semantic challenges (the Frege-Geach 
problem, the truth problem etc.) to face that go straight to the heart of the semantic 
programme  of  expressivism.  These  semantic  challenges  suggest  that  expressivist 
theories cannot be considered as full-blown semantic theories unless they meet these 
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challenges successfully. If they don’t manage to meet these semantic challenges, then 
all  expressivist  theories  eventuallly  amount  to  are  pragmatic  theories.  That  is, 
theories of the mental content expressed in various contexts by speakers but not of 
linguistic content per se.
 I don’t have much time to discuss these notorious semantic challenges at any 
depth, but as neglecting these important challenges to expressivism might give the 
wrong  impression  to  readers,  namely,  that  I  don’t  take  the  challenges  seriously 
enough or, even worse, that I ignore the challenges the Epilogue is a quick note to 
these semantic challenges.
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Epilogue The Semantic Problems of Normative 
Expressivism: A Short Note
In  the  last  chapter  7  we  went  some  way  to  argue  for  a  habits-endorsement 
expressivist  solution  to  ‘the  epistemic  justification  puzzle’.  We  argued  for  this 
solution  by  means  of  claiming  that  it  can  both  capture  the  attractions  of  norm-
expressivism and plan-reliance expressivism while outflank the problems of plan-
reliance expressivism. 
But  as  it  is  common  wisdom,  in  philosophy,  rarely  if  ever  philosophical 
explorations have an all-perfect ending. As we have already hinted in the concluding 
paragraphs of the Ch.7, normative expressivist approaches face semantic challenges 
that threaten to strangle the expressivist semantic programme from its infancy. That 
is,  semantic  challenges  that  if  expressivism is  to  establish  itself  as  a  full-blown 
semantic theory, these challenges should be addressed. This last short chapter is a 
note to these semantic challenges. Let us turn to this.
Semantic  orthodoxy  has  it  that  semantic  theories  are  referential  and  truth-
conditional. They explain the meaning of sentences in terms of linguistic content and 
what that purports to refer to. And they are referential and truth-conditional for a 
very good reason. The reason is that truth-conditional semantics can easily account 
for  the  logical  properties  of  complex  sentences  embedded  in  unasserted  truth-
functional contexts, as the meaning of sentences is ‘fixed’ by the truth-conditions of 
the sentence. The meaning of the sentences is determined by their truth-conditions 
and truth-conditions do not allow any shift  of meaning that would render a valid 
inference invalid due to a fallacy of equivocation. That is, a fallacy where an invalid 
inference is drawn on the basis of using the same words with different meanings 
from one premise to another. 
Here  is  an  example  of  a  fallacious  modus  ponens  inference  because  of 
equivocation. 
P1: ‘Feathers are light’ 
P2: ‘If something is light, then it is not dark’ 
C: ‘Feathers are not dark’. 
This equivocation fallacy plays on the two different meanings of ‘light’ employed 
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in P1 and P2, namely, ‘light’ in the sense of not heavy and ‘light’ in the sense of 
having bright colour. Truth-conditional semantics rule out such occurrences because 
they do not allow for any such shift of meaning from premise to premise. As they 
‘fix’ the meaning of sentences with truth-conditions they rule out the possibility of 
any shift of meaning that would have led to a fallacy of equivocation.
For example, take this modus ponens: 
P1:‘Heliocentricism is justified’
P2 : ‘If heliocentricism is justified, then you should instruct your little brother to 
believe it’
C: ‘You should instruct your little brother to believe it’ 
This is a valid inference and truth-conditional semantics can easily explain why. 
Truth-conditions  fix  the  meaning  of  the  sentences  and  this  guarantees  that  the 
meaning of P1 will remain the same in the antecedent of P2 and the conclusion will 
follow.  Sameness  of meaning guarantees  truth-preservation  and truth-preservation 
forces the valid conclusion. That is, if P1 is true and P2 is true, then C must be true191. 
And all  this  happens in a thoroughly de-psychologized way,  as all  hinges on the 
impersonal  linguistic  content  and  nothing  on  the  personal  mental  content  of  a 
speaker.
However,  in  contrast  to  truth-conditional  theories  of  semantics,  expressivist 
theories are psychologistic theories of semantics. They are theories that analyse the 
meaning of sentences not in terms of linguistic content and reference/truth-conditions 
but  in  terms  of  the  mental  content  expressed  by  speakers.  This  seems  to  make 
expressivism prima facie inconsistent with a theory of semantics, which, as Frege 
(1997)  insisted,  it  has  to  be  de-pshychologized.  For,  semantics  ought  to  be  de-
psychologised and expressivism is in essence a psychologistic theory of meaning.
This is the real point behind P.Geach’s (1972) notorious  Frege point, now very 
well known as ‘the Frege-Geach Problem’ (or ‘the embedding problem’). The Frege-
Geach problem suggests  that  expressivist  theories  cannot  establish  themselves  as 
full-blown semantic theories because they can’t account for the logical properties of 
complex sentences embedded in unasserted truth-functional contexts, as any theory 
191  As L.Caroll (2008) has made clear in his famous ‘What the Turtoise said to Achilles’ we can start 
an infinite regress for justifying our valid inferences. I take the standard view here and ignore such ‘ 
infinite regress’ complications.
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of semantics ought to do. Expressivism cannot account for the logical properties of 
normative discourse because, as a psychologistic theory of meaning,  it  allows for 
shift of meaning from sentence to sentence and this means that valid conclusions 
won’t  follow in virtue  of  a  fallacy  of  equivocation.  If  that  is  the  case,  then  our 
analysis  of  justification  assertions  and  attributions  is  not  adequate  for  a  natural 
language  where  assertions  and  attributions  can  be  found  embedded  in  logically 
complex truth-functional contexts. Let me elaborate.
Expressivism explains meaning in terms of mental content (or ‘states of mind’). 
To say that ‘murder is wrong’ or that ‘p is justified’ is to express a state of mind. 
What exactly is this state of mind depends on the contours of the expressivist theory 
one has. Yet, we also use normative language in truth-functional, unasserted contexts 
like in conditionals,  disjunctions,  negations etc.  The problem, however,  is that  in 
such ‘unasserted contexts’ we might not express the noncognitive attitude we express 
in contexts of simple assertion. This suggests that in such cases we are using the 
sentences  with  different  meaning  from one  premise  to  another  and  this  thwarts 
sameness  of  meaning  that  is  necessary  for  validity.  The  upshot  is  that  valid 
inferences are rendered invalid.
For example, take this epistemic disjunctive syllogism: 
P1: ‘Geocentricism is not justified.’
P2: ‘Either heliocentricism is justified or geocentricism is justified’.
C: ‘Therefore, heliocentricism is justified.’ 
This is a valid argument,  if  anything is, and the problem is that if we assume 
expressivism as our semantic theory then it seems that there will be cases where the 
valid conclusion won’t follow because the speaker might express different meaning 
in P1 from the second disjunct in P2. P1 is an assertion and according to, say, norm-
expressivism, we express an attitude of endorsement for the epistemic norms that 
rule out this belief. P2, though, it is not an assertion and in this case it seems wide 
open that a speaker might utter the sentence without expressing any attitude of norm-
endorsement for the meaning of the second conjunct. As Frege (1997) would have 
said, we can utter P2 without expressing any ‘assertoric force’. In such an event, we 
would have a fallacy of equivocation. 
Now, if expressivism cannot provide a response to the Frege-Geach problem and 
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provide semantics for natural  languages that can account for validity (and overall 
logical properties) then expressivism is doomed. It is doomed because a theory that 
can account only for atomic normative sentences like assertions and attributions but 
not for logically complex sentences cannot model the workings of natural languages 
(which, obviously, are logically complex). For, any semantic theory must be able to 
account for things like ‘if p then q; p; therefore q’ ‘p; therefore ¬¬p’ and an infinite 
number of other logically complex inferences.
In the face of the Frege point, expressivists have tried a number of ways to resolve 
the Frege-Geach problem. Some have tried to build a ‘logic of attitudes’, others have 
incorporated  a belief  component  into the mental  state  expressed meant  to  do the 
necessary semantic work etc192. Reasonably, we cannot even begin to introduce these 
approaches here or moreover to examine whether they work or not. The thesis has 
proceeded on the hopeful assumption that somehow these problems can be resolved 
and  that,  if  such  a  solution  is  discovered,  habits-endorsement  expressivism  can 
follow such a solution.
But  even  with  solving  the  Frege-Geach  problem  this  won’t  mean  that 
expressivists  are done with their  problems with logic.  This  is  an important  point 
M.Schroeder (2008) has drawn. M.Schroeder (2008) has argued himself for a certain 
solution to the Frege-Geach problem but also pointed out that for expressivism to 
establish itself as a full-blown semantic theory is not enough to just solve the Frege-
Geach problem. The reason is that normative sentences do not just appear embedded 
in  unasserted truth-functional  contexts  with other  normative  sentences.  They also 
appear in such contexts with ordinary descriptive sentences like ‘grass is green’. We 
can have, for instance, the sentence ‘ Either grass is green or Heliocentricism is not 
justified’. 
This means that expressivists need to explain the workings of natural languages in 
all sorts of discourse and not just the normative discourses. They need to explain how 
language ought to work in its entire field of application, namely, normative, ordinary 
descriptive and their  combination.  This means that for normative expressivism to 
192  Logic  of  attitudes  approaches  have  been  suggested  by  S.Blackburn  (1984,  1993,  1998)  and 
A.Gibbard (1990, 2003). M.Ridge (2006) has proposed that expressivim can solve the problem if it 
goes  ‘ecumenical’,  that  is,  incorporate  a  belief  into  the  content  of  what  is  being  expressed. 
M.Chrisman (2010) has argued that  inferentialism could solve the problem and that  this makes it 
superior to expressivism.
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work it must expand to cover the workings of natural language in general. It must 
offer  an  expressivist  picture  of  language  tout  court.  This  is  a  big  task  and  if 
expressivism can accomplish such a task,  then,  indeed,  we can a la  Kant talk  of 
expressivism  as  effecting  a  ‘Copernican  revolution’  in  philosophy.  But  whether 
expressivism can meet this semantic challenge is an open question for conceptual 
exploration. Our own journey of conceptual exploration, however, ends here.
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